Campbell v. Commonwealth

242 N.E.3d 580

Alvin CAMPBELL

v.COMMONWEALTH.

SJC-13504

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued February 5, 2024.

Decided October 8, 2024.

West Codenotes

Recognized as Unconstitutional

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A, § 1

Pretrial Detention. Bail. Rape. Statute, Construction. Words, "Physical force."

Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on August 1, 2023.

The case was heard by Wendlandt, J.

Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the petitioner.

Sarah Montgomery Lewis, Assistant District Attorney (Lynn Feigenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, & Georges, JJ.

GAZIANO, J.

General Laws 276, § 58A (1) (§ 58A or force clause), permits the pretrial detention of a defendant charged with a felony offense that has as an element "the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." The question in this case is whether rape, G. L. c. 265, § 22 (§ 22), qualifies as a predicate offense under the force clause of the pretrial detention statute. Because rape is a crime of physical violence requiring unwanted forceful penetration of another person, we hold that it does qualify.

1. Background. The defendant, Alvin Campbell, is alleged to have raped eight women.¹ The Commonwealth contends that the defendant repeatedly lured heavily intoxicated women into his vehicle by posing as a rideshare operator. After the women passed out, the defendant proceeded to rape them, often taking photographs or recording videos of the assaults. Between 2020 and 2021, the defendant was indicted on three sets of charges, with each case entered on separate dockets of the Superior Court.

In March 2020, a grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts of aggravated rape, G. L. c. 265, § 22 (a); three counts of indecent assault and battery on a person age fourteen or older, G. L. c. 265, § 13H; kidnapping, G. L. c. 265, § 26; and photographing an unsuspecting nude person, G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b). At the defendant’s arraignment, cash bail was set at $250,000. In July 2020, the defendant filed pro se a motion for release from pretrial detention on COVID-19 grounds. A Superior Court judge denied his motion and subsequently raised the defendant’s cash bail to $500,000. With respect to the first set of charges, the Commonwealth did not move for pretrial detention based on dangerousness under § 58A.²

The defendant, in September 2020, was indicted on the second set of charges -- five counts of rape, G. L. c. 265, § 22; two counts of aggravated rape, G. L. c. 265, § 22 (a); eight counts of photographing an unsuspecting nude person, G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b); two counts of kidnapping, G. L. c. 265, § 26; two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person age fourteen or older, G. L. c. 265, § 13H; and one count of assault with intent to rape, G. L. c. 265, § 24. At the defendant’s arraignment, the Commonwealth moved for pretrial detention based on dangerousness under § 58A. The defendant did not object, and after a hearing, the judge found the defendant dangerous and ordered him held without bail.

In March 2021, a grand jury indicted the defendant on the third set of charges -- three counts of rape, G. L. c. 265, § 22; and two counts of photographing an unsuspecting nude person, G. L. c. 272, § 105 (b). At the defendant’s arraignment, the Commonwealth again moved for pretrial detention based on dangerousness. After a hearing, the defendant was adjudged dangerous and ordered held without bail.

In September 2022, the defendant filed a series of unsuccessful motions across all three sets of indictments. He filed a motion for bail review in the first docket on September 26, 2022. After a hearing, this motion was denied on September 30, 2022. The defendant also filed a motion for reconsideration of his pretrial detention under § 58A in both the second and third dockets on September 26 and 28, 2022, which was also denied on September 30, 2022. In May 2023, the defendant again filed a motion for bail review in the first docket and a motion for reconsideration of his pretrial detention in the second and third dockets. After a hearing, the motion judge denied all three motions in a written decision, dated July 5, 2023. Regarding the § 58A pretrial detention orders, the motion judge concluded that because rape has "as an element the use of force," it qualifies as a predicate offense under the force clause. The judge also determined that the defendant posed "an extremely high danger" to the community.

In August 2023, the defendant appealed from the July 5 order denying his motions for reconsideration. That same month, he filed an emergency petition for relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in which he requested the court vacate the § 58A pretrial detention orders and release him on reasonable cash bail. The defendant argued that rape could not serve as a predicate for detention under § 58A and that, even if it could, "the evidence in this case [did] not require detention."

