Cagey v. Commonwealth

179 A.3d 458

Joisse A. CAGEY and Dale J. Cagey, Her Husband, Appellants

v.COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, a Commonwealth Agency, Appellee

No. 36 WAP 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: October 17, 2017

Decided: February 21, 2018

Mark J. Homyak, Esq., for Appellant.

Andrew C. Spears, Esq., Handler, Henning & Rosenberg, L.L.P., for Appellant Amicus Curiae.

John G. Knorr III, Esq., Kemal A. Mericli, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Henry James Salvi, Esq., for Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE

We granted allocatur to determine whether the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("PennDOT") is liable for injuries caused by negligently and dangerously designed guardrails erected on Commonwealth real estate. The case presents an opportunity to clarify the contours of the real estate exception to sovereign immunity, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4), especially in light of the Commonwealth Court's expansive treatment of our prior decision in Dean v. Dep't of Transp. , 561 Pa. 503, 751 A.2d 1130 (2000). In Dean , we held that PennDOT has no duty to erect guardrails alongside Commonwealth roadways. Id. at 1134. Here, however, the question is whether the Commonwealth owes a duty of care when PennDOT has in fact installed a guardrail alleged to be dangerous. Pursuant to the plain language of the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521 – 8528 (the "Act"), we find that the General Assembly has waived PennDOT's immunity as a bar to damages caused by dangerous guardrails affixed to Commonwealth real estate. Dean is inapposite and does not control under the facts presented here. We reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Act was enacted in response to this Court's decision in Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways , 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978), wherein we abolished the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. Pursuant to the Act, the Commonwealth generally enjoys immunity from suit for damages in negligence except under certain circumstances set forth therein. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521 – 8522. Specifically, as discussed in more detail infra, section 8522(a) of the Act waives immunity in the instances set forth in section 8522(b)"for damages arising out of a negligent act where the damages would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of sovereign immunity." Id. , § 8522(a). Pertinent to the case at bar, the defense of sovereign immunity may not be raised when the real estate exception, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4), applies.

On June 22, 2015, Joisse and Dale Cagey (the "Cageys") filed a negligence action against PennDOT. In their complaint, the Cageys alleged that on January 26, 2015, they were travelling southbound on State Route 551 in Beaver County, Pennsylvania when they encountered snow and ice on the roadway. Cageys' Complaint at 2. As a result of these conditions, Joisse Cagey ("Mrs. Cagey"), the driver of the car, lost control of the vehicle, which spun off the roadway and slammed into a guardrail adjacent to the road. Id. at 3. The guardrail penetrated the side of the vehicle, resulting in substantial injuries to Mrs. Cagey, including toe, foot and leg fractures. Id.

The Cageys sought damages for Mrs. Cagey's injuries and for Mr. Cagey's loss of consortium. Id. at 6–7. Specifically, they alleged that their damages were the result of the following: (1) PennDOT's negligent installation of a guardrail within an area that should have been traversable by vehicle; (2) PennDOT's negligent installation of a dangerous "boxing glove" guardrail that was not "crashworthy"; and (3) PennDOT's negligent failure to inspect or correct the "boxing glove" guardrail. Id. at 5. On July 9, 2015, PennDOT filed an answer and new matter in which it raised the defense of sovereign immunity.

On September 8, 2015, PennDOT filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, in which it argued that the Act barred the Cageys' claims. PennDOT argued that the Cageys' causes of action did not fall within any of the enumerated exceptions to its sovereign immunity. On October 13, 2015, the Cageys filed a reply in which they conceded that the trial court was bound by existing Commonwealth Court decisions interpreting Dean . Thus, on December 4, 2015, the trial court granted PennDOT's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The Cageys timely appealed to the Commonwealth Court where they argued that its prior decisions have improperly expanded this Court's holding in Dean . In Dean , we specifically held that the "failure to erect a guardrail on the highway is not encompassed by the real estate exception to sovereign immunity." Dean , 751 A.2d at 1134 (observing that "the lack of a guardrail does not render the highway unsafe for the purposes for which it was intended, i.e., travel on the roadway"). While our decision in Dean was limited to the question of whether PennDOT has an obligation to install guardrails, subsequent Commonwealth Court decisions expanded our ruling to provide sovereign immunity protection in circumstances where the Commonwealth installed guardrails but did so in an allegedly negligent manner. For example, in Fagan v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. , 946 A.2d 1123 (Pa. Commw. 2006), the plaintiff argued that the Commonwealth was not immune from suit where the complaining party alleged that guardrails were negligently designed or maintained. See id. at 1125–26. Declining to limit Dean to its facts (i.e. the absence of a guardrail), the Commonwealth Court in Fagan determined that "where a guardrail existed, the failure to design it differently or the failure to maintain it were not dangerous conditions of roadways for which immunity was waived either for the Commonwealth or for local government." Id. at 1127–28.

