Camacho-Santiago v. United States

523 F.Supp.3d 206

Carlos R. CAMACHO-SANTIAGO, Petitioner,

v.UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

Civil No. 18-1140 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed March 3, 2021

Luz M. Rios-Rosario, San Juan, PR, for Petitioner.

Laura G. Montes-Rodriguez, Mariana E. Bauza, United States Attorneys Office District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

FRANCISCO A. BESOSA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Carlos R. Camacho-Santiago ("Camacho")’s motion to vacate the judgment against him and to allow him to consider a reinstated plea offer. (Docket No. 1.)¹ As discussed below, the Court ORDERS an evidentiary hearing solely on whether Camacho was prejudiced by his attorney's deficient performance.

I. Background

In 1993, Camacho was convicted of four crimes in Puerto Rico court. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 4–5.) For one conviction, he was sentenced to ten years of probation. Id. at p. 4. For the other three convictions, he was sentenced to two, three, and five years of probation. Id. at pp. 4–5; see Docket No. 2, Exs. 1–3. The Puerto Rico sentencing court explained that those three probation terms were to be served consecutively to the sentence for the first conviction, (Docket No. 2, Exs. 1–3), but did not indicate whether those three terms of probation were to be served consecutively to, or concurrently with each other. See id. If the three terms of probation were to be served consecutively to each other, Camacho's probation would end in 2013 (i.e., twenty years after 1993). If they were to be served concurrently with each other, the probation would end in 2008 (i.e., fifteen years after 1993).

In 2012, Camacho was charged in federal court with two counts of drug trafficking crimes. (Crim. No. 12-413, Docket No. 3); see also Crim. No. 12-413, Docket No. 518 at pp. 3–7 (superseding indictment). He pled not guilty. (Crim. No. 12-413, Docket Nos. 578, 590.)

That same year, Puerto Rico authorities began proceedings to revoke Camacho's probation because of the federal charges. (Docket No. 2, Exs. 4–5.) They necessarily assumed that the three terms of probation were to be served consecutively to each other and that, as a consequence, Camacho was still on probation in 2012. See id. Camacho's lawyer, Ismael Rodríguez-Izquierdo ("Rodríguez"), argued in the revocation proceedings in the state court that the federal charges were based on inadequate evidence. Id., Exs. 6–7, 9.

The government made a plea offer in the federal case. (Docket No. 1 at p. 2.) According to Camacho, "[t]he plea offered [sic ] tendered by the prosecution in the federal case was for ten (10) years of imprisonment." Id.

Rodríguez also represented Camacho in the federal case. Id. Camacho states that he rejected the federal plea offer on Rodríguez's advice. Id. Apparently, Rodríguez told Camacho that he was still on probation for the Puerto Rico charges and that pleading guilty to the federal charges would cause Puerto Rico to revoke his probation. Id. So, like the Puerto Rico authorities, Rodríguez necessarily believed that the three terms of probation were to be served consecutively to each other, and that Camacho was still on probation in 2012. See id. Camacho says Rodríguez counseled that the revocation would land him in prison for twenty years consecutive to any federal sentence. Id.

Camacho proceeded to trial in the federal case. In various pre-trial motions, Camacho indicated his intention to proceed to trial. See Docket No. 10 at pp. 8–9 (collecting pre-trial motions).

In 2014, a jury found Camacho guilty of the federal charges. (Crim. No. 12-413, Docket No. 1448.) At the sentencing hearing, Camacho stated that he did not agree with the jury's decision but would respect it. (Crim. No. 12-413, Docket No. 1874 at pp. 34–35.) This Court sentenced Camacho to 360 months imprisonment and entered judgment. (Crim. No. 12-413, Docket No. 1651.) The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. United States v. Camacho-Santiago, 851 F.3d 81, 83 (1st Cir. 2017).

After Camacho was convicted, the Puerto Rico court revoked his probation and sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment. (Docket No. 2, Ex. 15.) That court, like Rodríguez and the Puerto Rico authorities, must have thought that the three probation terms were to be served consecutively to each other and that Camacho was still on probation. See id.

