C.W. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist.

C.W. ET AL.

v.CAPISTRANO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Case No. SACV 11-1157 DOC (RNBx)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date: December 5, 2012

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

PRESENT:

THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE

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¦Julie Barrera   ¦N/A           ¦
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¦Courtroom Clerk ¦Court Reporter¦
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ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF:

None Present

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT:

None Present

PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

Before the Court is a Motion for Attorneys' Fees filed by Capistrano Unified School District ("District"). (Dkt. 49). After reviewing the moving papers and other filings the Court GRANTS District's Motion.¹

I. Background

Plaintiffs C.W. ("Student") and K.S. ("Mother") (collectively, "Plaintiffs" or "Mother") sued District under the Individual with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") to appeal an administrative decision ("Decision") issued by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") that found in favor of District. Plaintiff also brought three other claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

The facts of this case are already well known to the parties after years of litigation and summarized by this Court in its August 3, 2012, Order ("Order") (Dkt. 46). Additional facts and procedural history regarding the due process hearing that Mother appealed and the multiple orders issued by this Court regarding Mother's three other claims are excellently summarized by District in its Motion and not disputed by Mother. See Am. Mot. (Dkt. 49) at 1-7. Given that the parties are intimately familiar with thiscase after extensive litigation and multiple orders issued by this Court, this Court does not recount the facts here.

In the August 3, 2012, Order, this Court affirmed the ALJ's Decision, denied Plaintiffs' appeal, denied all of Plaintiffs' requests for relief, and stated that the Court was willing to entertain a motion for attorneys' fees from District. Order (Dkt. 46) at 13.

II. Discussion

In the present Motion, District seeks $94,602.34 in attorneys' fees and $2,058.21 in costs incurred in litigating the due process hearing and defending itself on appeal, "money that might have been better spent improving educational opportunities for [plaintiff student] and other disabled students." See Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1402 n.10 (9th Cir. 1994) (lamenting the more than $100,000 in attorneys' fees incurred by school district due to litigious parents of disabled child); Aguirre v. Los Angeles Unif. Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) ("All children suffer when the schools' coffers are diminished on account of expensive, needless litigation.").

This Court first reviews the two prongs of the statute under which District moves. This Court then concludes that District is entitled to fees and costs under either prong. Finally, the Court concludes that District's fees and costs are reasonable.

a. Law regarding frivolous and improper purpose prongs

A school district that is a "prevailing party"² in an action or proceeding brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1415 may recover attorneys' fees either:

(II) . . . against the attorney of a parent who files a complaint or subsequent cause of action that is frivolous,unreasonable, or without foundation, or against the attorney of a parent who continued to litigate after the litigation clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; or

(III) . . . against the attorney of a parent, or against the parent, if the parent's complaint or subsequent cause of action was presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the costs of litigation.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)-(III); 34 C.F.R. § 300.517(a).³

The purpose of a fee award under these Sections is to deter frivolous cases and unreasonably demanding or litigious parents and their attorneys. See El Paso Independent Sch. Dist. v. Berry, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23153, *21 (5th Cir. 2010).

District seeks fees under the "frivolousness" prong, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II), and "improper purpose" prong, id. at § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III). See Am. Mot. (Dkt. 49) at 1. The Court addresses each prong in turn.

b. Frivolous prong

The Court first concludes that District is entitled to fees under the frivolousness prong because, among other things, Mother sought a remedy for a harm actually caused by Mother, the remedy sought was well beyond any measure of relief Student couldpossibly obtain, Mother adopted legal theories contrary to the plain language of the statute under which she sued, contrary to controlling Ninth Circuit authority, and contrary to the record, and Mother's legal theories would undermine the policy behind the IDEA's fee-shifting statutes.

The Court next concludes that District also seeks fees under the "improper purpose" prong because Mother's offer to ransom her child's IDEA appeal in exchange for money to which her non-attorney advocate was not entitled shows that the purpose of this appeal was not to vindicate the rights of her disabled child. Rather, Mother's purpose was to harass, unnecessarily delay, and needlessly increase the litigation costs incurred by District until it acquiesced to paying her non-attorney advocate.

Finally, the Court rejects Mother's arguments to the contrary as untimely and irrelevant.

i. Mother's four Causes of Action were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation

The Court first addresses the two alternative legal theories that were the basis of Mother's appeal of the ALJ's Decision ("Fourth Cause of Action"). The Court then turns to Mother's other three claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("First Cause of Action"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Second Cause of Action"), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("Third Cause of Action").

1. Fourth Cause of Action appealing Decision based on Mother's theory that one of the reports in a triennial assessment was procedurally defective

Mother's Fourth Cause of Action appealed the ALJ's Decision on the theory that the District committed a procedural violation by failing to use the words "[Student] may need special education and related services" in one report ("Disputed Report") among several reports conducted as part of its triennial assessment to determine Student's visual and motor skills. Order (Dkt. 46) at 2, 6.

Mother's argument that the ALJ erred in finding no procedural violation was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation for so many reasons, such as: (1) theplain language of the California statute at issue did not require the Disputed Report to repeat the exact phrase in the statute, and Mother cited no authority suggesting otherwise; (2) the Disputed Report actually provided the information that the statute required; and (3) Mother sought a remedy well beyond any measure of relief Student could possibly obtain. See Order (Dkt. 46) at 7-8.

Regarding the first two bases for this Court's conclusion under the frivolous prong, as the Court explained in its Order:

The relevant procedural requirement—California Education Code Section 56327— requires the creation of a "written report, or reports, . . . of the results of each assessment" and provides eight types of information that the "report shall include," such as "[w]hether the pupil may need special education and related services" and the "basis for making the determination." Cal. Educ. Code § 56327(a-b).

The Disputed Report sufficiently stated that Student may need special education services based on a disability because the Disputed Report stated that Student actually was diagnosed by a prior IEP Team as having a disability rendering her eligible for special education services, namely, "Other Health Impairment." . . . Obviously, the "basis for making the determination" that Student may need special education services is this prior diagnosis. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56327(a-b).

The purpose of the Section 56327(a) and (b) requirements is to ensure that the assessment report contains information from which the IEP Team can determine if the child has a disability that makes her eligible for special education. The Disputed Report more than adequately fulfills this purpose because it states that a prior IEP Team has already diagnosed Student as having a disability that makes her eligible for special education.

id. at 7.

Regarding the third bases for this Court's conclusion under the frivolous prong, the present action was especially frivolous because, even assuming that the Disputed Report failed to provide the required information, Mother provided no argument orevidence of any harm resulting from this omission. Rather, as this Court explained in its Order, District agreed with Mother that Student was eligible for special education services and actually recommended that Student be provided with several such services. Id. at 8-9. Mother, for unexplained reasons, refused to accept these services. Instead, she sought money on appeal for three years of compensatory services, without providing any evidence or argument of any causal link between the purported procedural violation and this exceedingly expensive remedy.

In short, Mother's position was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation because it was a contrary to the plain language of the statute under which she sued, contrary to the record, and sought a remedy well beyond any measure of relief Student could possibly obtain. See Johnson v. Bismarck Public Sch. Dist., 949 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1991) (IDEA litigation should not be continued after plaintiffs achieve most of the substantial results they seek); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Berry, 2010 WL 4459735, 55, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23153 (5th Cir. 2010) (reaching same conclusion and awarding fees to the district).

2. Fourth Cause of Action appealing Decision based on M...