Campbell v. Anytime Labor-Kansas, LLC

DENISE CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. ANYTIME LABOR-KANSAS, LLC, d/b/a LABORMAX STAFFING, et.al., Defendants.

Case No. 16-00142-CV-W-GAF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI WESTERN DIVISION

May 11, 2016

ORDER

Now before the Court is Plaintiff Denise Campbell's ("Plaintiff") Motion to Remand. (Doc. # 13). Plaintiff argues her Missouri workers' compensation claim must be remanded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), and therefore, in the interest of judicial economy, all or some of her other claims should also be remanded. (Id.). Defendants Anytime Labor-Kansas, LLC d/b/a LaborMax Staffing ("ALK"); Anytime Labor-Funding, LLC, d/b/a LaborMax Staffing ("ALF"); Amy Flowers ("Flowers"); and Gina Vallery ("Vallery") (collectively "Defendants") oppose. (Doc. # 25). Also before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue, arguing the above-captioned matter should proceed in the District of Kansas rather than the Western District of Missouri. (Doc. # 6). Plaintiff opposes. (Doc. # 19). For the following reasons, the Motion to Remand is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and the Motion to Transfer Venue is DENIED.¹

DISCUSSION

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS²

Plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, residing in Manhattan, Riley County, Kansas. (Petition ("Pet."), located at Doc. # 1-2, ¶ 1). ALK is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the state of Kansas and headquartered in Clay County, Missouri. (Id. ¶ 3). It was authorized to conduct business in both the state of Missouri and the state of Kansas and was doing business in both states. (Id. ¶ 4). ALF is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the state of Missouri and headquartered in Clay County, Missouri. (Id. ¶ 5). Like ALK, ALF was authorized to conduct business and was conducting business in both Missouri and Kansas. (Id. ¶ 6). Plaintiff alleges ALF and ALK operate as a single entity. (See, generally, id. (referring to ALK and ALF collectively as Defendant LaborMax); Doc. # 19, pp. 9-10). ALK and/or ALF were Plaintiff's employer from January 16, 2014 to December 21, 2014. (Pet. ¶ 19). Flowers is an authorized agent of ALK and/or ALF, who worked in Kearney, Clay County, Missouri, and was Plaintiff's manager throughout Plaintiff's employment. (Id. ¶ 9). Flowers allegedly discriminated against Plaintiff. (Id.). She resides in the state of Missouri. (Id. ¶ 10; Doc. # 7, p. 2). Vallery is also an authorized against of ALK and/or ALF and was Plaintiff's supervisor throughout Plaintiff's employment. (Pet. ¶ 12). Vallery allegedly discriminated against Plaintiff. (Id.). She is a Kansas resident. (Id. ¶ 13; Doc. # 7, p. 2).

ALK and/or ALF operate temporary employment agencies that place temporary workers with customer businesses. (Pet. ¶ 30). As ALK and/or ALF's customers, the businesses would allegedly request that ALK and/or ALF refrain from sending them older or disabled workers by directly stating such or by using code words. (Id. ¶ 31). Code words included "fresh workers" toexclude "old" workers and "too slow" for workers with physical disabilities. (Id.). Defendants purportedly encouraged Plaintiff to fulfill the customers' requests. (Id.). Plaintiff reported this alleged discrimination to Flowers in Clay County, Missouri, but Defendants failed to address the issue. (Id. ¶ 32).

Plaintiff also alleges Defendants required her to ask temporary workers during interviews about their injuries, disabilities, and medications. (Id. ¶ 33). In April 2014, a temporary worker reported a disability. (Id. ¶ 34). Defendants' customer then allegedly discriminated against this temporary worker. (Id.). Plaintiff advised the temporary worker to file a claim with the EEOC. (Id. ¶ 35). Flowers then wrote Plaintiff up for the first time and began verbally attacking, embarrassing, and sending sarcastic emails to Plaintiff from Flowers' workplace in Clay County, Missouri. (Id.).

On approximately September 14, 2014, Flowers purportedly removed evidence of discrimination from ALK and/or ALF's electronic storage. (Id. ¶ 37). Flowers and Vallery also allegedly removed evidence of discrimination from ALK and/or ALF's standard operating procedures in the employee binder. (Id.). On or about October 16, 2014, Plaintiff meet with an EEOC representative investigating the temporary worker's claim. (Id. ¶ 36).

