Camelo ex rel. P.C. v. Bristol-Warren Reg'l Sch. Dist.

MICHAEL CAMELO, as parent andnext friend of P.C., et al., Plaintiffs, v. BRISTOL-WARREN REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

C.A. No. 19-660 WES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

March 12, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 11. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of P.C., their minor son. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1-1. During the events at issue, P.C. was an eighth-grade student at Kickemuit Middle School, part of Defendant Bristol-Warren Regional School District. Defendants Mario Andrade and Christine Homen were the superintendent of the school district and principal of the school, respectively.² Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 20.

The controversy at the heart of this case began in late April of 2019, when P.C. was removed from school "pending an investigation into behaviors . . . ." Id. ¶ 7. Andrade notified Plaintiffs of the removal through a letter. Id. ¶ 8. At a subsequent meeting, Andrade and Homen told Plaintiffs that P.C. had been removed because other students had made statements that P.C. had pulled his pants down and exposed his penis to his algebra class. See id. ¶ 9. Defendants did not provide those statements to Plaintiffs during the meeting or at any other time. See id. ¶ 10. The only document substantiating the allegations was a "vague list of allegations" that did not list the accusers. Id. ¶ 22. The Complaint implies that Plaintiffs and their son have always denied the allegations against him. See id. ¶¶ 15, 19, 21, 48, 52.

In the weeks following the meeting, the school system investigated the alleged incident. See id. ¶¶ 11-14. P.C. and his parents met with an investigator from the school district to answer questions about the allegations against P.C.; again, they did not receive documentation of the allegations. Id. ¶ 14. Attorneys for the school system, with Andrade's authorization, offered a restorative justice plan to P.C. Id. ¶ 16. The written plan listed students who were allegedly in fear of P.C. Id. Andrade offered to have P.C. return to school with conditions including "no contact orders, change of academic teams and a rigid program sponsored by the Day One, the state's premiere sexual trauma center." Id.

It appears that Plaintiffs rejected this offer and instead sought review of the removal through an expedited hearing with the Rhode Island Department of Education ("RIDE"). See id. ¶¶ 20-21. However, the Complaint implies that Plaintiffs abandoned their appeal because "RIDE does not deal with substantive and procedural due process issues," a decision would not be issued before the end of the school year, and Plaintiffs were told that P.C.'s grades and school record would be unblemished by the incident.³ Id. ¶ 21. P.C. remained suspended from school through the end of his eighth-grade year. Id. ¶ 27.

After Plaintiffs filed suit in the Providence County Superior Court, the case was removed to this Court. See Defs.' Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Their Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, lists twelve causes of action, including various forms of negligence, infliction of emotional distress, denial of freedom of expression, violation of equal protection, violation of procedural due process, and conspiracy to violate civil rights. Defendants later filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 11.

II. DISCUSSION

When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court "take[s] the well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant . . . ." Kando v. R.I. State Bd. of Elections, 880 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Facts drawn from documents "fairly incorporated" in the pleadings and facts "susceptible to judicial notice" may be considered. Kando, 880 F.3d at 58 (citation omitted). The motion should be granted only if "the properly considered facts conclusively establish that the movant is entitled to the relief sought." Id. (citation omitted).

Defendants argue that many of the substantive claims are insufficiently pled, that the claims against the three individual Defendants should be rejected entirely, and that the school district and school committee are improper defendants. See Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Pleadings 5-19, ECF No. 11-1.

1. Claim-Specific Arguments

a. Procedural Due Process

Count XI, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that Defendants violated P.C.'s constitutional right to due process by suspending him without sufficient notice or opportunity to be heard. Compl. ¶ 77. Defendants argue - relying in part on the RIDE decisions, which fall outside the scope of this motion, see supra note 3 - that "P.C. has been given ample due process." Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Pleadings 15.

Due process requires that parties facing a "deprivation of life, liberty, or property by adjudication" be given "notice reasonably calculated" to "afford them the opportunity to present their objections" and "of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-314 (1950) (citations omitted). Students possess a property interest in the benefits of their education and a liberty interest in their reputation, both of which are implicated by school suspensions. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975). Therefore, "students facing suspension . . . must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." Id. at 579. "[T]he timing and content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved." Id. (citations omitted). More specifically, "due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story." Id. at 581. Without a sufficient opportunity to assess the evidence, a student facing suspension cannot fully respond to the allegations or explain and defend the conduct at issue. See Pomeroy v. Ashburnham Westminster Regional Sch. Dist., 410 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D. Mass. 2006). The Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutional requirements for suspensions longer than ten days. See Johnson v. Collins, 233 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248 (D.N.H. 2002).

Plaintiffs allege that P.C.'s due process rights were violated because he did not receive written documentation of the statements against him, the names of his accusers, the time and date of the conduct in question, or any written findings of fact supporting his suspension. See Compl. ¶¶ 77, 79, 81-82. In sum, the Complaint alleges that the evidence provided to P.C. amounted to little more than the bare accusation that he pulled down his pants during class. See id. ¶¶ 7-10, 14-16. School suspensions do not necessitate "the procedural requirements of a common law criminal trial." Gorman v. U. of Rhode Island, 837 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988). However, because P.C. denied the allegations, the school was required to provide an "explanation of the evidence" against him. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 581. Given the length of the suspension at issue, a one-sentence description of the alleged offense was insufficient. See id. at 584 (stating that suspensions longer than ten days "may require more formal procedures"); McGrath v. Town of Sandwich, 22 F. Supp. 3d 58, 66 (D. Mass. 2014) ("[A] reasonable official would have understood that categorically declining to disclose the content of witness statements or a report of the incident violated" the student's "right to be informed of the evidence against him . . . ."). Thus, the Complaint plausibly alleges a violation of the P.C.'s right to be informed of the evidence against him.

Moreover, affording all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the Complaint alleges that P.C. did not receive an opportunity to present his side of the story until he met with a school representative on May 16, seventeen days after his removal from school. See Compl. ¶¶ 7-9, 14, 79, 83. This delay violates Goss's requirement that notice and hearing occur prior to removal, or, where the student's "presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process[,]" "as soon as practicable" following removal. 419 U.S. at 582-83. Lastly, the Complaint alleges that the school eventually determined that the allegation that P.C. pulled down his pants during class was false, but the school continued to enforce P.C.'s suspension without providing an alternate basis. See Compl. ¶¶ 15-16. If true, this conduct would violate the requirement that P.C. receive "oral or written notice of the charges against him . . . ." Goss, 419 U.S. at 581.

As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately pled a violation of procedural due process. However, not all counts of the Complaint fare so well.

b. Freedom of Expression

Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants deprived P.C. of his right to free speech under the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions by "penalizing [his] grades, filing egregious sexual charges against him, denying [him] his graduation and [the] opportunity to finish his baseball season," and "compell[ing] [him] to express ideas" that were not his own. Compl. ¶¶ 58, 64; see generally, id. ¶¶ 57-68. However, neither the Complaint nor Plaintiffs' other filings indicate any ways in which P.C.'s expressive conduct was either restricted or compelled. Moreover, Plaintiffs make no reasonable argument, and point to no case law, for the proposition that activities such as middle school graduation or sports participation implicate freedom of expression. Therefore, the Court enters judgment for Defendants on Counts XIII and IX.

c. Equal Protection

In Count X, Plaintiffs bring a...