In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth Court acknowledged that it had consistently applied the holding in Fagan to other similar cases. Cagey v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. , 2650 C.D. 2015, at 4, 2016 WL 4068321(Pa. Commw. July 28, 2016) (unreported opinion) (citing, e.g. , Lambert v. Katz , 8 A.3d 409, 417 (Pa. Commw. 2010) ; Stein v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n , 989 A.2d 80, 88 (Pa. Commw. 2010) ). On the basis of this precedent, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court's order granting PennDOT's motion, explaining that its decisions following Dean "represent a logical and reasonable application of principles set forth by our Supreme Court, which have gone uncontradicted by our legislature." See Cagey , 2650 C.D. 2015 at 6.

In reaching its conclusion, the Commonwealth Court rejected the Cageys' argument that its interpretation of the real estate exception to sovereign immunity is contrary to the common law duty of a possessor of land. Ostensibly ignoring the statutory requirement set forth at section 8522(a) of the Act, the Commonwealth Court held that "where a Commonwealth agency enjoys immunity from tort liability, it is irrelevant that a private person would be liable for a similar act." Id. (citing Page v. City of Phila. , 25 A.3d 471, 476 (Pa. Commw. 2011) ).

On appeal, the Cageys argue that Dean is inapplicable to the facts of this case because Dean establishes only that the Commonwealth's failure to install a guardrail does not give rise to a waiver of sovereign immunity under section 8522(b)(4). Cageys' Brief at 5 (citing Dean , 751 A.2d at 1133 ). They posit that the Commonwealth Court has "erroneously extrapolated" from Dean that a "dangerous defective guardrail" is legally and logically equivalent to the absence of a guardrail. Id. at 7–11. The Cageys also argue that section 8522(b)(4) creates a single real estate exception—not separate "highway" and "real estate" exceptions—imposing liability for injuries caused by any and all dangerous conditions of Commonwealth realty. Id. at 13. In this regard, they disapprove of the Commonwealth Court's focus, which follows Dean , on whether a guardrail renders "the highway unsafe for its intended purpose of travel." Id. at 12 (quoting and criticizing Stein v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n , 989 A.2d 80 ). Finally, highlighting our rules governing statutory construction, the Cageys assert that the plain language of the Act waives sovereign immunity for any "dangerous condition" of Commonwealth real estate for which there would be a common law duty of care owed. Id. at 13–17 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a) ). Because, at common law, a possessor of land would be liable for the installation of a dangerous guardrail adjacent to a highway, see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 307, 368 ; Scarborough v. Lewis, 523 Pa. 30, 565 A.2d 122, 126 (1988), the Cageys contend that the General Assembly clearly intended PennDOT to be liable in the case at bar. Cageys' Brief at 16–17.

PennDOT argues that our decision in Dean compels the result reached by the Commonwealth Court. The agency posits that Dean "did not turn on the absence of an 'artificial condition,' but [instead on] ... the fact that the failure to install a [guardrail] had nothing to do with the safety of travel on the roadway." PennDOT's Brief at 13. Because the guardrail in this case "had no effect on the Cageys' ability to travel safely on the roadway," PennDOT urges it cannot be liable for injuries caused by the guardrail regardless of whether it was negligently designed and installed on Commonwealth real estate. See id. PennDOT insists that there is a distinction between its "general duty to keep property safe for its intended use," which extends to all Commonwealth real estate, and the "specific duty to keep property safe for vehicular travel ," which extends only to "the traveled portion of the highway" and therefore does not apply here. Id. at 14 (emphasis original). While conceding that the holding in Dean "is precisely that PennDOT does not have a duty to...