Caldwell v. Dept. of Corr. Agency

Clay Caldwell, Appellant v. The Dept. of Corrections Agency

No. 631 C.D. 2014

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Submitted: September 19, 2014

November 17, 2014

BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON

In this appeal, Clay Caldwell (Caldwell), representing himself, asks whether the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County (trial court) erred in dismissing his complaint with prejudice based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the vexatious nature of the litigation. Caldwell contends the trial court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over his complaint, which involved state tort and constitutional claims based on incidents occurring within Greene County. He maintains his pursuit of these claims was not vexatious or intended to harass. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

I. Background

In November 2009, Caldwell, an indigent inmate currently serving a life sentence at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) at Greensburg, following a transfer from SCI-Greene, filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), to proceed without liability for court fees or costs. Certified Record (C.R.), Item No. 42. The trial court denied the motion for failure to file a complaint, stating "[t]here is no pending lawsuit or action." Tr. Ct. Order, 11/25/09; C.R., Item No. 39. The trial court instructed Caldwell that he may file a revised petition to proceed IFP when he files his complaint. Id.

In January 2010, Caldwell filed a second petition to proceed IFP. C.R., Item No. 38. The trial court denied his petition pursuant to Section 6602(f)(1) of the act commonly referred to as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 Pa. C.S. §6602(f)(1), also known as the "three strikes rule." Tr. Ct. Order, 1/6/10; C.R., Item No. 37. The trial court explained that Caldwell, on more than three occasions, filed lawsuits concerning the conditions of his confinement, which were dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. (citing Caldwell v. Folino, 2009 WL 3055298 (W.D. Pa., No. CV-09-217, filed September 21, 2009) (unreported); Caldwell v. Folino, 2009 WL 1929905 (W.D. Pa., No. 2:08-cv-00122, filed July 1, 2009) (unreported) (Folino I), vacated in part and remanded, 2020 WL 3610169 (3rd Cir., No. 09-3104, filed September 17, 2010)¹ (Folino II); Caldwell v. Beard, 2008 WL 2887810 (W.D. Pa., No. CV-07-727, filed July 23, 2008) (unreported), aff'd, 2009 WL 1111545 (3rd Cir., No. 08-3286, filed April 27, 2009)).

Three years later, in March 2013, Caldwell filed a third IFP motion. In addition, he filed a complaint naming Secretary Jeffrey A. Beard, SCI-Greene Superintendent Louis Folino, seven correctional officers from SCI-Greene, "M.A. Price, Gagnon, J. Miller, Lukachyk, Topka, Norman, Sokol," (IndividualDefendants), and the Department of Corrections (Department) (collectively, Defendants) as defendants. C.R., Item No. 35. In an affidavit accompanying his filings, Caldwell explained he delayed filing his complaint with the trial court until final judgment in his federal court action involving the same incidents and Defendants. Id.; see Folino I; Folino II.²

In the complaint, he alleged the correctional officers: touched him in a sexual manner during pat-down searches; filed false disciplinary charges against him; wrongfully subjected him to restrictive housing; transferred him from SCI-Greene to SCI-Greensburg in retaliation for filing grievances and civil suits; wrongfully seized and destroyed his personal property in retaliation for filing grievances and civil suits; handcuffed him too tightly; required him to obtain a permit for his Native American religious items; and, mishandled and mocked his religious items. According to Caldwell, the first of these incidents - the pat-down search - occurred in November 2007.

In addition, Caldwell averred Defendants improperly filed misconduct reports and denied his grievances. He claimed the Department's policies, customs and practices violated his constitutional rights. He asserted state tort claims for gross negligence and violations of his state constitutional rights.

For relief, Caldwell demanded nominal and punitive damages in the amount of $74.4 million from the Department and $580,000 from each of the Individual Defendants as well as 35% of their gross yearly income for 10 years. He also requested injunctive relief in the form of modified prison policies, single-cell status, magazine subscriptions, family visitations, personal property, sentence reduction, expunged misconduct reports, nonparticipation in prison programs, and unrestricted phone calls.

