C.R.S. v. M.L. (In re K.R.S.)

1

2024 UT App 165

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF K.R.S., A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

C.R.S., Appellant, v. M.L. AND G.L., Appellees.

No. 20230712-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah

November 15, 2024

Sixth District Court, Manti Department The Honorable Marvin D Bagley No. 222600005

Jason B. Richards and Alexandra Mareschal, Attorneys for Appellant

Mark R. Nelson and Jessica Griffin Anderson, Attorneys for Appellees

Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which Judges Michele M. Christiansen Forster and Amy J. Oliver concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 Orders terminating a parent's rights are-when entered by a juvenile court-generally held to be immediately appealable as of right. The question presented in this case is whether parental termination orders are immediately appealable as of right when they are entered by a district court in the context of an adoption proceeding, even if the court has not yet disposed of the underlying adoption petition. We hold that they are not, and that we therefore do not have jurisdiction-at this time and in this procedural posture-to consider the merits of C.R.S.'s (Father) appellate challenge to the district court's order terminating his parental rights. Accordingly, we dismiss Father's appeal.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father is the biological father of K.R.S. (Child), who was born in January 2019. For a time, Father cohabited with Child's mother, M.L. (Mother), but they never married; in October 2019, Mother married G.L. (Stepfather). Child has resided with Mother since birth, and with Mother and Stepfather since their marriage.

¶3 In 2021, Father filed a paternity action, and he eventually obtained a court order establishing himself as Child's father. Under the terms of the ensuing decree of paternity Mother was awarded "sole legal custody" and "sole physical custody" of Child, and Father was awarded "less than statutory minimum supervised parent time." However, Father apparently did not fully exercise his parent-time rights; indeed, the district court in this case found that "Child has never been alone with" Father and that Father "made little to no effort to see or to establish a relationship with [Child], seeing [Child] in person only when his family members . . . requested a visit and via a rare video call."

¶4 In November 2022, Stepfather filed a petition for adoption in district court, asking for an order "establishing between" himself and Child "the legal relationships of parent and child." In his petition, Stepfather alleged that he had developed a "strong relationship" with Child and had become a father figure to him. Based on these facts and others, Stepfather asserted that it was in Child's best interest for Stepfather to adopt him. Notice of the pending adoption proceeding was served on Father, who responded by asking for leave to intervene in the proceeding. Stepfather did not oppose Father's request, and the court granted it, thus making Father a party to the adoption proceeding.

¶5 Meanwhile, Stepfather and Mother (collectively, Petitioners) filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights. They filed this petition in district court in the already-pending adoption action, and not as a separate proceeding. In their termination petition, Petitioners asserted that several statutory grounds existed to justify termination of Father's rights, including abandonment neglect and abuse, unfitness, and token efforts. In addition, they asserted that it was in Child's best interest to have Father's parental rights terminated.

¶6 At the first hearing after the filing of the termination petition, the court found Father to be indigent, and the court later appointed an attorney from the local public defender's office to represent him. That attorney (Counsel) filed a document entitled "General Denial," which was apparently intended to function as an answer to the termination petition. At a hearing in March 2023, the court set a trial date for July 2023; Father confirmed, on the record, that the date worked for him. Father was also present at another hearing in April 2023; at that hearing, the court scheduled a final pretrial conference to occur on June 7.

¶7 At the June 7 hearing, Counsel appeared, but Father did not. Counsel asked to "withdraw as counsel" in the case because Father had "not [been] engaging with" Counsel. In particular, Counsel reported that he had been sending Father emails-which Counsel believed to be "an effective workable communication path" because he had communicated that way with Father in the past-and that Father had been quite sporadic in responding. In one of the responses Father did send, he indicated to Counsel that he had "hired another attorney," and Counsel reported that, since that email, Father had not answered any of his messages. Counsel lamented that he could "do no good for" Father if Father "does not work with" Counsel.

¶8 After considering Counsel's request, the court scheduled another pretrial conference in two weeks, and it ordered Counsel

to send Father an email "telling [Father] he ha[d] to be" at the hearing in two weeks or else "he risk[ed] losing the case." The court also instructed its clerk to send independent notice of the hearing to Father, including a warning that, if Father "[did] not show up in person" at the hearing, "he risk[ed] having default entered against him." The clerk did indeed send such a notice. And so did Counsel-his email to Father gave the date and time of the hearing and stated, "If you do not appear IN PERSON [at the hearing] the judge may ENTER DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU." Father responded to Counsel's email by asking "when is court," and Counsel again provided the date and time.

¶9 At the hearing two weeks later, Father did not appear. Counsel renewed his motion to withdraw. After hearing argument from both sides, the court granted Counsel's motion. In addition, it found that Father either knew about the hearing or was "intentionally preventing himself from knowing," and that he nevertheless chose not to attend. The court stated that, as a consequence, it was "going to enter default" against Father.

¶10 In the ensuing weeks, Petitioners submitted a proposed order of termination, accompanied by additional documentation, including an affidavit from Mother setting forth facts supporting the request. Father was served with a copy of these documents. Eventually, after Father did not appear or object, the district court entered an order of termination, including findings of fact and conclusions of law.

¶11 In the order, the court found that Child had "never been alone with" Father, that Father had "gone months at a time without contact with" Child, and that Father had "made little to no effort to see or to establish a relationship with Child." The court also found that Father had "made little effort to financially support" Child. In addition, the court recited Father's "extensive criminal record," his "history of habitual and excessive drug and alcohol use," and his "history of violent and erratic behavior." Based on these findings, the court concluded that several statutory grounds for termination were present, including abandonment, neglect, and unfitness, as well as the fact that Father had "made only token efforts to avoid being an unfit parent." Finally, the court concluded that it was strictly necessary and in Child's best interest for Father's rights to be terminated.

¶12 This order, however, resolved only the petition for termination of Father's rights; it did not purport to resolve, and did not resolve, the underlying petition for adoption that Stepfather had filed to open the case.^[1]

¶13 A couple of weeks after the court issued its order, Father filed a pro se notice of appeal, stating his intention to "appeal the decision of the court" terminating his rights. He did not ask the district court, pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to certify the challenged order as final. And he has not asked us, pursuant to rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for permission to mount an interlocutory appeal.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶14 In his appeal, Father attempts to challenge the propriety of the district court's order terminating his parental rights. He raises both procedural and substantive objections to the order. But before we engage with the merits of Father's challenges, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. Because we conclude that we do not, the jurisdictional issue is the only one we address in this opinion. "Whether this court has jurisdiction over an appeal is a question of law that we review for correctness." TKS Co-Pack Mfg., LLC v. Wilson, 2024 UT App 87, ¶ 32, 552 P.3d 258 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

¶15 The rules governing a party's ability to appeal a district court's order are relatively strict. "As a general rule, an appellate court does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal [from a district court order] unless the appeal is taken from a final order or judgment that ends the controversy between the litigants." Copper Hills Custom Homes, LLC v. Countrywide Bank, FSB, 2018 UT 56 ¶ 10, 428 P.3d 1133 (quotation simplified). This principle is often called the "final judgment rule," id. (quotation simplified), and it mandates that, unless an exception applies, parties may only "appeal a final order or judgment," see Utah R. App. P. 3(a)(1), that "adjudicates all claims and the rights and liabilities of all parties," see Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a); see also In re Estate of Heater, 2021 UT 66, ¶ 13, 498 P.3d 883 ("For an appellate court to have jurisdiction, there must be no claims pending below." (quotation simplified)); Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50 ¶ 10, 5 P.3d 649 ("To be final, ...