Cal. Dui Lawyers Ass'n v. Cal. Dep't of Motor Vehicles

77 Cal.App.5th 517

292 Cal.Rptr.3d 608

CALIFORNIA DUI LAWYERS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

California DUI Lawyers Association et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.California Department of Motor Vehicles et al., Defendants and Appellants.

B305604, B309145

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Filed April 15, 2022

Law Offices of Robert S. Gerstein, Robert S. Gerstein ; Law Office of Joshua C. Needle, Joshua C. Needle, Santa Monica; Carlton Fields, Ellyn S. Garofalo and Amir Kaltgrad, Los Angeles, for California DUI Lawyers Association and Steven R. Mandell.

Attorney General of California, Rob Bonta; Senior Assistant Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen ; Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Gary S. Balekjian ; and Deputy Attorney General, Jacqueline H. Chern for California Department of Motor Vehicles and Steve Gordon.

CURREY, J.

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) conducts administrative hearings to determine whether automatic suspension of a driver's license is warranted after the driver has been arrested for driving under the influence. At these hearings, the DMV mandates that the hearing officers simultaneously act as advocates for the DMV and as triers of fact. The DMV also authorizes its managers to change hearing officers’ decisions, or order the hearing officers to change their decisions, without notice to the driver.

Based on these practices, the California DUI Lawyers Association and attorney Steven R. Mandell (collectively, CDLA) sued the DMV and its director¹ for injunctive and declaratory relief. CDLA alleged three cause of action: (1) violation of 42 United States Code section 1983 affecting due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ( section 1983 ); (2) violation of due process rights under article I, section 7 of the California Constitution (state due process); and (3) "illegal expenditure of funds" under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a ( section 526a ). CDLA alleged that both the lack of a neutral hearing officer, and the ex parte communications between DMV managers and hearing officers, violate drivers’ rights to procedural due process under the California and United States Constitutions.

CDLA and the DMV each moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. The trial court (Hon. Rita Miller, presiding) held CDLA did not have taxpayer standing to assert its claims. The trial court granted the DMV's motion for summary judgment on that basis, and denied CDLA's motion for summary judgment. In California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1247, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 787 ( CDLA I ), this court reversed the judgment, with instructions to vacate the orders granting the DMV's summary judgment motion and denying CDLA's summary judgment motion. ( Id. at p. 1266, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 787.)

On remand, and after further briefing, the trial court (Hon. Holly J. Fujie, presiding) addressed the merits of the parties’ motions. It denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, but (1) granted the DMV's motion for summary adjudication of CDLA's first cause of action ( section 1983 ); and (2) granted CDLA's motion for summary adjudication of its second (state due process) and third ( section 526a ) causes of action. The trial court concluded the DMV's structural design allowing for ex parte managerial interference with the hearing officers’ decision-making violates due process under the California Constitution, and thus constitutes waste under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. The trial court also granted the DMV's motion for summary adjudication on the following issue: "As a matter of law, the DMV hearing officer's dual role as advocate for the DMV and trier of fact does not violate due process."

The trial court entered judgment in favor of the DMV on the first cause of action ( section 1983 ), and in favor of CDLA on the second (state due process) and third ( section 526a ) causes of action. The judgment enjoined the DMV from maintaining or implementing a structure allowing managerial interference with hearing officers’ decision-making through "ex parte communications or command control." It also found CDLA to be the prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorneys’ fees.

In this consolidated² appeal, CDLA appeals from the judgment contending the trial court erred by: (1) granting the DMV summary adjudication on the issue of whether a hearing officer's dual roles as advocate for the DMV and adjudicator violates drivers’ due process rights; and (2) granting the DMV's motion for summary adjudication of CDLA's first cause of action under section 1983. The parties also both appeal from the post-judgment award of attorneys’ fees.

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude, based on the undisputed facts, CDLA was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of its causes of action. CDLA is therefore entitled to summary judgment. We further conclude the trial court's attorneys’ fee award did not constitute an abuse of discretion. In light of CDLA's additional success on appeal, however, we remand the matter to the trial court to reevaluate the amount of fees awarded to CDLA (but express no opinion whether the amount should be increased), and to calculate the amount of fees and costs CDLA incurred on appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We borrow much of our description of the background from CDLA I .

A. Statutory Background

"This action involves the ‘administrative per se’ or ‘APS’ system used to suspend a driver's license following an arrest for driving under the influence. ‘Under the administrative per se law, the DMV must immediately suspend the driver's license of a person who is driving with .08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood. ( [Veh. Code,] § 13353.2, subd. (a)(1).) The procedure is called ‘administrative per se’ because it does not impose criminal penalties, but simply suspends a person's driver's license as an administrative matter upon a showing the person was arrested for driving with a certain blood-alcohol concentration ....’ ( MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150, 155, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 48, 81 P.3d 975.)

" ‘When a driver is arrested for driving under the influence and is determined to have a prohibited blood-alcohol content (BAC), the arresting officer or the DMV serves the driver with a "notice of [an] order of suspension or revocation" of his or her driver's license, advising that the suspension will become effective 30 days from the date of service. ( Veh. Code, §§ 13353.2, subds. (b) & (c), 13353.3, subd. (a).) The notice explains the driver's right to an administrative hearing before the effective date of the suspension if the driver requests a hearing within 10 days of receipt of the notice. ( Id. , §§ 13353.2, subd. (c), 13558, subd. (b).)’ ( Brown v. Valverde (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1531, 1536-1537, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 429 ( Brown ).)

"At the hearing, ‘[t]he sole task of the hearing officer is to determine whether the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe the person was driving, the driver was arrested, and the person was driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or higher. If the hearing officer determines that the evidence establishes these three facts by a preponderance of the evidence, the license will be suspended. ( Veh. Code, §§ 13558, subd. (c)(1), 13557, subd. (b)(2), 14104.2, subd. (a) ...)’ ( Brown, supra , 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1537-1538, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 429, fn. omitted.) DMV bears the burden of proof. ( Petrus v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1244, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 686 ( Petrus ).)" ( CDLA I, supra , 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1251-1252, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 787.)

B. CDLA's Complaint

"CDLA filed a complaint on August 1, 2014, alleging that the APS hearing system is unfair and unconstitutional. CDLA alleged that continued possession of a driver's license is a vital property right that cannot be suspended without due process of law. According to the complaint, ‘[T]he APS system ... requires the Hearing Officers to act both as advocate for the DMV and arbiter/decision maker, creating an obvious and inherent conflict of interest and bias favoring one party over the other.’ CDLA alleged that as a result, the ‘APS hearings violate the State and Federal Due Process rights ... of license holders by failing to provide a fair, neutral and impartial Hearing Officer.’ In addition, ‘the APS system unconstitutionally allows DMV managers, executives, and/or administrators ex parte communications with the Hearing Officers and direct control over the decision-making process.’ CDLA asserted that ‘[t]hese procedures and practices are unconstitutional on their face and as applied.’

"CDLA alleged that according to DMV written materials, the hearing officer at each APS hearing acts as investigator, advocate for DMV, and fact finder. CDLA's complaint noted that California's Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ( Gov. Code, § 11340 et seq. ) states that a person may not serve as a presiding officer in an adjudicative proceeding where ‘[t]he person has served as investigator, prosecutor, or advocate in the proceeding or its preadjudicative stage,’ or ‘[t]he person is subject to the authority, direction, or discretion of a person who has served as investigator, prosecutor, or advocate in the proceeding or its preadjudicative stage.’ ( Gov. Code, § 11425.30, subd. (a)(1) & (2).) However, the Vehicle Code ‘specifically exempts the APS adjudicative hearings from the prophylactic separation of functions mechanism set forth in the APA.’ CDLA also alleged that hearing officers’ ‘initial ... decision to set aside a suspension is subject to ex parte review, criticism, and unilateral reversal’ by DMV management, ‘prior to it being issued to the licensee, without notice [to] or input from the licensee.’ " ( CDLA I , 20 Cal.App.5th at pp....