Cameron v. Santiago

310 A.3d 391

223 Conn.App. 836

Catherina CAMERON

v.Javier SANTIAGO

(AC 46440)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Submitted on Brief November 14, 2023

Officially Released February 20, 2024

Catherina Cameron, self-represented, filed a brief as the appellant.

Moll, Clark and Seeley, Js.

SEELEY, J.

₈₃₇The self-represented plaintiff, Catherine Cameron, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing, sua sponte, her action against the defendant, Javier Santiago.¹ On appeal, she claims that the ₈₃₈court deprived her of procedural due process by sua sponte dismissing her action, with prejudice, without giving her notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to the grounds on which the court based its dismissal. We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In July, 2016, the plaintiff and the defendant had a sexual encounter in a hotel room. According to the plaintiff, the defendant did not comply with the terms of her consent to that sexual encounter because he did not wear a condom during the entirety of the sexual encounter. In February, 2018, the plaintiff filed a small claims action against the defendant seeking $5000 for medical expenses and pain and suffering stemming from the 2016 sexual encounter with the defendant, alleging that, following the encounter, she experienced anxiety and fear about becoming pregnant or contracting a sexually transmitted disease. In the small claims matter, the court rendered judgment for the defendant after finding that the plaintiff had "failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence her claim for medical expenses and pain and suffering from an alleged sexual assault by the defendant."

Thereafter, in June, 2019, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant in the Superior Court for breach of contract. The complaint in the breach of contract action, which detailed the same 2016 sexual encounter, alleged that the defendant had failed to pay the plaintiff certain sums of money pursuant to agreements entered into by the parties. In November, 2021, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a stipulated judgment in the breach of contract action, pursuant to which the defendant is required to pay the plaintiff $10,000 by November, 2024. The defendant has not yet made any payment pursuant to that judgment.

₈₃₉In May, 2022, the plaintiff commenced the present action, alleging that the defendant did not comply with the terms of her consent to the 2016 sexual encounter by failing to wear a condom during the entirety of the sexual encounter. On March 3, 2023, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging claims for assault, battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, recklessness, and negligence. On March 8, 2023, the defendant filed an answer. A remote, on-the-record pretrial conference was held on April 14, 2023, at which only the plaintiff appeared and did so as a self-represented party. At the outset of the pretrial conference, the court stated to the plaintiff that, before it would hear from her, it wanted to review the history of the case. It then proceeded to question the plaintiff several times regarding whether the facts of the present case involved the same circumstances concerning her 2016 sexual encounter with the defendant, to which she replied, "[y]es." It also questioned her regarding the two prior actions she had brought related to the 2016 sexual encounter. The court then stated: "[U]nder the law, you cannot continue to keep retrying a case, especially when you’ve already obtained a judgment, which you did in this ease." Even though the plaintiff responded that the defendant waived any defenses, the court simply stated that the present action was brought well beyond the statute of limitations and that it would issue a written order on the matter. It then adjourned the conference.

[1] On April 17, 2023, the court issued a written order dismissing the action sua sponte with prejudice. In the order, the court noted that the plaintiff previously had filed a small claims matter related to the 2016 sexual encounter, which resulted in a judgment for the defendant after a hearing. The court also noted the plaintiff’s prior breach of contract action, which resulted in a stipulated judgment, and stated: "The plaintiff now ₈₄₀brings this action again involving the same parties and same factual allegations. A remote, on-the-record pretrial conference was held on April 14, 2023. The plaintiff acknowledged … that the claim involves the same parties and factual allegations of the two prior actions, arising from an incident which occurred on July 3, 2016. She stated she believes the defendant should be defaulted and she should be allowed to proceed, despite the matter having already gone to judgment in the [breach of contract] case. The case is dismissed with prejudice. The matter has already been adjudicated through a final stipulated judgment and the present action has been brought well past the statute of limitations." Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue and for reconsideration, which the court denied, and this amended appeal followed.²

[2–7] On May 2, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation seeking an articulation and clarification of the legal basis for the trial court’s dismissal of her action with prejudice. On May 31, 2023, the court issued a written articulation of its decision. In that articulation, the court first compared the facts of the present case to those of the prior breach of contract action and explained that its dismissal was based on the prior pending action doctrine.³ Specifically, the court stated: ₈₄₁"In the present case, the content of the pleadings reveals that both actions arise out of the same course of conduct. Therefore, in the present case and the prior pending action, the liabilities asserted are based entirely on the same underlying facts. In each action, the plaintiff seeks to adjudicate the same underlying rights; therefore, the actions are exactly the same. Accordingly, because the present case and the prior pending action are exactly the same … the court has no discretion and must dismiss the present case under the prior pending action doctrine."⁴ Next, the court applied this court’s holding in Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 54 Conn. App. 164, 166–68, 734 A.2d 589 (1999), to the facts of the present case and concluded that it could not afford meaningful relief to the plaintiff and that the action, therefore, was moot. In particular, the court stated that "both of the plaintiff’s actions here demand the same relief, which is available to her via the stipulated judgment entered in her prior pending action, and ₈₄₂the court cannot afford her any further relief than that already pending."

I

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court deprived her of procedural due process by dismissing her case, sua sponte, without affording her with notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the grounds for the court’s dismissal. We agree and conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the court’s sua sponte dismissal of the action was improper.

[8–12] We first set forth our standard of review and governing legal principles. "Whether a party was deprived of his [or her] due process rights is a question of law to which appellate courts grant plenary review. … The core interests protected by procedural due process concern the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. … Fundamental tenets of due process require that all persons directly concerned in the result of an adjudication be given reasonable notice and opportunity to present their claims or defenses. … It is the settled rule of this jurisdiction, if indeed it may not be safely called an established principle of general jurisprudence, that no court will proceed to the adjudication of a matter involving conflicting rights and interests, until all persons directly concerned in the event have been actually or constructively notified of the pendency of the proceeding, and given reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard. … It is fundamental in proper judicial administration that no matter shall be decided unless the parties have fair notice that it will be presented in sufficient time to prepare themselves upon the issue." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Houghtaling v. Commissioner of Correction, 203 Conn. App. 246, 279–80, 248 A.3d 4 (2021); see also Coleman v. Bembridge, 207 Conn. App. 28, 45, 263 A.3d 403 (2021); Jackson v. ₈₄₃Pennymac Loan Services, LLC, 205 Conn. App. 189, 195–96, 257 A.3d 314 (2021).

Our Supreme Court has stated that, "[f]or more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. … It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. … Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. … Instead, due process is a flexible principle that calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. … [T]hese principles require that a [party] have … an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his [or her] own arguments and evidence orally." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re DeLeon J., 290 Conn. 371, 378, 963 A.2d 53 (2009).

[13] In the present case, the plaintiff was entitled to adequate notice of the issues that the court intended to address at the pretrial conference. The court, furthermore, never gave the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on any of the grounds that it raised sua sponte and on which it based...