Calvin S. v. O'Malley

1

CALVIN S., Plaintiff, v. MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

No. 22-cv-6195

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

March 18, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Hon Keri L. Holleb Hotaling United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Calvin S.^[1]appeals the decision of the Defendant Commissioner (“Commissioner”) of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying him disability benefits. For the reasons set forth below Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 12) is DENIED^[2]; the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 15) is GRANTED. The Commissioner's decision is affirmed.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

According to the ALJ, on May 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), alleging disability beginning on March 22, 2021.^[3](R. 16.) Plaintiff's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 69-73, 75-81.) An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held an Administrative Hearing and subsequently issued a June 29, 2022 decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 16-29.) On September 6, 2022, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review (R. 1-9), rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner, reviewable by the district court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff filed this lawsuit seeking review of the ALJ's decision (Dkt. 1), and the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Keri L. Holleb Hotaling's initial caseload when she assumed the bench (Dkt. 21).

B. The ALJ's Decision

The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff's claim following the SSA's usual five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled during the relevant period. (R. 1629); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2025 and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged 2021 disability onset date. (R. 19.) At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had severe and non-severe impairments, which the ALJ listed and discussed. (Id.) The ALJ concluded at step three that Plaintiff's impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet or medically equal one of the SSA's listings of impairments. (R. 1922.)

Before step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) “to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c),” with some exertional, postural, and environmental limitations. (R. 22-23.) At step four, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff would be able to perform past relevant work. (R. 28.) Accordingly, the ALJ ended the analysis and concluded Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 29.)

C. Standard of Review

On review, the Court does not “merely rubber stamp the ALJ's decision”; instead, “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Prill v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 738, 746 (7th Cir. 2022).

“Substantial evidence is not a high threshold, as it means only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion[,]'”, and “a claimant bears the burden of proving []he is disabled.” Prill, 23 F.4th at 746 (quoting and citing Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)).

The ALJ need only “‘minimally articulate'” the “‘justification for rejecting or accepting specific evidence of a disability'” to satisfy the “lax” standard. Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 371 (7th Cir. 2004)). Under this standard, the Court is not to try the case de novo or supplant the ALJ's findings with the Court's assessment of the facts, whether as to credibility or conflicting record evidence. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004); Schmidt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 2000). If there is substantial evidence, the Court must affirm even if “reasonable minds could differ” or the evidence would support another conclusion. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2018); Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2004).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC is contrary to law and not supported by substantial evidence in two ways because it (1) improperly omitted limitations as to “the aftereffects of cancer and treatment for cancer” and (2) does not fully account for Plaintiff's right upper extremity limitations. Plaintiff also argues that the RFC is flawed because the ALJ did not appropriately conduct a subjective-symptoms analysis.^[4]

A. The ALJ's Assessment

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of degenerative changes in the lumbar spine; de Quervain's tenosynovitis in his right wrist;^[5]vertigo; and bursitis in his right foot. (R. 19.) The ALJ also found Plaintiff had the non-severe impairments of prostate cancer, acid reflux, sleep difficulties, fatty liver, a thyroid nodule, and pulmonary nodules. (Id.) Because Plaintiff raises challenges as to the RFC regarding only his prostate cancer and treatment and de Quervain's tenosynovitis, the Court details facts only as to those conditions.

Plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate cancer in October 2020 but did not pursue treatment until April 2021. (R. 19.) In April 2021, Plaintiff's oncologist, Olaide Ajayi, M.D., noted Plaintiff had no pain and had not yet begun treatment. (Id.) Tests were negative for metastatic disease. (Id.) Dr. Ajayi, and a radiation oncologist, Corbin Johnson, M.D., after consultation agreed Plaintiff should begin androgen deprivation therapy (Lupron injections) that would persist for two to three years; after two months of those treatments, Plaintiff would begin a forty-day course of radiation. (R. 19-20.) In July 2021, approximately two months after he had begun the androgen deprivation therapy, Plaintiff reported some hot flashes and nocturia and anticipated beginning radiation soon. (R. 19.) In September 2021, Dr. Johnson saw Plaintiff after Plaintiff completed radiation and concluded Plaintiff's reported symptoms, which included weakness, night sweats, and insomnia, were attributable to the androgen deprivation therapy rather than the shorter-term radiation treatments. (R. 20.) In October 2021, Dr. Ajayi noted that Plaintiff reported some hot flashes and difficulty sleeping but also that he continued normal activities and felt well overall. (Id.) Dr. Ajayi continued Plaintiff's androgen deprivation therapy with injections every twelve weeks and a three- month follow-up appointment. (Id.) In January 2022, Plaintiff reported hot flashes and fatigue. (Id.) At Plaintiff's appointments in April and October 2021 and in January of 2022, Dr. Ajayi described Plaintiff's status as “fully active, able to carry on all pre-disease performance without restriction.” (R. 19, 20.) Dr. Ajayi also repeatedly noted that Plaintiff had no signs or symptoms of active or recurrent prostate cancer. (R. 20.) The ALJ stressed that he did “not mean to imply that the claimant's prostate cancer and treatment for prostate cancer [were] insignificant event[s] in [Plaintiff's] life” but that he “conclude[d] that [Plaintiff's] prostate cancer did not significantly limit his ability to do basic work-related activity for a consecutive period of at least 12 months and therefore [] is a non-severe impairment.” (R. 20-21.)

In March 2021, Plaintiff reported right wrist pain with no known inciting injury. (R. 25.) He was fitted with a wrist brace that did not lead to improvement. (Id.) In June 2021, Plaintiff submitted a function report in which he indicated he could lift only twenty to thirty pounds. (R. 23, 197.) In July 2021, radiographs revealed no fractures, dislocations or other acute osseous abnormalities, and orthopedists diagnosed Plaintiff with de Quervain's tenosynovitis. (R. 25.) Plaintiff was not interested in injections or surgery at the time, so he was prescribed a topical antiinflammatory gel and a removable thumb spica brace and referred to occupational therapy. (Id.) Occupational therapy provided temporary relief, and Plaintiff reported he continued normal activities, working through pain. (Id.) Plaintiff later received a steroid injection. (R. 25, 51.) In June and September 2021, Plaintiff completed functional reports in which he reported difficulty shaving, dressing, sweeping, and mopping due to wrist pain. (Id. at 25-26.) He continued to have, inter alia, wrist tenderness, pain aggravated by gripping and pinching, and decreased grip strength in examinations in March 2022. (R. 25.) Plaintiff's wrist did not have motion deficits, weakness, instability, or neurological dysfunction. (Id.) Plaintiff wore a wrist brace during the Administrative Hearing and testified that sweeping, mopping, and other tasks caused his wrist to ache. (R. 26.)

The ALJ considered the opinions of the state-agency consultants in reaching a decision. The ALJ found the October 21, 2021 opinion of the reconsideration-level state agency medical consultant, Jacqueline Fister, M.D., “more persuasive” than that of the initial-level medical consultant, who addressed only Plaintiff's prostate cancer and no other claimed impairments. (R. 27, 78-79.) According to the ALJ, Dr. Fister “more thoroughly considered” Plaintiff's impairments and determined Plaintiff “retained the ability to perform a range of medium exertional work activity on a full-time sustained basis.” (R. 27.) The ALJ “conclude[d] [Plaintiff's] de Quervains tenosynovitis is a severe impairment[,]” but it did “not preclude [Plaintiff's] ability to perform full-time...