Callbeck v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, Inc.

480 F.Supp.3d 308

Geralyn CALLBECK, Plaintiff.

v.FALLON COMMUNITY HEALTH PLAN, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-cv-40038-TSH

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Filed August 14, 2020

Ryan P. Avery, Mirageas & Avery, LLC, Milford, MA, for Plaintiff.

Chelsie A. Vokes, Bowditch & Dewey LLP, Worcester, MA, Robert George Young, II, Bowditch & Dewey, LLP, Framingham, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

(Docket No. 13)

HILLMAN, D.J.,

Geralyn Callbeck ("Plaintiff") filed this action against Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc. ("Defendant"), alleging several counts of discrimination and retaliation. Defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Docket No. 13). For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part its motion.

Background ¹

Defendant hired Plaintiff to work as a Registered Nurse ("RN") in its Summit Elder Care site in May 2016. As an RN, Plaintiff's main duties included caring for wounds, taking patients’ vital signs, administering IV lines and injections, and performing various administrative duties.

One morning in June 2019, Plaintiff woke up without any feeling in her right arm. She visited a hospital, and a neurologist diagnosed her with radial nerve palsy. Because radial nerve palsy "substantially limits an individual's ability to hold, lift, grip and otherwise apply pressure with his or her hands," Plaintiff applied for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (the "FMLA") while she underwent treatment. (Docket No. 10 at 3). Defendant approved her request for leave and noted that Plaintiff could not return to work until she had "been cleared by [her] doctor to return ... with no restrictions." (Docket No. 10 at 3).

Although Defendant had granted Plaintiff leave through August 9, 2019, Plaintiff sought to return to work in early July. Defendant asked Plaintiff to provide documentation of her restrictions and the expected end date for those restrictions. On July 12, Plaintiff submitted a letter from her doctor stating that she could return to work on July 15 without restriction and indicating that she would need to utilize wrist splints for one to six months. (Docket No. 10-2 at 1). Defendant informed Plaintiff that it considered "the wearing of wrist splints" a restriction, indicated that it could not accept this restriction, and denied her request to return. (Docket No. 10 at 4) (emphasis removed). When Plaintiff requested further explanation of the denial, Defendant replied that "[e]mployee and participant safety were key factors in the decision." (Docket No. 10 at 5).

Plaintiff obtained counsel and, on July 31, demanded immediate reinstatement with backpay through July 15. On August 7, Plaintiff received notice of a communication allegedly sent to Plaintiff's doctor on August 1 requesting clarification. Because her leave was scheduled to expire on August 9, Plaintiff sought an extension while she obtained further documentation of her restrictions. Her doctor drafted a second letter stating that Plaintiff could "return to work in her full and usual capacity without restrictions with the reasonable accommodation of wearing the right wrist splint," and Plaintiff submitted it on August 16. (Docket No. 10 at 5). Defendant authorized Plaintiff to return to work on August 26. (Docket No. 10 at 6). It refused, however, to compensate Plaintiff for any lost wages between July 15 and August 26 or to restore any employee benefits used during this period.

On October 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD"). (Docket Nos. 10 at 6, 10-8 at 1). Two weeks later, Plaintiff was involved in a car accident, and her driving license was suspended. (Docket No. 10 at 6). When Plaintiff informed Defendant about the incident, Defendant stated that her position required an "active driver's license" and a clean driving record. (Docket No. 10 at 6). Plaintiff challenged these requirements, reminding Defendant that they had not existed when it hired her in 2016, and Defendant amended its policy as applied to Plaintiff to require only "reliable transportation" to and from work. (Docket No. 10 at 6).

In January 2020, Plaintiff requested permission to withdraw her administrative action before the MCAD and to refile in state or federal court. The MCAD granted her request and dismissed the action on February 7.

On February 20, 2020, Plaintiff's clinical manager, Lynnette Bilodeau, and the facility's site director, Sheila Despres, sent Plaintiff home from work for displaying "slurred and slowed" speech. Although the two knew that Plaintiff took medications which could cause dry mouth and that Plaintiff's use of dentures could compound the condition, they suspended Plaintiff with pay pending an investigation into the cause of her speech impairment. (Docket No. 10 at 7). The next day, Linda St. John, the Vice President for Talent Management, called Plaintiff at 3:27pm demanding that she take a drug test in Shrewsbury at 4:45pm. Plaintiff stated that she could not appear for the drug test on such short notice given the suspension of her license, and Ms. St. John rescheduled the test for February 24. Although Plaintiff duly showed up to and passed the February 24 drug test, Defendant issued Plaintiff a written warning for "appearing to be under the influence of drugs" at work and "not agreeing to be tested on the day it was requested." (Docket No. 10 at 7–8).

In the following months, Defendant allegedly improperly disclosed confidential health and personnel information about Plaintiff to other employees. Plaintiff overheard her fellow employees making light of her medical conditions, and she was harassed by her managers and fellow employees about the need to be "fit for duty" at work. (Docket No. 10 at 8).

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on April 3, 2020. She served the complaint on Defendant on May 12, 2020. The next day, Ms. Despres and Ms. Bilodeau called Plaintiff into Ms. Despres’ office for allegedly displaying slurred and slowed speech again. Although Plaintiff offered to take a test to rule out use of drugs or alcohol, Ms. Despres instead instructed Plaintiff to perform administrative work for the rest of the day and allow other employees to cover her patient care duties. At the end of the day, Ms. Despres called Plaintiff back into her office to participate in a conference call with a representative from human resources. Ms. Despres suspended Plaintiff with pay for failing to request necessary accommodations for her physical and mental conditions and informed Plaintiff that she "had 48 hours to obtain medical documentation stating what accommodations she would need to perform her essential job functions." (Docket No. 10 at 8). During the call, the HR representative "interrupted [Plaintiff] and/or prevented her from speaking altogether on several occasions ..., prompting [Plaintiff] to throw up her hands in frustration at one point." (Docket No. 10 at 8–9). Ms. St. John terminated Plaintiff one day later for allegedly making an obscene gesture during the May 13 conference call, even though Plaintiff did not make any such gesture.²

Plaintiff amended her complaint on June 15, 2020. (Docket No. 10). Her First Amended Complaint raises the following claims against Defendant: (1) failure to reasonably accommodate the impairment associated with her radial nerve palsy (Counts I and II); (2) retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination before the MCAD (Counts III and IV); and (3) discrimination for the impairments associated with her depression, anxiety, attention deficit disorder, and use of dentures (Counts V and VI). (Docket No. 9 at 9–12). Defendant moved to dismiss all claims on June 29, 2020. (Docket No. 13).

Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc. , 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2000). To survive the motion, the complaint must allege "a plausible entitlement to relief."

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "The relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw from the facts alleged in the complaint." Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset , 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ).

Discussion

1. Failure to Accommodate Claims (Counts I and II)

Counts I and II assert that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16) ("Chapter 151B") and the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, by failing to reasonably accommodate the impairments caused by her radial nerve palsy.³ To establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that (1) she suffers from a disability or handicap;⁴ (2) she could perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodations, (3) she requested reasonable accommodations; and (4) her employer, despite knowing of her disability, denied to grant her reasonable accommodations. Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , 484 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2007) ; Gudava v. Ne. Hosp. Corp. , 440 F. Supp. 3d 49, 58 (D. Mass. 2020).

Here, Plaintiff has met her pleading burden. She alleges that, between July...