C.R. v. M.T.

1

C.R., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. M.T., Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-47-22

Supreme Court of New Jersey

April 22, 2024

Argued October 24, 2023

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.

Leah A. Vassallo argued the cause for appellant (Kennedy &amp Vassallo, attorneys; Leah A. Vassallo, on the brief).

Cheryl Turk Waraas argued the cause for respondent (South Jersey Legal Services, attorneys; Kenneth M. Goldman, Andrew Vazquez-Schroedinger, Douglas E. Gershuny, on the briefs; and Lindsey Eveland, law student, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21-3(b), on the briefs).

CJ Griffin argued the cause for amicus curiae Partners for Women and Justice (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, on the brief).

Mary M. McManus-Smith argued the cause for amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey (Legal Services of New Jersey attorneys; Mary M. McManus-Smith, Shoshana Gross, Monica Gural, and Dawn Miller, on the brief).

WAINER APTER, J., writing for the Court.

In this appeal, the Court considers the showing required to establish "the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim" pursuant to N.J.S.A 2C:14-16(a)(2) in order to obtain a final protective order under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA).

Plaintiff "Clara" testified that, in June 2018, she was sexually assaulted by defendant "Martin." Clara applied for a temporary protective order (TPO), and then a final protective order (FPO), under SASPA. After hearing testimony, the trial court made explicit findings under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(1) and (2). The court found that (1) Clara had been "subjected to nonconsensual sexual contact within the meaning of SASPA" because her "extreme voluntary intoxication" made it impossible for her to consent to sexual contact; and (2) there was a possibility of future risk to Clara's safety or well-being because Martin had been subjected to legal fees defending against the SASPA FPO and "may now harbor a grudge against [Clara] which would probably not have occurred but for these proceedings." The court therefore issued an FPO directing Martin to have no contact with Clara.

The Appellate Division reversed on the basis of the test the trial court had used to assess consent under N.J.S.A 2C:14-16(a)(1). 461 N.J.Super. 341, 350-51 (App. Div. 2019). The Court reversed, holding that "the affirmative consent standard . . . is the correct standard to be applied in determining whether sexual activity" was consensual under SASPA. 248 N.J. 428, 431, 445 (2021). The Court noted that the trial court on remand could expand upon its abbreviated discussion of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2). Id. at 448.

On remand, Clara testified that she continued, more than three years later, to be intensely traumatized by the sexual assault. Martin did not testify, electing to rely on his testimony from the initial hearing. The court found Clara's testimony from the first and second hearings "credible and believable" and Martin's testimony from the first hearing "not credible" and "not truthful." On the first factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(1), the court therefore held that consent to sexual contact "was not affirmatively and freely given." Turning to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2), the court noted that "the statute only requires a possibility, as opposed to a probability." The court found "a significant risk to [Clara's] psychological well-being should this order not remain in effect" and ordered the FPO previously issued to remain in effect.

The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that "plaintiff satisfied her burden of demonstrating a predicate act as defined under" N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(1) and that "there exists a possibility of future risk to her safety or well-being as required by" the ordinary terms of -16(a)(2). The Court granted certification limited to the interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2). 254 N.J. 183 (2023).

HELD: The plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2) creates a standard that is permissive and easily satisfied. Here, plaintiff testified that a sexual assault "destroyed" her, she was intensely traumatized, and she was "terrified" for her safety. The family court found her testimony credible. Based on that testimony, the court held plaintiff had demonstrated a "possibility of future risk" to her "safety or well-being." The Court affirms.

1. "Any person alleging to be a victim of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct," who is not eligible for a restraining order as a "victim of domestic violence" under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (PDVA) may apply for a protective order under SASPA. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-14(a)(1), -16. The standard for granting a SASPA protective order differs depending on whether the applicant seeks a temporary or final order. Importantly, an FPO does not require a showing that it is "necessary to protect the safety and well-being" of the victim like a TPO does, see N.J.S.A. 2C:14-15(a); rather, an FPO requires only the "possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim," N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2). (pp. 14-18)

2. The permissive standards for a SASPA TPO and a PDVA temporary restraining order (TRO) are nearly identical, as are the procedures for seeking a PDVA final restraining order (FRO) and a SASPA FPO. Notably, both SASPA FPOs and PDVA FROs require consideration of a list of non-exhaustive factors, but SASPA lists only two such factors -- "(1) the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness . . .; and (2) the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim," N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a) -- whereas the PDVA lists six, see N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a). The Legislature could have duplicated the second factor for a PDVA FRO -- "[t]he existence of immediate danger to person or property," N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(2) -- in SASPA, but it did not. In addition, the consequences to a defendant of a PDVA FRO are drastically different from the consequences to a respondent of a SASPA FPO. (pp. 18-22) 3. Applying ordinary definitions of the terms used in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2), the statute's plain language requires a court to consider whether there is a chance that a survivor may be exposed to physical danger, risk, or injury, or may be exposed to something emotionally unwelcome or unpleasant that could make the survivor feel uncomfortable, unhealthy, or unhappy. Because the language of factor two is centered on the safety or well-being of the victim-survivor, a survivor's own testimony regarding possible future risks to their safety or emotional well-being can suffice. The Court's reading of the plain text of factor two as creating a lenient and easy-to-satisfy standard is reinforced by context: the "possibility of future risk" required for a SASPA FPO is less demanding than the "necessary" protection required for a SASPA TPO or the "immediate danger" required for a PDVA FRO. Applying that standard, the Court defers to the trial court's factual findings because they are supported by substantial evidence and finds no error in the court's legal conclusion. (pp. 22-26)

4. The Court explains why it is not persuaded by Martin's claims of error, why it disagrees with the concurrence's view of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(e) and (f), and why it declines to adopt either the six PDVA factors or the standard established for PDVA FROs for use in the SASPA context. Finally, the Court explains that its discussion of Clara's testimony is not intended to imply that such evidence of psychological symptoms or treatment is necessary to satisfy N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2). (pp. 26-33)

AFFIRMED.

JUSTICE FASCIALE, concurring, disagrees that a SASPA FPO requires victims to speculate about the "possibility of future risk to [their] safety or well-being." In Justice Fasciale's view, once a victim proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a respondent committed a predicate act of "nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct," N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(1), the victim is automatically entitled to an FPO prohibiting the respondent from contacting the victim and committing further predicate acts, see N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(e). Justice Fasciale regards the "possibility" of what may or may not happen in the future, see N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2), as a factor to consider when fashioning additional relief in the FPO under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(f) rather than an element of proof that a victim must establish to obtain an FPO.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, PIERRE-LOUIS, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE WAINER APTER's opinion. JUSTICE FASCIALE filed a concurrence.

OPINION

WAINER APTER JUSTICE

This case, now before us for the second time, concerns the requirements for a final protective order under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA), N.J.S.A 2C:14-13 to -21 (2023).^[1] SASPA directs that in determining whether to issue a final protective order, "the court shall consider but not be limited to the following factors: (1) the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual contact [or] sexual penetration . . . against the alleged victim; and (2) the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim." N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a).^[2] We hold that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2) creates a standard that is permissive and easily satisfied. Here, plaintiff testified that a sexual assault "destroyed" her, she was intensely traumatized, and she was "terrified" for her safety. The family court found her testimony credible. Based on that testimony, the court held plaintiff had demonstrated a "possibility of future risk" to her "safety or...