On August 18, 2023, a single justice issued a memorandum of decision and judgment denying the defendant’s emergency petition. Relying on language in Scione v. Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 225, 229, 114 N.E.3d 74 (2019), the single justice reasoned that rape qualifies as a predicate offense for pretrial detention under the force clause because an element of rape includes the use or threatened use of force. The single justice further concluded that the motion judge appropriately considered the relevant factors under Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 698, 80 N.E.3d 949, S.C., 478 Mass. 361, 84 N.E.3d 1269 (2017), in determining that "no conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the community."

In October 2023, the defendant filed in this court a late notice of appeal from the single justice’s decision, which the single justice allowed. On November 22, 2023, we issued an order allowing the defendant’s appeal to proceed in the full court.

[1, 2] 2. Discussion. We review a single justice’s denial of a petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, for clear error of law or abuse of discretion. See Brangan, 477 Mass. at 697, 80 N.E.3d 949. "We must also consider the propriety of the Superior Court judge’s underlying bail order. In reviewing both the single justice’s judgment and the bail judge’s order, we must consider the legal rights at issue and independently determine and apply the law, without deference to their respective legal rulings" (citations omitted). Id.

[3, 4] a. General Laws c. 276, § 58A. Where the Commonwealth seeks pretrial detention based on dangerousness, the "threshold question" is whether the defendant has been charged with committing a predicate offense under § 58A. Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 711, 905 N.E.2d 90 (2009). "If no predicate offense has been charged, a defendant may not be placed in pretrial detention …. " Commonwealth v. Vieira, 483 Mass. 417, 421, 133 N.E.3d 296 (2019).

"Predicate offenses under § 58A either are specifically enumerated in the statute or fall within one (or more) of the [broader] categories …" (footnote omitted). Scione, 481 Mass. at 227, 114 N.E.3d 74. Because the offense of rape, G. L. c. 265, § 22, is not among the crimes explicitly enumerated as a predicate offense under § 58A, it must fall within one of the broader categories to qualify as a predicate offense. Prior to our decision in Scione, there were three categories of predicate felonies:

"(1) those felonies that ‘ha[ve] as an element of the offense the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against the person of another’ (force clause); (2) ‘any other felony that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person of another may result’ (residual clause); or (3) ‘a misdemeanor or felony involving abuse as defined in [G. L. c. 209A, § 1]’ (abuse clause)."

Scione, supra, quoting G. L. c. 276, § 58A. However, in Scione, supra at 232, 114 N.E.3d 74, we determined that the residual clause unconstitutionally was vague, leaving only two pathways by which an offense not otherwise listed in § 58A may qualify as a predicate offense -- the abuse clause and, relevant here, the force clause. See G. L. c. 209A, § 1 (defining abuse as occurrence of certain acts "between family or household members").

[5–7] "In determining whether a crime qualifies under the force clause of [§ 58A], we take a ‘categorical approach.’ " Vieira, 483 Mass. at 422, 133 N.E.3d 296, quoting Scione, 481 Mass. at 228, 114 N.E.3d 74. An offense serves as a predicate for purposes of § 58A "if, and only if, the elements of the offense always fall within the ambit of the force clause." Commonwealth v. Escobar, 490 Mass. 488, 496, 191 N.E.3d 1052 (2022). This inquiry focuses on the elements of the offense, not the particular facts surrounding the offending conduct. Id. We are required to consider "the most innocent conduct" criminalized by the applicable statute to determine whether the offense satisfies the force clause. United States v. Jackson, 32 Frith 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 143 S. Ct. 1026, 215 L.Ed.2d 192 (2023), quoting United States v. Roof, 10 Frith 314, 398 (4th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 143 S. Ct. 303, 214 L.Ed.2d 132 (2022).

Applying the categorical approach, we must determine whether it is possible to commit the offense of rape without having used, attempted to use, or threatened "physical force."

[8] In relevant part, § 22, states:

"Whoever has sexual intercourse … with a person, and compels such person to submit by force and against his will, or compels such person to submit by threat of bodily injury … shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years."

The rape statute follows the common-law definition of rape and requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable...