Callaway v. City of Austin

CAROLINE CALLAWAY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF AUSTIN; TRAVIS COUNTY;AUSTIN POLICE OFFICER PATRICK OBORSKI;AUSTIN POLICE OFFICER ADAM JOHNSON;TRAVIS COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPUTIES JOSEPH HOSTEN,TUNI ORTON, JOSHUA STRICKLAND,LISA JOHNSON, AND FNU ROBLES; PRO-TOUCH NURSES, INC.;AND SHANEA RAMSEY-GRAHAM, Defendants.

A-15-CV-00103-SS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

July 14, 2015

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

ON THIS DAY the Court considered the following pending motions: Defendants Pro-Touch Nurses, Inc. and Shanea Ramsey-Graham (the "Pro-Touch Defendants")' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint [Dkt. #41], Plaintiff's Response thereto [Dkt. #49], and the Pro-Touch Defendants' Reply in Support [Dkt #51]; Defendants City of Austin, Officer Adam Johnson, and Officer Patrick Oborski (the "City Defendants")' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. #43], Plaintiff's Response thereto [Dkt. #46], and the City Defendants' Reply in support [#47]; and Defendants Travis County, Deputy Joseph Hosten, Deputy Tuni Orton, Deputy Joshua Strickland, Deputy Lisa Johnson, and Deputy (FNU) Robles (the "Travis County Defendants")' Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. #44], the Travis County Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. #45], Plaintiff's Response thereto [Dkt. #53], and the Travis County Defendants' Reply in support [Dkt. #54]. Having reviewed the pleadings, the briefing of the parties, the relevant law, and the case file as a whole, the Court now enters the following Opinion and Orders.

I. Background

Plaintiff Caroline Calloway alleges she was stopped by Austin Police Officer Patrick Oborski in the early morning hours of February 4, 2013, after running a red light. 2d. Am. Compl. [Dkt. #35] at 3. Officer Oborski asked Callaway to perform a field sobriety test and the take a breathalyzer test for the presence of alcohol. Id at 4. Callaway declined the breath test, and Officer Oborsky arrested her and obtained a warrant to draw her blood for purposes of testing it for the presence of alcohol. Id.

Callaway alleges her arrest was part of a "no-refusal weekend," an Austin Police Department initiative coinciding with the 2013 Super Bowl Weekend. Id. As part of the "no refusal weekend," officers of the Austin Police Department were instructed to arrest any individual who did not consent to voluntary breath or blood tests and obtain a warrant from a standby judge to authorize a blood draw from the individual to obtain potential chemical evidence of driving while intoxicated. Id.

Callaway states she was taken to the Travis County Sheriff's Office central jail for processing, where Officer Adam Johnson was the DWI supervisor for the no-refusal initiative. Id. She asserts she was not combative or resistant during her arrest or during the booking process, id., though she did tell "the Officers" she would not consent to a blood draw. Id. at 5. She also alleges she "had informed the officers that she suffered from an anxiety disorder for which she took medications." Id. She does not specify which officers she provided this information.

Callaway alleges, after a warrant was obtained, Officer Johnson led her, in handcuffs, to a small padded room with a restraint chair. Id. at 4. Callaway states she was "kept in physical restraints during the entire time relevant to this incident," id., and did not attempt to flee, fight, or otherwise escape. Id. In addition to Austin Police Department Officers Adam Johnson and Patrick Oborski, she alleges Travis County Sherriff's Officers Hosten, Orton, Strickland, (Lisa) Johnson, and Robles were waiting in the small padded room. Id. A phlebotomist, nurse Shannon Ramsey-Graham, was also waiting in the room to take Callaway's blood. Id. Callaway asserts that, without any discussion, she was placed into the restraint chair, which involved leg irons, straps over her legs, shoulders, and wrists, and handcuffing her hands and feet to the chair. Id.

Callaway was 22 years old at the time and weighed 140 pounds. Id. She reiterates several times that she never tried to fight or flee the restraints. Id. She alleges all seven officers nevertheless surrounded her in the restraint chair and that one of the officers put a bag "completely over Callaway's head, covering her eyes, nose, and mouth." Id. at 5. She asserts that, at the time the bag was over her head, she felt at least four officers physically grabbing and restraining her. Id. At this point, Callaway alleges she began to involuntarily shake from anxiety, and she began gasping for breath, fearing that she was being suffocated. Id. Officer Adam Johnson grabbed her arm to forcibly steady it for the blood draw. Id.

Nurse Ramsey-Graham attempted a blood draw, but the needle popped out and blood spilled onto Officer Johnson. Id. Callaway asserts Officer Johnson then resorted to using his boot and his body weight to try to hold Callaway's arm still. Id. Callaway's shaking continued, and another officer "used his hand or hands to choke Callaway around her neck, until she was on the verge of losing consciousness and her body went limp." Id. As Callaway went limp, Officer Johnson continued to press down on her arm with the aid of his boot and nurse Ramsey-Graham obtained a blood draw from Callaway's hand. Id. at 6. Callaway asserts she suffers from severe bruising, particularly around her neck; nerve damage, which she alleges may be permanent; and post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of her experience. Id. at 13.

Callaway brings suit against the City of Austin and Officers Oborski and Johnson; Travis County and Travis County Sheriff's Deputies Hosten, Orton, Strickland, Johnson, and Robles; nurse Ramsey-Graham, and nurse Ramsey-Graham's employer, Pro-Touch Nurses, Inc. ("Pro-Touch"), a company that contracts with the City of Austin to take blood samples on "no refusal" weekends. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff asserts each Defendant violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to be free from unlawful seizures by participating in, or creating the conditions for, an unreasonable use of force in drawing her blood. Id. at 8-9. Against the individual officers, Callaway alleges each officer is liable not only for his or her individual role but also as a bystander who had a duty to protect Callaway from the actions of the other officers. Id. at 9-10. Notably, she does not assert bystander liability against Ramsey-Graham, the nurse. Id. Against the City of Austin and Travis County, Callaway asserts claims for direct liability arising out of the City and County's alleged policies that encouraged (or, in the alternative, lack of formal policies and training to prevent) "no refusal" blood draws that relied on excessive force. Id. at 10. She does not assert any similar "policy and procedure" or "lack of training" claim against Pro-Touch, Inc. Id.

Callaway asserts additional state law claims for assault and battery and negligence against each of the individual officers, nurse Ramsey-Graham, and Pro-Touch, Inc. Id. at 11-12. She further asserts claims for medical malpractice against Ramsey-Graham and Pro-Touch, Inc. Id. at 12. She seeks actual damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and unspecified injunctive relief against all defendants. Id. at 12-13.

II. Legal Standards Applicable to All Defendants

A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)6

When evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and all facts pleaded therein must be taken as true. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 mandates only that a pleading contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," this standard demands more than unadorned accusations, "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Bell Ail. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The Supreme Court has made clear this plausibility standard is not simply a "probability requirement," but imposes a standard higher than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The standard is properly guided by "[t]wo working principles." Id. First, although "a court must 'accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint,' that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Second, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679. Thus, in considering a motion to dismiss, the court must initially identify pleadings that are no more than legal conclusions not entitled to the assumption of truth, then assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations and determine whether those allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. If not, "the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).

B. Excessive Force Claims Relating to Arrests and Pretrial Investigations

Callaway's Section 1983 claims against all defendants are grounded in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2d Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 35] at 8. "In a federal civil rights action under [Section] 1983, when a claim arises under multiple constitutional provisions, a court should analyze the claim under the most applicable...