Cafarella v. Mass. Inst. of Tech.

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THOMAS CAFARELLA, Plaintiff, v. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-11032-IT

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

November 2, 2023

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Indira Talwani, United States District Judge

Pending before the court is Defendant Massachusetts Institute of Technology's (“MIT”) Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 10] and Partial Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) [Doc. No. 8] statements and claims in Plaintiff Thomas Cafarella's Complaint [Doc. No. 1-5]. The Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 10] and the Partial Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 8] are both DENIED for the reasons set forth herein.

I. Factual Background as Alleged in the Complaint

Cafarella was employed by MIT for approximately fourteen years (from September 2007 to February 2022) as the Office Manager of the dental department. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10, 11 [Doc. No 1-5]. On February 3, 2022, MIT informed Cafarella that he was being terminated by the University due to “a lack of work resulting in the elimination of [his] position.” Id. ¶ 10. MIT terminated Cafarella's employment the next day, February 4, 2022. Id. At the time of his termination, Cafarella believed that there was sufficient work available to justify his position and was aware of several open positions in his department for which he was qualified but which were not offered to him. Id. ¶¶ 13-15. One of these positions was filled by someone younger than him who had held the same job title as he had. Id. ¶ 15. Cafarella had committed no misconduct and had never had disciplinary issues during his fourteen-year term of employment with the institution. Id. ¶ 27.

As of February 4, 2022, MIT had not fully paid Cafarella his earned wages as required by the Massachusetts Wage Act (“Wage Act”). Id. ¶ 17 (citing M.G.L. c. 149 § 148). Cafarella notified MIT and filed a complaint with the Attorney General's Office under the Wage Act and in Cambridge District Court. Id. ¶ 18. Cafarella also contacted MIT and made a demand regarding the Wage Act claim. Id. ¶ 19.

Less than one month after Cafarella was terminated, MIT posted a position that closely mirrored Cafarella's previous position. Id. ¶ 20. After seeing the posted position, Cafarella withdrew his demand regarding the Wage Act claim and notified MIT that he believed he was terminated due to age discrimination. Id. ¶ 21. Cafarella and MIT then discussed the newly posted position and MIT indicated that it did not believe that Cafarella “was suited for the role.” Id. ¶ 22. Because of this statement, he did not apply to the posted position. Id.

Cafarella and MIT began negotiations regarding the Wage Act claim and the discrimination claims. Id. ¶ 23. The settlement agreement ultimately fell apart due to MIT's insistence that the agreement specify that “[Cafarella] shall not be entitled to any employment with MIT now or at any time in the future, and he will not apply for employment with MIT at any time in the future.” Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. Cafarella refused to sign the agreement if it contained that condition, and the stalemate resulted in the end of settlement negotiations. Id. ¶ 26. Cafarella contends that the only change in circumstances between himself and MIT were the filing of the Wage Act and discrimination claims. Id. ¶ 28.

After the settlement negotiations failed, MIT paid the full amount requested for the Wage Act violation. Id. ¶ 29. Cafarella dismissed his complaint in Cambridge District Court regarding his Wage Act claim and filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (“MCAD”). Id. ¶¶ 29-31.

In early 2023, a previous colleague notified Cafarella that MIT was going to post a position he was qualified for. Id. ¶¶ 33, 34. While still on the lookout for this position, Cafarella discovered MIT had filled the position before ever posting it. Id. ¶ 35. Cafarella contends that this is the first time this has happened at MIT in fifteen years. Id.

Cafarella subsequently withdrew his MCAD complaint to file in Middlesex Superior Court. Id. ¶ 36.

II. Procedural Background

Cafarella's Complaint [Doc. No. 1-5] alleges that MIT retaliated against him for pursuing the Wage Act claim in violation of M.G.L. c. 149, §§ 27C, 148, and 148A (Count I); discriminated against him on the basis of his age in violation of M.G.L. c. 151B and §4(1B)(Count II) and in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (Count IV); and retaliated against him for complaining about age discrimination in violation of M.G.L. c. 151B, §§ 4(4) and 4(4A) (Count III) and in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (Count V). Defendants removed this case on the basis of original jurisdiction over the federal claims and supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 4-7 [Doc. No. 1].

