Cain v. William J. Huff II Revocable Trust Declaration Dated June 28, 2011

216 N.E.3d 456

Michael O. CAIN and Linda A. Raymond et al., Appellants-Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants,

v.WILLIAM J. HUFF II REVOCABLE TRUST DECLARATION DATED JUNE 28, 2011, and Nicole E. Huff Revocable Trust Declaration, Dated June 28, 2011, Appellees-Defendants and Third-party Plaintiffs

Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-PL-1258

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed July 31, 2023

Attorney for Appellants Michael O. Cain and Linda A. Raymond: Todd G. Relue, Ryan T. Leagre, Plews Shadley Racher & Braun LLP, Indianapolis, IN

Attorney for Appellant Tammy Jo Sexton-Troy: Darla S. Brown, Sturgeon & Brown, PC, Bloomington, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellees William J. Huff II Revocable Trust Declaration Dated June 28, 2011, and Nicole E. Huff Revocable Trust Declaration, Dated June 28, 2011: Tammy L. Ortman, Lewis & Kappes, P.C., Indianapolis, Indiana

Kenworthy, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Trusts for William and Nicole Huff (collectively, "Huffs") own a parcel of land abutting a neighborhood called The Shores. This parcel—which we call the THR Parcel—comes with certain appurtenant easement rights to cross The Shores. After the Huffs obtained the THR Parcel, they obtained an adjacent tract, which we call the Chumley Parcel. Eventually, litigation arose concerning the scope of the Huffs’ easement rights with respect to both parcels.

[2] Below, the Huffs sought partial summary judgment, requesting a declaration "the Huffs are entitled to use the [e]asement[s] to access the Huffs’ [p]roperty, including both the THR Property and the Chumley Parcel, as long as [the] Huffs do not intensify the [e]asement[s]." Cain App. Vol. 2 at 154. The trial court granted the Huffs’ motion. In doing so, the court included language suggesting there is no longer delineation between the THR Parcel and the Chumley Parcel, which renders the declaratory judgment broader than requested. Determining the Huffs are entitled only to the declaratory judgment they sought, we affirm partial summary judgment for the Huffs while clarifying the scope of the judgment. We remand the case for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History¹

[3] Kenton L. Robinson owned a tract of land near Lake Monroe, which he planned to develop into a subdivision called The Shores. Adjacent to the tract was the THR Property, at that point owned by Terre Haute Realty Corporation ("THR"). In 1990, Robinson executed a Grant of Easement ("Grant"), which specifically describes the THR Property as the dominant estate. See Cain App. Vol. 3 at 41–48 & 217. In the Grant, Robinson established three easements across common areas in The Shores. Id. at 41–48. A representative from THR signed the Grant, assenting to the "terms, conditions[,] and covenants" of the Grant. Id. at 44. One provision states:

Grantee covenants to limit use of the easements ... for the construction, development[,] and use by Grantee and its ... assigns of six (6) single[-]family residential structures, each of which may include guest and caretaker quarters and other buildings attendant thereto, to be located on Grantee's real estate described in Exhibit A and as more particularly described above.

Id. at 43 (emphasis added). Exhibit A describes only the THR Property. See id. at 41–48 & 217. No portion of the Grant describes other property as part of the dominant estate. See id. at 41–48. And there is no language allowing THR or its successor in interest to unilaterally add land to the dominant estate. See id.

[4] In 2017, the Huffs obtained the THR Property. See id. at 19–40. They later acquired the Chumley Parcel from Chumley, LLC. See id. at 13–18. The Chumley Parcel forms a peninsula on Lake Monroe. See id. at 78–79.

[5] In 2018, Michael O. Cain and Linda A. Raymond—owners of one of the affected lots in The Shores (collectively, "Cain")—sued the Huffs, alleging the Huffs were exceeding their easement rights. Cain App. Vol. 2 at 58. At first, the lawsuit concerned only the THR Property, focusing on whether the Huffs could truck logs from the THR Property across The Shores. See id. at 58–63. The litigation led to two appeals involving the propriety of injunctive relief. See Cain v. William J. Huff, II Revocable Trust Declaration, Dated June 28, 2011 , 149 N.E.3d 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied ; William J. Huff, II Revocable Trust Declaration, Dated June 28, 2011 v. Cain , 120 N.E.3d 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Eventually, the litigation involved the Chumley Parcel. See Cain App. Vol. 2 at 126–28, 140.