In 2015, a Puerto Rico appellate court held that Camacho's probation ended in 2008. (Docket No. 2, Ex. 18 at p. 13.) The appellate court explained that because the 1993 sentencing court did not indicate whether the three terms of probation were to be served concurrently with, or consecutively to, each other, the law required that they be served concurrently. Id., Ex. 18 at pp. 12–13. In support, the appellate court pointed to Rule 179 of the Puerto Rico Rules of Criminal Procedure and People v. García, 165 D.P.R. 339, 344 (P.R. 2005). (Docket No. 2, Ex. 18 at pp. 12–13.) This means, of course, that pleading guilty in the federal case could not have caused Puerto Rico to revoke Camacho's probation in 2012. Id. at p. 13.

II. The Parties’ Positions

A. Camacho

Camacho's motion boils down to the following four propositions: (1) His Puerto Rico probation ended before the federal proceedings began. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 2–3.) (2) His lawyer erred in advising him that accepting the plea in the federal case would lead Puerto Rico to revoke his probation. Id. (3) He would have accepted the federal plea but for that advice. Id. at p. 3. (4) Following the advice landed him in prison for longer than he would have been imprisoned had he accepted the plea offer. Id.

Camacho explains that Rodríguez recently admitted that his plea bargain advice was mistaken. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 3, 9, 17.) According to Camacho,

[Rodríguez] candidly and honestly admitted to giving [Camacho] mistaken advice regarding his alleged exposure to a twenty (20) year local court revocation judgment consecutive to the ten (10) year federal sentence offered in a plea by the prosecution. [Rodríguez] also stated that his mistaken advice prevented [Camacho] from considering the federal plea offer; that this fact caused [Camacho] not to be able to evaluate the plea offered and the consequences of facing the federal trial without accepting the plea tendered by the prosecution.

Id. at p. 9.

B. The Government

The government argues that Rodríguez's advice was not deficient at the time it was given. (Docket No. 10 at pp. 5–7.) According to the government, the circumstances giving rise to Camacho's claim were not foreseeable at the time and are "wholly dependent on events that transpired after the representation ended." Id. at p. 5. Therefore, the government argues that Camacho leans too heavily on hindsight in implying that Rodríguez should have known that Camacho's probation had ended. Id. at pp. 5–6. The government warns, "To conclude that counsel should have known facts dependent on a later ruling by the state court of appeal, is to declare that counsel should engage in speculation of potential unforeseen circumstances." Id. at p. 7.

The government also asserts that Camacho cannot show he would have accepted the government's plea offer but for Rodríguez's advice. Id. at pp. 8–10. In support, the government points to Camacho's assertions before and during the trial regarding (i) his intention to proceed to trial, (ii) the government's alleged lack of sufficient evidence against him, and (iii) his disagreement with the jury's verdict. Id. According to the government, these assertions "unequivocally suggest that Camacho was determined to go to trial well before and after any plea offer was extended" and establish "a reasonable probability that Camacho would have proceeded to trial regardless of the pending state revocation." Id. at pp. 8–9.

III. Applicable Law

In certain circumstances, a federal prisoner may attack his conviction or sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. An allegation that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance during plea bargaining may be a proper basis on which to attack a conviction or sentence. See Andrus v. Texas, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1875, 1881, 207 L.Ed.2d 335 (2020) ; Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004) ; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel generally requires a section 2255 petitioner to satisfy a two-pronged test. A petitioner "must show that his ‘counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and that such deficiency prejudiced him." Feliciano-Rodríguez v. United States, 986 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ) (emphasis supplied).

The first prong of that standard is sometimes known as the "performance prong." When evaluating whether a petitioner satisfies the performance prong, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Courts maintain "a ‘strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,’ " Feliciano-Rodríguez, 986 F.3d at 37 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ), and "find an attorney's performance deficient ‘only where, given the facts known at the time, counsel's choice was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made it.’ " Id. (quoting Knight v. Spencer, 447 F.3d 6, 15 (1st Cir. 2006) ). "[A] reviewing court must not lean too heavily on hindsight: a lawyer's acts and omissions must be judged on the basis of what he knew, or should have known, at the time his tactical choices were made and implemented." Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2002).

A showing that defense counsel gave incompetent advice to accept or reject a plea offer can be sufficient to satisfy the performance prong. See Lafler...