Cain v. Bureau of Admin. Adjudication

KORAN CAIN Plaintiff, v. BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION, et. al. Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-613

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

December 7, 2016

OPINION

SLOMSKY, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This action arises out of Plaintiff Koran Cain's dispute of a parking ticket. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Bureau of Administrative Adjudication ("BAA") based on events surrounding his traffic violation and the subsequent proceedings in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff claims BAA violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force, his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive fines, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. (Doc. No. 3 at 9.) Plaintiff also claims BAA violated his rights under the Fifth and Ninth Amendments. (Id. at 8.) Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (Doc. No. 6.) For reasons that follow, this Court will grant Defendant's Motion.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹

On April 26, 2014, Plaintiff was issued a citation and fined $51.00 for parking in a no-parking zone. (Doc. No. 12, Ex. A.) Approximately two months later, on July 1, 2014, Plaintiff challenged the validity of the parking ticket in front of the Bureau of Administrative Adjudication ("BAA"), the local agency which provides administrative hearings for disputed parking tickets and traffic violations. (Doc. No. 12 at 4.) He claimed that there were no signs alerting drivers that the place where he parked was a no-parking zone. BAA, however, found that Plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the citation was valid. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed BAA's decision to its Appeals Panel. (Id.) However, the Appeals Panel "found that there was an insufficient basis on which to modify the original decision." (Doc. No. 12, Ex. B.) The Appeals Panel confirmed that the parking ticket was valid and enforceable. (Id.)

Next, Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. (Id. at 4-5.) On April 9, 2015, Plaintiff appeared before Judge Linda Carpenter to dispute the validity of the parking ticket and to challenge the decision of BAA to enforce thefine. (Id. at 5.) According to Plaintiff, Judge Carpenter informed "BAA [that] Mr. Cain has presented evidence and has won his argument." (Doc. No. 3 at 6.) Therefore, Plaintiff returned to BAA and demanded a refund for the fine. (Id. at 1.) According to Plaintiff's Complaint, at some point following his oral argument, he returned to BAA and "told the supervisor that the judge said [he would] get [his] compensation [from] this office." (Id. at 6.) When BAA refused to issue a refund, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reimbursement of Fees with the Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. No. 12 at 5.) On January 14, 2016, Judge Carpenter denied Plaintiff's Motion for Reimbursement of Fees paid in regard to the parking ticket. (Doc. No. 12, Ex. F.)

On March 9, 2016, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint against BAA and Judge Carpenter.² (Doc. No. 3.) Plaintiff alleged Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments during the BAA hearing and appeal process. (Id.) On July 25, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No 6.) Defendant requested this Court dismiss the Complaint arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief and that Plaintiff's claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata. (Id. at 6, 9.) On October 6, 2016, this Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 9.) Complying with the Court's Order, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of Fact and a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 10-11.) The Court interprets these filings as Plaintiff's response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. That Motion is now ripe for review.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The motion to dismiss standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). After Iqbal it is clear that "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice" to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 663; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 231 n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Applying the principles of Iqbal and Twombly, the Third Circuit in Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2010), set forth a three-part analysis that a district court must conduct in evaluating whether allegations in a complaint survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss:

First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."

Id. at 130 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). "This means that our inquiry is normally broken into three parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged." Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

Pleadings submitted by pro se litigants are generally held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, a pro se Plaintiff's complaint must do more than allege his entitlement to relief, it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008)). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not 'shown' — 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The "plausibility" determination is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff brought this action against the Bureau of Administrative Adjudication ("BAA") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that BAA violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments based on his appeal of a parking ticket. Plaintiff's main contention is that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated through BAA's handling of his parking ticket dispute.

A. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Claim for a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that his right to "due process . . . under the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment" was violated. (Doc. No. 3 at 9.) The gist of Plaintiff's argument is that BAA did not have the authority to determine whether his ticket was valid, and that it violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by doing so. Although Plaintiff does not state clearly whether he contends his right to procedural or substantive due process was violated, this Court will address each in turn.

1. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Claim for a Violation of his Right to Procedural Due Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment

The Complaint asserts that Plaintiff's procedural due process rights were violated by BAA's handling of the parking ticket. (Doc. No. 3.) To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must allege that: "(1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of life, liberty, or property, and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide due process of law." Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation of his procedural due process rights for two reasons. First, he does not plead any facts describing how he was deprived of his "life, liberty, or property." U.S. Const., amend. XIV. At most, Plaintiff may be arguing that he was deprived of his property when BAA refused to issue a refund for the $51.00 parking citation. However, this is not pled with any specificity or clarity in the Complaint. Second, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts showing how the procedures available to him before BAA and the Court of Common Pleas did not provide due process of law. Although the Complaint is not clear, Plaintiff essentially contends that BAA did not have the authority to handle the parking ticket dispute. He states, "traffic court is a farce" and that BAA "cannot give an order[,] it must come from a judge." (Doc. No. 3 at 8.) These are not facts, but are inaccurate legal conclusions.³Plaintiff has not demonstrated how BAA's handling of the parking ticket dispute violated his procedural due process rights. To the contrary, Plaintiff had at least three opportunities to challenge the validity of the parking ticket—before BAA, before BAA's Appeals Panel, and before the Court of Common Pleas. He was afforded sufficient notice and opportunities to be heard. For all these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim...