Calderon-Alibran v. Puerto Rico

IVELISSE CALDERON-ALIBRAN, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, Defendant.

CIVIL No. 21-1149 (ADC)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

March 31, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

S/AIDA M. DELGADO-COLON, United States District Judge

Before the Court is defendant the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's (“Defendant”) motion to dismiss. ECF No. 13. Plaintiff Ivelisse Calderon-Alibran (“Plaintiff”) opposed. ECF No. 17. A reply ensued. ECF No. 20. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Defendant on July 18 2021. ECF No. 11. Therein, Plaintiff raised claims of racial discrimination and hostile work environment pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”). ECF No. 11. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.

Now Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Garda-Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must “ask whether the complaint states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Cooper v. Charter Commc'n Entertainments I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Maloy v. Ballori-Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 2014)) (internal quotations marks omitted).

“To cross the plausibility threshold, the plaintiff must ‘plead factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Cooper, 760 F.3d at 106 (citing Maloy 744 F.3d at 252). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, .., on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) ... .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). “Non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint must then be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible.” Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court may ordinarily only consider facts alleged in the complaint and its attached exhibits. See Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993). Otherwise, the Court must convert the motion into one for summary judgment. See Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d)). However, under certain narrow exceptions, some extrinsic documents may be considered without converting the motion. See Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2013). These exceptions are: (1) documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties, (2) official public records, (3) documents central to plaintiff's claim, and (4) documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint. See Id. (quoting Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3). “When a complaint's factual allegations are expressly linked to-and admittedly dependent upon-a document (the authenticity of which is not challenged), that document effectively merges into the pleadings, thereby giving the Court the discretion to consider such additional material.” Newman v. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 901 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing TransSpec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008)).

III. Relevant Factual Allegations in the Complaint^[1]

Plaintiff is a black Puerto Rican female who began working for the Puerto Rico Department of Justice (“PR DOJ”) in September 1989 and was eventually promoted to the position of “Administrator of the Legal Office System.” She was the main secretary of the Chief Prosecutor for the San Juan judicial district. Prior to Jorge Carrion-Ramos's (“Carrion-Ramos”) appointment as Interim Chief on April 15, 2019, she had already worked for nine different Chief Prosecutors. As Interim Chief, Carrion-Ramos was the highest-ranking prosecutor in the San Juan judicial district.

Before Carrion-Ramos began working as Interim Chief Prosecutor, Plaintiff learned that he did not want her to continue as the Chief Prosecutor's secretary from co-workers who asked her whether she was going to be transferred to another office. In their first meeting, Carrion- Ramos told her that she could be transferred to whatever job she wanted so long as she was not working directly with him. As a career employee with over 30 years of experience, she was not provided a reason as to why she was being urged to transfer.

On April 17, 2019, two days after starting as Interim Chief Prosecutor, Carrion-Ramos questioned Plaintiff as to why she did not prepare attendance sheets and meeting minutes. Plaintiff maintains she had left the same on his desk the previous afternoon.

On April 29, 2019, a co-worker informed Plaintiff that she was being mocked by other coworkers during the activities for Administrative Professionals' Day. Specifically, this comment was made about her: “well, the [Chief] Prosecutor gave her the option of leaving [her position]. If she did not want to leave, it's time for her now to withstand the pressure.” The next day, Plaintiff requested permission to leave work because she was having a nervous breakdown, but Carrion-Ramos responded by questioning her intensely. Subsequently, Plaintiff had to go to the emergency room and to consult a psychiatrist, who diagnosed her with depression, insomnia, and anxiety.

On May 31, 2019, Carrion-Ramos called Plaintiff into his office and, in the presence of a co-worker, scolded her for not having answered to a particular email while he was out on vacation earlier that month. She responded by reminding him of his instructions to her to not answer any emails during his absence. Carrion-Ramos replied by raising his voice and claiming that she was failing in her duties.

On June 3, 2019, Carrion-Ramos interrogated her regarding his access card to the parking area. While she tried to explain to him that she already had informed him about the need to reprogram the access card, Carrion-Ramos stated “look, many times you talk to me and I don't hear you.”

On June 5, 2019, Carrion-Ramos proposed that Plaintiff's workstation be relocated to an isolated cubicle that wasn't in the Chief Prosecutor's office because it would be seen as “more elegant” or “more classy” than the current setup. As the main secretary for the Chief Prosecutor of the San Juan judicial district, Plaintiff was the first person you would see when entering Carrion-Ramos's office. Out of the four black employees in the San Juan judicial district, she was the only one to directly work with the Chief Prosecutor on a regular basis. Plaintiff felt as if he was trying to make her invisible.

As time went on, Carrion-Ramos inhibited Plaintiff from performing her essential tasks by eliminating and altering her customary functions such as handling the correspondence, managing the filing system, answering emails, attending to visitors, coordinating appointments, scheduling commitments, keeping attendance records, taking minutes, drafting communications, and supervising other co-workers. Furthermore, he would avoid talking to Plaintiff and when he did, he would take a deep breath and make negative gestures that publicly demonstrated his displeasure with her. Instead of permitting people to leave documents with Plaintiff as was previously done, Carrion-Ramos would shout at visitors from his desk and tell them to ignore her and to go directly into his office. Carrion-Ramos would not allow her to escort some visitors to his office. When co-workers requested information from her regarding routine matters, Plaintiff would have to tell them that Carrion-Ramos did not authorize her to answer follow-up requests.

Plaintiff's recalls that her presence seemed to provoke Carrion-Ramos's anger, annoyance, and discomfort. She felt intimidated, nervous, and under intense stress and pressure. Regardless, she continued working in her customary professional manner. She also felt that she was being forced to work in an abusive work environment where she was fearful of the next humiliating incident.

Everything came to a head on June 19, 2019. When Plaintiff arrived at the office at 8:30 a.m., she found out that Carrion-Ramos had moved her workstation to such a small space that she could not move her chair. When she asked for a co-worker's assistance, Carrion-Ramos came out of his office and screamed at her in front of other co-workers, “you have an attitude problem. You do not cooperate. Yesterday, I asked you where you wanted your desk, and you stated, ‘wherever you want.' Now, you want to change it.” Plaintiff responded that his actions demonstrated a “lack of respect” and asked him, “what have I done that since Day 1, you treat me this way . . .” As a result, Plaintiff suffered a nervous breakdown and experienced chest pains that were so severe that she required medical attention and time off from work.

During her absence, Carrion-Ramos replaced Plaintiff with a “light skinned” employee who had no experience as an administrator. When Plaintiff was absent in the past, the norm was that she would be substituted by Maria Velez (“Velez”), who is also a black Puerto Rican female who was familiar with Plaintiff's work. However, Plaintiff heard that Carrion-Ramos did not want Velez working in his office. Plaintif...