Camacho v. Cnmi Dep't of Corr.

JESSE JAMES BABAUTA CAMACHO, Plaintiff, v. CNMI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-00008

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

January 31, 2019

DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING COMMONWEALTH AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS, AND GRANTING IN PART THE PERSONAL CAPACITY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jesse James Babauta Camacho is a prisoner in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands ("Commonwealth" or "CNMI"). He is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the CNMI Department of Corrections (DOC) and eleven DOC employees for violating the Eighth Amendment by denying and interfering with his access to medical care. Before this Court are the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands' Motion to Correct Misjoinder and Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of DOC and the official capacity defendants (ECF No. 36), and personal capacity Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 37, 42).¹ Plaintiff filed a timely response (ECF No. 44), and Defendants did not file a reply. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(a)(2), the Court took these motions under advisement without a hearing. (ECF No. 45.)

Having reviewed the record and the briefs, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Commonwealth and official capacity Defendants' motions and DISMISSES the case against them. It also GRANTS the personal capacity Defendants' motion to dismiss, but Plaintiff is GRANTED limited leave to amend his claims against some of the personal capacity Defendants.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts alleged in Plaintiff Camacho's original letter to the Court (ECF No. 1) and amended complaint (ECF No. 4, 4-1)² are as follows: On the night of August 30, 2017, Camacho was transported to the emergency room with chest pains, difficulty breathing and near loss of consciousness. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) In the emergency room, his vital signs were taken, and he saw a doctor who, without conducting any tests, told him that he was suffering from anxiety. (Id.; ECF No. 4-1 at 12.) Camacho was returned to the prison without any medications. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) The next evening, on August 31 at 5:30 p.m., Camacho again experienced chest pain, difficulty breathing, and light-headedness. (Id.) He reported these symptoms to a corrections officer (who is not a defendant in this matter) and asked to go to the hospital. (Id.) Instead, EMTs were called to the prison to attend to him. (Id.) The EMTs checked Camacho's vital signs and found them to be normal, but suggested that the officers bring him to the hospital. (Id.) Two other officers told Camacho that he would have to wait until the shift change at 7:00 p.m., and that they were awaiting a phone call from the commanders, Lieutenant Frances Rebuenog and Commander Lorraine Rios (both named Defendants). (Id. at 2; ECF No. 4-1 at 2-3.) He was finally told that he would be taken to the hospital the next day. (ECF No.1 at 2.)

On the morning of the third day, September 1, Camacho continued to ask officers when they would take him to the hospital. (Id.) He was told that, per Lieutenant Rebuenog, they would call the EMTs to come again instead of taking him to the hospital. (Id.) The EMTs arrived and recommended that Camacho be brought to the hospital, but Commander Rios decided against taking him to hospital, instead just allowing him to use a nebulizer. (Id.) By 2:40 p.m., Camacho reported that his pain was worsening to an officer, who was given permission by Lieutenant Rebuenog to take Camacho to the mini-court for some fresh air and was told that they would call the EMTs again. (Id.; ECF No. 4-1 at 2.) About two hours later, Camacho telephoned his aunt to ask her to call DOC to ask them to bring him to the hospital, but she was unable to get through. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) At 7:00 p.m., during the shift change, Camacho again asked an officer to take him to the hospital because he was suffering from chest pains. (Id. at 3.) Two officers told him he looked pale. (Id.) He then slid to the floor and blacked out. (Id.) Only then was Camacho brought to the hospital, where he was hooked up to an EKG and subsequently told by a doctor that he was having a heart attack. (Id.) His doctor told one of the officers that "what [he was] going through could have been prevented if [he had been] taken up to the hospital sooner." (Id.)

Camacho remained in the hospital until September 7, 2017. (Id.) When he was discharged, his doctor advised him to have a follow-up appointment at the FCC (Family Care Clinic)³ in one week and to see a heart specialist in Hawaii as soon as possible. (Id.) Defendant Nina Aldan, DOC MedicalOfficer, failed to make a follow-up appointment for Camacho at the FCC; it was an ER doctor that made the appointment for him. (ECF No. 4-1 at 3-4.) She also told him that they could not send him off-island because there is no money. (ECF No. 1 at 3.)

