Calhoun v. Wash. Cnty. Cmty. Servs. Child Support Unit, Civil No. 18-cv-1881 (ECT/HB)

Rhome J. Calhoun, Plaintiff, v. Washington County Community Services Child Support Unit, Defendant.

Civil No. 18-cv-1881 (ECT/HB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

April 23, 2019

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Rhome J. Calhoun, P.O. Box 165826, Irving, TX 75016, pro se

James R. Andreen and Samantha R. Alsadi, Erstad & Riemer, P.A., 8009 34th Ave. South, Suite 200, Minneapolis, MN 55425, for Defendant Washington County Community Services Child Support Unit

HILDY BOWBEER, United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Washington County Community Services Child Support Unit's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 34]. The motion has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1. See (Order for Referral [Doc. No. 40].) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the motion be granted.

I. Background

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Rhome Calhoun, pro se, initially filed this case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas on June 8, 2018. (Compl. [Doc. No. 3].) At that time, Plaintiff claimed officers at three different state child support enforcement agencies in Washington State, Los Angeles County, and Minnesota violated his constitutional rights when they enforced child support payment obligations against him. (Id.) The Honorable David C. Godbey, United States District Court Judge of the Northern District of Texas, held that venue was improper and severed Plaintiff's action into three lawsuits. (Order Transferring to Another District [Doc. No. 11].) Plaintiff's claims against "State of MN DHS Child Support Enforcement and Ashley L. Parker" were thus transferred to this District on July 3, 2018. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed a second Complaint and "Additional Facts"¹ in this District on September 2, 2018, in which he withdrew claims against the previously named defendants and substituted the Washington County Community Services Child Support Unit (hereafter "Defendant") in their place. See (Am. Compl.; Additional Facts [Doc. No. 25].) Plaintiff raised two claims in the Amended Complaint: (1) violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because a Notice and Finding of Financial Responsibility ("NFFR") that established monthly child support payments for Plaintiff's two children was created and signed by someone who was not a judge, and (2) violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because Defendant collected money pursuant to the allegedly unlawful NFFR. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 7.)

B. Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that in 1997, the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, Division of Child Support issued to Plaintiff a Notice and Finding of Financial Responsibility ("NFFR") that established monthly child support payments for Plaintiff's two children. (Am. Compl. ¶ 7; see also Aff. of Samantha R. Alsadi in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. C [Doc. No. 38-3].²) The custodial parent of Plaintiff's children ("Custodial Parent") applied for and received an AFDC Title IV-D loan from Washington State and assigned to that state her rights to the payments received from Plaintiff. (Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff began payments on the AFDC loan in 2000 through income withholding from his paychecks, and the loan was repaid in full as of 2007. See (Id.; see also Case Payment History, Am. Compl. Ex. 1-4 [Doc. Nos. 24-1 to 24-4].) Plaintiff alleges, however, that the NFFR was not signed by a judge, and was issued in violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff further alleges that the Custodial Parent moved to Minnesota in 2000 but did not apply for an AFDC Title IV-D loan in this state. (Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) He alleges that Defendant nevertheless began seizing moneys from him, through income withholding and interception of his federal income tax refunds, beginning in 2000 and continuing through the present. (Id.) He contends these seizures violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiff asks the Court to order Defendant to return all monies illegally seized, in the amount of $49,733.05; to "clear [his] name from their records; to stop sending income withholding notices to his employers; to stop reporting to credit reporting agencies that he has an outstanding debt in the amount of $40,162; to stop intercepting his income tax refunds; and to stop reporting to the State Department passport control authorities that he is in arrears on his child support obligations. (Am. Compl. at 4.)

On December 21, 2018, Plaintiff filed a "Notice of Petition to Vacate a Void Judgment Coram Non-Judice 'Before a Person Not a Judge' Void for Violation of the 14th Amendment and Must be Vacated Under Federal Rule 60(b)(4) or State Law Equivalent." (Mot. to Vacate Judgment [Doc. No. 31].) The same day, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6).

The Court heard arguments on both motions on February 14, 2019. Plaintiff withdrew his Motion to Vacate Judgment at the hearing for the reasons stated on the record. See (Feb. 14, 2019 Minute Entry [Doc. No. 46].) Thus, the only motion before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

II. Discussion

Plaintiff did not expressly plead claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Amended Complaint. But because the Court liberally construes pro se pleadings "in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework," Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004), the Court construes the Amended Complaint as setting forth claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows a person under certaincircumstances to sue a governmental entity for violating his rights under the U.S. Constitution. Defendant appears to recognize as much in its briefing. See, e.g., (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 16).

Defendant moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint on three grounds: (1) lack of personal jurisdiction, (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and (3) insufficient service of process. See generally (Def.'s Mem. in Supp.) In presenting its arguments, Defendant raised the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a jurisdictional bar to this case. See (id. at 19-22.) Due to Rooker-Feldman's jurisdictional nature, see Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995), the Court addresses the doctrine's applicability before considering the other grounds for dismissal advanced by Defendant. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes Rooker-Feldman does not apply to this case but recommends Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be granted because Defendant is not subject to suit. Moreover, even if Defendant could be sued, the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege a claim against it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

1. Legal Standard

"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine stands for the general principle that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review state court judicial decisions." Prince v. Arkansas Bd. of Examiners in Psychology, 380 F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-416 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-483 (1983)). Rooker-Feldman is narrowly construed. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459,464 (2006) (describing Rooker-Feldman as "a narrow doctrine"). In particular, the United States Supreme Court has stated that Rooker-Feldman "has no application to judicial review of executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency." Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002); see also Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1348-1349 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the City's "undefended assumption that the doctrine applies to administrative as well as judicial decisions").

2. Analysis

Defendant acknowledges the Supreme Court's statement in Verizon Maryland that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to decisions made by state administrative agencies. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 20.) Defendant nonetheless argues that Rooker-Feldman bars Plaintiff's lawsuit because, in essence, Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies when the NFFR was issued in 1997 transformed the NFFR into "a final order" that is now "equivalent to a state court decision." (Id.)

Defendant cites no case law—and the Court has found none—in support of its argument that an administrative agency decision somehow morphed into a state court decision through the passage of time and/or Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his right to appeal. Regardless of how final the NFFR was, it remained a decision of a state administrative agency, not of a state court. It thus follows from Verizon Maryland and Van Harken that the administrative agency decision at issue here is beyond the reach of Rooker-Feldman.

Furthermore, it is well established that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a bar to bringing a claim for relief under § 1983. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 147 (1988) (holding that "plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies before instituting § 1983 suits in federal court"); Van Harken, 103 F.3d at 1349 (observing that "[c]ountless cases . . . allow people who lose in state administrative proceedings to seek relief in federal district court under civil rights legislation such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983" without requiring prior exhaustion of administrative remedies).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Rooker-Feldman does not require dismissal of this case. See Charchenko, 47 F.3d at 983.

B. Personal Jurisdiction Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)

Though county governments have departments that carry out county business, Minnesota law only grants the power to "sue and be sued" to the county itself. See Minn. Stat. § 373.01, subd. 1(a)(1) (each county in Minnesota "is a body politic and corporate and may . . . [s]ue...