[6] The Huffs filed a counterclaim against Cain and a third-party complaint against Tammy Jo Sexton-Troy and eleven other affected estate-holders in The Shores² (collectively at times, "Sexton-Troy"). See id. at 141–64. The Huffs later moved for summary judgment on Count 3 of the counterclaim/third-party complaint. Cain App. Vol. 2 at 164–65. In doing so, the Huffs sought a specific declaratory judgment "the Huffs are entitled to use the [e]asement[s] to access the Huffs’ [p]roperty, including both the THR Property and the Chumley Parcel, as long as [the] Huffs do not intensify the [e]asement[s]." Id. at 154. In seeking this declaration, the Huffs asked the trial court to "apply the law of the case" and rely on language in portions of the prior appellate opinions. Id. at 165.³

[7] The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the Huffs. In doing so, the court determined it was bound by the law-of-the-case doctrine. Id. at 54–55. The written order contains the following statement: "[T]he Huffs may use the Grant ... to access the entirety of their real estate, without regard for the delineation between the THR [Property] and [the] Chumley Parcel[.]" Id. at 55 (emphasis added). The order also contains language rendering the order final and appealable. See id. at 57. Several non-prevailing parties moved to correct error, see Sexton-Troy App. Vol. 2 at 203–15, and the court denied those motions.

[8] Cain and Sexton-Troy⁴ now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[9] At the outset, we note the parties at times focus on the law-of-the-case doctrine. But we need not address this doctrine in depth. As our Supreme Court has explained, this doctrine "is not a uniform rule of law, but rather ‘only a discretionary rule of practice.’ " State v. Lewis , 543 N.E.2d 1116, 1118 (Ind. 1989) (quoting United States v. U.S. Smelting Refin. & Mining Co. , 339 U.S. 186, 199, 70 S.Ct. 537, 94 L.Ed. 750 (1950) ). As such, the doctrine does not limit the power of an appellate court.⁵ See id. ; accord 18B Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 (3d. ed. 2023) (noting any perceived constraint "is a matter of discretion" and, "[s]o long as the case remains alive, there is power to alter or revoke earlier rulings"). And to the extent either prior appeal in this case (involving mere injunctive relief) implicated the law-of-the-case doctrine, we decline to apply the doctrine. Cf. State v. Huffman , 643 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ind. 1994) (electing to address the merits out of fairness); Wedel v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp. , 839 N.E.2d 1236, 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Huffman and declining to apply the discretionary doctrine where the prior appeal involved property rights).

Standard of Review

[10] Cain and Sexton-Troy ("Neighbors") appeal from the denial of their motions to correct error, which challenged the order granting summary judgment to the Huffs. In general, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the ruling is "clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law." Bruder v. Seneca Mortg. Servs., LLC , 188 N.E.3d 469, 471 (Ind. 2022). Moreover, "[w]e review summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court." U.S. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Erie Ins. Exch. , 204 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind. 2023). As to summary judgment, the party seeking summary judgment must designate the evidence "on which it relies for purposes of the motion." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). At that point, any opposing party shall designate evidence in opposition. Id. In the end, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the "designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to ... judgment as a matter of law." Id.

Indiana Easement Law

[11] As our Supreme Court recently stated: "An easement is the right to use another's land for a specified purpose. An easement appurtenant benefits adjoining land; an easement in gross benefits a specific individual. The land benefited by an easement is the dominant estate; the land burdened by an easement is the servient estate." Town of Ellettsville v. DeSpirito , 111 N.E.3d 987, 990 (Ind. 2018). And where—as here—an easement was "voluntarily created by a written instrument to serve a specified purpose," the easement is known as an express easement. Easement , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Furthermore, in seeking summary judgment, the Huffs do not claim any implied easement rights.⁶ Rather, this case involves only express easements appurtenant, i.e. , "a permitted use of land granted by the servient estate-holder for the benefit of the dominant estate-holder [that] runs with the dominant estate." DeSpirito , 111 N.E.3d at 991.

[12] When examining the scope of easement rights in Indiana, we "hold[ ] the parties to the agreement they—or their predecessors in interest—made when they negotiated their easement or acquired their property concerning the easement." Id. at 995 ; cf. Successor in Interest , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (noting a successor in interest "retains the same rights as the original owner, with no change in substance"). In this way, Indiana common law "promotes certainty," ensuring "property interests and corresponding property values remain stable and predictable." DeSpirito , 111 N.E.3d at 995.

[13] As to our common law,...