On or about December 1, 2014, Plaintiff injured her back while lifting a large file box onto a shelf at work, which resulted in a herniated disc. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39). The herniated disc affects several of her major life activities including working, bending, lifting, standing, sitting, and walking. (Id. ¶ 39). Defendants presented Plaintiff with a refusal of treatment form, which Plaintiff alleges she signed because she was fearful that seeking treatment would cause Defendants to terminate her employment. (Id. ¶ 40). As her symptoms worsened, Plaintiff requested to see a workers' compensation doctor. (Id. ¶ 41). On or about December 8, 2014,Plaintiff went to the workers' compensation doctor, and the doctor prescribed physical therapy and workplace restrictions and ordered a Magnetic Resonance Imaging ("MRI"). (Id.). The next day, Flowers called Plaintiff from Clay County, Missouri, yelled at her about alleged poor work performance, and again wrote Plaintiff up. (Id. ¶ 42). After receiving Plaintiff's workplace restrictions, Defendants purportedly increased Plaintiff's work duties and increased her sales requirement from 30 sales to 50 sales per day. (Id. ¶ 43).

On December 12, 2014, Plaintiff emailed the workers' compensation doctor, stating she was in pain from sitting all day. (Id. ¶ 44). The doctor then released Plaintiff from work the following week. (Id.). That same day, after sending the email to the doctor, Defendants wrote Plaintiff up four times in ten minutes and took Plaintiff's work phone away. (Id. ¶ 45). Vallery indicated that Plaintiff went to the doctor without permission from Defendants. (Id. ¶ 46). The next day, Plaintiff obtained a workers' compensation attorney and subsequently filed a workers' compensation claim. (Id. ¶ 47).

On December 19, 2014, Defendants presented Plaintiff with a "Notice of Temporary Modified Offer of Employment," which changed Plaintiff from a salaried employee to an hourly employee and reduced her pay. (Id. ¶ 48). Plaintiff returned to work three days later. (Id. ¶ 49).

On December 23, 2014, Plaintiff emailed Defendants' human resource department, located in Clay County, Missouri, and reported their alleged discriminatory and retaliatory actions against her. (Id. ¶ 50). The next day, Defendants wrote Plaintiff up for creating a hostile work environment by discussing Defendants' alleged treatment of her with her co-workers. (Id. ¶ 51). Plaintiff emailed Vallery about the write up, and then Vallery took Plaintiff's keys and blocked Plaintiff's access to her computer and email. (Id. ¶ 52). On December 27, 2014, Plaintiff emailed the owner of ALK and ALF to report Defendants' alleged discriminatory andretaliatory treatment of her. (Id. ¶ 53). Two days later, Plaintiff fell at work due to a severe back spasm. (Id. ¶ 54). On December 31, 2014, Defendants terminated Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 55). Plaintiff alleges this decision was made in Clay County, Missouri. (Id.). That same day, Defendants allegedly decided in Clay County, Missouri to dispute Plaintiff's workers' compensation claim and delay the proceedings and her medical treatment. (Id. ¶ 56).

Plaintiff filed the above-captioned matter in the Circuit Court for Clay County, Missouri on January 6, 2016, setting forth ten counts on which she sought relief. (Id.). Counts I—IV allege age discrimination, failure to accommodate, disability discrimination, and retaliation by Defendants, all in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.010 et seq. (Id. ¶¶ 57-109). Count V alleges a violation of Missouri law when the Defendants purportedly retaliated against her for filing a workers' compensation claim. (Id. ¶¶ 110-19). Counts VI—IX allege age discrimination, failure to accommodate, disability discrimination, and retaliation by Defendants in violation of relevant federal laws, specifically, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (Id. ¶¶ 120-69). Count X alleges a violation of Kansas law when the Defendants purportedly retaliated against her for filing a workers' compensation claim. (Id. ¶¶ 170-79). Defendants thereafter removed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). (Doc. # 1).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Removal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Little Rock Cardiology Clinic, P.A., 551 F.3d 812, 816 (8th Cir. 2009). A federal district court may exercise removal jurisdiction only where the court would have had original jurisdiction had theaction initially been filed there. Krispin v. May Dep't Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)). "The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 [federal question jurisdiction] and 1332 [diversity jurisdiction]." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006).

Removal statutes are strictly construed, and any doubts about the correctness of removal are resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941); In re Bus. Men's Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993). A party seeking removal and opposing remand carries the burden of establishing federal subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010). A court must resolve all doubts about federal jurisdiction in favor of remand to state court. Id.

B. Change of Venue Standard

When venue is proper where the action was initially filed, a motion to...