C.R. v. M.T.

313 A.3d 24

257 N.J. 126

C.R., Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.M.T., Defendant-Appellant.

A-47 September Term 2022

087887

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued October 24, 2023

Decided April 22, 2024

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.

Leah A. Vassallo argued the cause for appellant (Kennedy & Vassallo, attorneys; Leah A. Vassallo, Vineland, on the brief).

Cheryl Turk Waraas argued the cause for respondent (South Jersey Legal Services, attorneys; Kenneth M. Goldman, Atlantic City, Andrew Vazquez-Schroedinger, Douglas E. Gershuny, on the briefs; and Lindsey Eveland, law student, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21-3(b), on the briefs).

CJ Griffin argued the cause for amicus curiae Partners for Women and Justice (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, on the brief).

Mary M. McManus-Smith argued the cause for amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey (Legal Services of New Jersey, attorneys; Mary M. McManus-Smith, Shoshana Gross, Monica Gural, and Dawn Miller, on the brief).

JUSTICE WAINER APTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

₁₃₂This case, now before us for the second time, concerns the requirements for a final protective order under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to -21 (2023).¹ SASPA directs that in determining whether to issue a final protective order, "the court shall consider but not be limited to the following factors: (1) the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual contact [or] sexual penetration … against the alleged victim; and (2) the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim." N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a).²

We hold that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2) creates a standard that is permissive and easily satisfied. Here, plaintiff testified that a sexual assault "destroyed" her, she was intensely traumatized, and she was "terrified" for her safety. The family court found her testimony credible. Based on that testimony, the court held plaintiff had demonstrated a "possibility of future risk" to her "safety or well-being." We affirm.

₁₃₃I.

A.

We rely on the comprehensive discussion of the facts and procedural history set forth in our first opinion in this case, C.R, v. M.T. (C.R. I), 248 N.J. 428, 250 A.3d 830 (2021). We add here only those details necessary to understand the question presented and events that occurred after our remand in C.R. I.

On the evening of June 26, 2018, Clara went out to two bars with her then-bestfriend Sylvia.³ Clara testified that later that night, she was sexually assaulted by Martin, Sylvia’s cousin, on the floor of Martin’s garage. Martin testified that the sexual penetration was consensual. Clara testified that it was not. Martin never contacted or attempted to contact Clara after the incident.

Clara applied for a temporary protective order (TPO), and then a final protective order (FPO), under SASPA. After hearing testimony from Clara, Martin, and Sylvia, the trial court made explicit findings under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(1) and (2).⁴ The court found that (1) Clara had been "subjected to nonconsensual sexual contact within the meaning of SASPA" because her "extreme voluntary intoxication" made it impossible for her to consent to sexual contact; and (2) there was a possibility of future risk to Clara’s safety or well-being because Martin had been subjected to legal fees defending against the SASPA FPO and "may now harbor a grudge against [Clara] which would probably not have occurred but for these proceedings." The court therefore issued an FPO directing Martin to have no contact with Clara.

Martin appealed. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to apply the "prostration of faculties" test to determine whether Clara had been sufficiently intoxicated ₁₃₄to be incapable of consenting to sexual activity under N.J.S.A. 2C;14-16(a)(1). C.R. v. M.T., 461 N.J. Super. 341, 350-51, 221 A.3d 154 (App. Div. 2010).

We granted Clara's petition for certification, 241 N.J. 329, 228 A.3d 214 (2020), and reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, C.R. I, 248 N.J. at 481, 259 A.3d 830, Rather than the "prostration of faculties" test, we held that "the affirmative consent standard articulated in" State in Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 (1092), "is the correct standard to be applied in determining whether sexual activity" was consensual under SASPA. C.R. I, 248 N.J. at 445, 259 A.3d 830. Under M.T.S., "any act of sexual penetration engaged in by the defendant without the affirmative and freely-given permission of the victim to the specific act of penetration constitutes the offense of sexual assault." 129 N.J. at 444, 609 A.2d 1266. We thus remanded to the trial court "for reconsideration of … whether the sexual activity was consensual or nonconsensual" under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(1), "utilizing the M.T.S. affirmative consent standard." C.R.I, 248 N.J. at 447, 259 A.3d 830.