The trial court granted Caldwell's third IFP motion. Tr. Ct. Order, 3/28/13; C.R., Prothonotary Docket Entries. Caldwell then filed a "Motion to Enter Judgment by Default against the Defendants, for Failure to Plead, and the Relief Sought by the Plaintiff in his Complaint." C.R., Item No. 30. The trial court issued a rule to show cause why Caldwell's relief should not be granted. Tr. Ct. Order, 7/1/13; C.R., Item No. 29. The Department responded, stating none of the named Defendants were served with original process in the matter, and, thus, they were not parties to the action. C.R., Item No. 22.

In the interim, Caldwell filed a "Motion for Damages against the Defendants for Delay in Actions for Bodily Injury, Death or Property Damage," as well as a "Petition for Order for Protection From Abuse of Authority and fromDestruction of Property and Official Oppression." C.R., Item Nos. 21, 27. The trial court denied these motions, and it instructed Caldwell to properly serve his complaint on the Defendants. See Tr. Ct. Order, 7/17/13; Tr. Ct. Order, 9/25/13; C.R., Item Nos. 14, 26.

In addition, Caldwell requested appointment of counsel. C.R., Item No. 18. He also filed two motions for special injunctive relief - one for a PFA from abuse of authority and destruction of property, the other requesting that the court direct the sheriff to serve his complaint on the Defendants. C.R., Item Nos. 12, 13.

Ultimately, the trial court denied Caldwell's request for counsel. Tr. Ct. Order, 11/13/13; C.R., Item No. 9. The trial court explained his action is civil in nature and the appointment of counsel is not a matter of right. Id. On its own accord, the trial court dismissed Caldwell's complaint with prejudice, citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the litigation's vexatious nature. Id. From this decision, Caldwell appealed to the Superior Court, which transferred the matter here.

II. Contentions

On appeal,³ Caldwell raises numerous contentions. He contends the trial court erred by: not appointing him counsel; determining it lacked jurisdiction over his complaint; not addressing his motion for judgment by default; notallowing him to amend his complaint; not providing assistance or protection to him as a pro se litigant; holding him to a higher standard in his pleadings; not finding the Defendants retaliated against him for pursuing his legal rights; determining his litigation was vexatious; and, dismissing the case with prejudice without consideration of Caldwell's lack of knowledge of procedural rules or the merits of his constitutional claims. For ease of discussion, we group Caldwell's claims into five categories: legal representation; judicial assistance; subject matter jurisdiction; judicial error; and, vexatious litigation.

III. Discussion

A. Legal Representation

First, Caldwell contends the trial court erred by not appointing him counsel. He argues the appointment of legal counsel is necessary for him to navigate the rules and procedures in pursuing his complaint.

A litigant does not have a right to counsel in a civil matter. Harris v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 714 A.2d 492 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). As this Court explained, due process does not require the appointment of counsel to an indigent inmate in a civil action because the interest at stake is financial, which commands a lower level of due process protection than life or liberty interests. Mason v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 886 A.2d 724 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); Harris.

Here, Caldwell's civil complaint seeks monetary damages in excess of 74 million dollars as well as injunctive relief against the Defendants for property damage. We discern no life or liberty interest at stake. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Caldwell's request for appointment of counsel.

B. Judicial Assistance

Next, Caldwell claims the trial court erred by not assisting him with his case or relaxing the procedural rules for him. Caldwell attempts to argue that, by proceeding pro se, that is without legal representation, the trial court was required to assist him with the procedural requirements or absolve him from complying with the same, particularly those relating to service. Such is not the case.

The courts are "under no duty to provide personal instruction on courtroom procedure or to perform any legal 'chores' for the defendant that counsel would normally carry out." Fraisar v. Gillis, 892 A.2d 74, 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 4th Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000)). More particularly, the courts are not required to accomplish service for a pro se litigant or explain to a litigant requesting such assistance that it does not perform the same. Id. To the contrary, "[r]equiring trial courts to advise a pro se litigant in such a manner would undermine the court's role as an impartial decision maker." Id.

Further, a pro se litigant is not absolved from complying with procedural rules. Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245 (Pa. Super. 2003); City of Phila. Water Rev. Bureau v. Frempong, 744 A.2d 822 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). "The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Jones v....