MIT has brought a partial motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) asserting that Cafarella's claims for retaliation fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Def.'s MTD [Doc. No. 8]. Additionally, MIT has moved to strike paragraphs 22-27 of the Complaint. Def.'s Mot. Strike [Doc. No. 10]. MIT argues that these paragraphs discuss statements made between the parties during the settlement negotiations regarding Cafarella's Wage Act and age discrimination claims, and are immaterial and impertinent. See Comp. at ¶¶ 22-27 [Doc. No. 1-5]; Mem. Supp. Def.'s Mot. Strike [Doc. No. 11]. Cafarella opposes both motions. Pl.'s Opp'n to MTD [Doc. No. 15]; Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. Strike [Doc. No. 16].

III. Standard of Review

In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court assumes “the truth of all well-pleaded facts” and draws “all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual material to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Rule 12(f) permits the court to strike “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous material.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Statements are immaterial or impertinent when they are unnecessary or unimportant to the issues in question. Autila v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.R.D. 23, 31 (D. Mass. 2022). As relevant here, “[o]ne test that has been advanced for determining whether an allegation in a pleading is immaterial and impertinent within the meaning of Rule 12(f) is whether proof concerning it could be received at trial.” Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 3d § 1382 (2004).

IV. Discussion

A. Motion to Strike

MIT argues that paragraphs 22-27 of the Complaint [Doc. 1-5] are impermissible and should be struck from the record because they would be inadmissible under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Mem. Supp. Def.'s Mot. Strike 3-4 [Doc. No. 11]. “Rule 408 prohibits the introduction of settlement offers or statements made during settlement negotiations ‘to prove or disprove the validity or amount' of that claim at a later date. However, such evidence is admissible for purposes other than to establish the claim's validity or amount.” Moreta v. First Transit of P.R., Inc., 39 F.Supp.3d 169, 176 (D.P.R. 2014) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 408). The Rule is “‘inapplicable when the claim is based upon some wrong that was committed in the course of the settlement discussions.'” Id. (citing Scott v. Goodman, 961 F.Supp. 424, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). “And a settlement offer may be used to show ‘an independent violation ... unrelated to the underlying claim which was the subject of the correspondence.'” Id. (citing Carney v. Am. Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Furthermore, motions to strike are generally disfavored in practice, as they are a drastic remedy. Alston v. Town of Brookline, Mass., 321 F.R.D. 41, 43 (D. Mass. 2017) (citing Manning v. Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2013)).

Plaintiff concedes that Paragraphs 22-27 of the Complaint “include settlement communications or information gathered in settlement communications.” Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. Strike [Doc. No. 16]. While the statements would not be admissible to substantiate Plaintiff's wage act and age discrimination claim, they may be relevant to showing an independent violation, namely Plaintiff's claims of a retaliatory failure to hire. See Moreta, 39 F.Supp.3d at 176. FRE 408 would therefore not necessarily serve as a bar to the admissibility of these statements. And MIT has offered no additional reason to strike these paragraphs outside of that Rule. Consequently, the court finds no basis to strike Paragraphs 22-27.

B. Motion to Dismiss

Counts I, III, and V of the Complaint assert that MIT retaliated against Cafarella for his Wage Act complaint (Count I) and/or his federal and state age discrimination complaints (Counts III and V). See Compl. 4,5,7 [Doc. No. 1-5]. MIT argues that all three of these claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Partial MTD 1 [Doc. No. 9].

For all three retaliatory claims, Cafarella must make a prima facia showing that (1) he engaged in protected conduct (2) he was subjected to an adverse action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected conduct and the adverse action. See Tombeno v. FedEx Corp....