Although the Appellate Division in C.R.I had not addressed N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2), the possibility of future risk to Clara’s safety or well-being, see 461 N.J. Super. 341, 221 A.3d 154, we discussed it briefly, noting that it would be relevant to the trial court’s reconsideration of the FPO on remand. 248 N.J. at 447-48, 259 A.3d 830. Recounting the trial court’s reasoning, discussed above, that Martin had "through this process been subjected to legal fees and may now harbor a grudge against [Clara] which would probably not have occurred but for these proceedings," we stated:

It cannot be that simply filing for a protective order is sufficient to create "the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim" noted in prong two. If that were so, prong two would be met in every single SASPA case. That could not have been the Legislature’s intention.

Here, the factual findings that the trial court put on the record appear to counter [Clara]’s establishing prong two of SASPA, and the trial court relied on the simple fact that [Clara] had sought a restraining order to conclude that "it is more likely than not that a final restraining order is appropriate" in this case. We remand so ₁₃₅that the trial court may expand upon its abbreviated discussion of prong two and make additional findings of fact that support a determination either that the prong has been satisfied, or not, in deciding whether to issue the final restraining order. [Id. at 448, 259 A.3d 830.]

B.

On remand before a different judge, Clara testified that she continued, more than three years later, to be intensely traumatized by the sexual assault.

Q. So since this time and after this event occurred [in 2018], how has been your well-being? How have you dealt with this issue?

A. I am affected by what happened every day. I’ve seen multiple therapists and I lay in bed at night and I can’t sleep because I still feel like I’m in the garage sometimes.

I have terrible intimacy issues. I can’t date because I don’t trust anyone. I don’t -- I have a hard time making friends because I don’t trust my friends anymore. I -- it destroyed me, honestly.

Like, I've lost my sense of self-worth. I lost everything. I feel like -- some days, I feel like I’ll never not be in that garage, honestly. Like, I wonder how I can ever not be traumatized by this and I don’t think that’s a possibility.

Q. Besides the well-being that you’ve just explained, if this were (inaudible -- recording issue), do you fear for your safety and the possibility of harm from this Defendant?

A. I do. I really, I do. I think the only reason I have any sort of peace of mind is because I know I have this temporary right now and I’m so terrified that if I didn’t have it, he would be angry that I’ve spent three years just asking for this.

Just asking for a sense of security. I think he would definitely harass me for challenging it. I feel like every time - I can’t even begin to explain the, like, terror that I feel every day when I am unsure of my surroundings.

I can’t even -- I have a hard time even going shopping by myself because what if something happens? How will I defend myself? And if there’s no protective order, then he has no consequences.

Martin did not testify, electing to rely on his testimony from the initial hearing.

The court found Clara’s testimony from the first and second hearings "credible and believable" and Martin’s testimony from the first hearing "not credible" and "not truthful." On the first factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(1), the court therefore held that consent to sexual contact "was not affirmatively and freely given."

₁₃₆Turning to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2), the court noted that "the statute only requires a possibility, as opposed to a probability, of future risk to the safety or wellbeing of the alleged Victim. The plain meaning of the word ‘possible’ subsumes the notion that an event may or may not occur." Acknowledging that Martin had not attempted to contact Clara in the more than three years since the incident, the court found that did "not foreclose the possibility of risk to [Clara’s] safety or her well-being."

The court detailed Clara’s testimony, set forth above, about the long-term effects of the incident, including that Clara had seen multiple therapists, had difficulty sleeping, had intimacy issues, and suffered ongoing consequences that were "real and traumatizing." Without an FPO, the court concluded that any progress Clara had "made in therapy could be eviscerated." Finding "a significant risk to [Clara’s] psychological well-being should this order not remain in effect," the court held that Clara had satisfied N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2).⁵ It therefore ordered the FPO previously issued by the initial trial court judge to remain in effect.

C.

Martin appealed, arguing that Clara satisfied neither N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(1) or (2) because the sexual activity was consensual, he posed no threat to Clara, and her fear of him was "irrational."

In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affi...