On October 17, 2017, Camacho was taken to Guam for a second opinion. (Id.) There, a doctor performed a cardiac catheterization and diagnosed him with severe four-vessel coronary artery disease. (Id. at 4.) The next day, Camacho complained of chest pains and was taken to the hospital, where he discussed his treatment options with his doctors. (Id.) Camacho opted for bypass surgery. (Id.) The doctors recommended Camacho be flown to Los Angeles for the surgery as soon as possible, but DOC delayed. (Id.) He was transported to Los Angeles about a month later, where he had the surgery the next day. (Id.) Camacho returned to Saipan two weeks later. (Id.) He claims he is now disabled, but did not provide details regarding his disability. (Id.)

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 13, 2018, this Court received Camacho's letter relaying the above facts. The Court construed his letter as a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs as a prisoner in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Order to Amend Complaint at 1, ECF No. 2.) The Court ordered Camacho to amend his complaint to indicate which officials and entities he intended to name as defendants. (Id. at 2.) In response, Camacho filed a complaint using Pro Se Form 14 (Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Prisoner)) as well as a handwritten list of eleven Defendants explaining the basis of his claim against each person. (ECF Nos. 4, 4-1.) He named as defendants the following individuals: Commissioner Vincent Attao, Director of Civil Division Georgia Cabrera, Captain JosePangelinan, Captain Pius Yaroitemal, the late Lieutenant Frances Rebuenog, Lieutenant Manuel Quitano, Sergeant Frederick Billy, COIII Cynthia Santos, COIII Lorraine Rios, COIII Benjamin Lizama, and COII Nina Aldan. (ECF No. 4-1 at 1.) In his handwritten exhibit, Camacho did not indicate whether he was suing the named persons in their individual or official capacities. However, on the pro se form he indicated that he was suing four⁴ defendants in their official capacity only - Cabrera, Rebuenog, Rios, and Lizama.

On August 21, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a motion to correct misjoinder of DOC and dismiss for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 36.) First, the Commonwealth moved to substitute itself for DOC because DOC lacks the capacity to be sued. Second, it moved to dismiss the claims against the Commonwealth and all official capacity Defendants because they are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. The personal capacity Defendants separately filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 37, 42.) Camacho filed a response in which he did not address the arguments put forth by Defendants, but instead he restated his claims against nine⁵ of the named defendants and quantified the monetary damages sought. (ECF No. 44.)

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IV. ANALYSIS

a. DOC lacks the capacity to sue or be sued

Defendant Commonwealth asserts that DOC must be dismissed from the case because it is a non-jural entity that lacks the capacity to sue or be sued. (CNMI Memo. at 7, ECF No. 36-1.) "[T]he court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. It is within the discretion of the court to permit the substitution of a party, but the court is not obligated to do so. Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc., 865 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 2017). The capacity of a governmental entity to be sued in federal court is determined by the law of the state where the district court is located. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b); see also Shaw v. State of California Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 604 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the [San Jose] Police Department's capacity to be sued in federal court is to be determined by the law of California."). To raise a party's capacity to sue or be sued, "a party must do so by a specific denial, which must state any supporting facts that are peculiarly within the party's knowledge." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(a).

Here, Commonwealth law is silent as to DOC's capacity to sue or be sued. Defendant asks the Court to interpret that silence as an intentional legislative act denying DOC the capacity to sue or be sued, by applying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.⁶ (CNMI Memo. at 8.) The impact of legislative silence depends on context. The U.S. Supreme Court has "long held that the expressio unius canon does not apply 'unless it is fair to suppose that Congress considered theunnamed possibility and meant to say no to it.'" Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381 (2013) (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003)).

This Court recently addressed the application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to legislative silence regarding the capacity of CNMI agencies to sue or be sued in two cases. First, in Norita v. CNMI Department of Public Safety, the Court stated:

The Commonwealth Supreme Court recognized the

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