Campbell v. Green

1

AARON CAMPBELL, Petitioner, v. DAVID GREEN, Respondent.

No. 5:20-CV-508-REW-HAI

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division

February 16, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

Robert E. Wier, United States District Judge.

On December 21, 2020, Petitioner Aaron Campbell filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See DE 1. On August 26, 2022 after extensive interim litigation and with a recommendation pending, Campbell moved to withdraw the petition. See DE 26. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Campbell's motion to withdraw and DENIES the request for a writ.

I. Background

Campbell does not challenge much in the facts adopted and summarized in either the Kentucky Supreme Court's or the Kentucky Court of Appeals's affirmances.^[1]See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (providing that a state court's factual determinations “shall be presumed to be correct” and that a habeas petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence”); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus, like previous courts addressing this issue, the Court presents the facts as described by the Kentucky Supreme Court:

In August 2009, intruders entered David Norris's home, tied him up, hit him in the head, and robbed him of $70,000. A police investigation failed to produce any suspects for over a year.

Norris was robbed at home again in October 2010. This time, two men entered his home, tied him up, and made off with his credit card. Police began another investigation, aided in this instance by surveillance videos of individuals using credit cards at local stores and by Crimestoppers. Within a short time, Michael Washington emerged as a suspect.

Washington eventually confessed to the crime and implicated Campbell, his cousin, as the other participant. After arresting Campbell, police questioned him about the robbery multiple times. Ultimately, Campbell confessed to being involved. In light of the information gained from Campbell's statement, police became suspicious that Washington and Campbell were involved in the earlier robbery of Norris's home. Forensic evidence verified this suspicion. Campbell eventually confessed to the second robbery, as well.

Campbell was separately indicted for each robbery of Norris's home. Before trial, Campbell filed a motion to suppress both of his confessions on grounds that police made promises of leniency and coerced him into confessing. The trial court denied Campbell's motions following a hearing. As a result, Campbell entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the trial court's decision. For the 2010 robbery, Campbell pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. And for the 2009 robbery, Campbell pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery and being a second-degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO 2) and, accordingly, was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. Campbell's sentences were ordered to run consecutively.

The second factual dispute also arises under one of Campbell's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and relates to the Kentucky Court of Appeals's statement, in one opinion, that Campbell filed a pro se motion requesting concurrent sentences. See id. at 28. As discussed below, the Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected this claim on an independent state ground, thus working a procedural bar to this Court's review. Accordingly, because the Court may not hear the claim, a hearing naturally is not necessary.

Campbell v. Commonwealth (“Campbell I”), No. 2014-SC-140-MR, 2015 WL 5652016, at *1 (Ky. Sept. 24, 2015).

In 2014, in the Kentucky Supreme Court, Campbell challenged the pretrial denial of the defense motion to suppress his confessions. See id. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. See id. at *5. In 2016, pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42, Campbell then moved to vacate the judgment, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”).^[2] See Campbell v. Commonwealth (“Campbell II”), No. 2016-CA-001666-MR, 2018 WL 297262, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2018). The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion. See id. at *2, *5. Then, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied review. See DE 23 at 2.

Subsequently, in 2020, Campbell moved for postconviction relief under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. See Campbell v. Commonwealth (“Campbell III”), No. 2018-CA-001884-MR, 2020 WL 507620 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020). In that motion, Campbell argued that a witness at the suppression hearing committed perjury and that the appellate court engaged in “mistake, inadvertence, or fraud.” Id. at *2 (internal quotations omitted). The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, and the Kentucky Supreme Court denied review. See id. at 4; DE 23 at 3.

With that background in mind, the Court turns to Campbell's instant petition. See DE 1.

In his petition, Campbell asserts six grounds for relief:

(1) The Kentucky Supreme Court erroneously concluded that Campbell's confession during a November 9, 2010 interrogation was voluntary. See DE 1 at 6, 17, 22-24.^[3] (2) The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in reviewing Campbell's 11.42 motion,^[4]improperly found that Campbell's trial counsel was not ineffective at the suppression hearing regarding Campbell's Miranda warning. See id. at 8, 17, 25.

(3) The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in reviewing Campbell's 11.42 motion, erroneously determined that Campbell's trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to argue that Campbell's November 2010 confession was inadmissible under Kentucky Rule of Evidence 410. See id. at 9, 17, 25-26.

(4) The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in reviewing Campbell's 11.42 motion, erred in concluding that Campbell's trial counsel was not ineffective regarding Campbell's potential penalty relative to the guilty plea. See id. at 11, 18, 27-28.

(5) The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in reviewing Campbell's 60.02 motion,^[5]improperly found that Campbell's argument, that the courts made a factual error regarding whether he had filed his own pro se sentencing motion, was procedurally barred. See id. at 18-19.

(6) The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in reviewing Campbell's 60.02 motion, erroneously concluded that Campbell's argument that the courts made a factual error regarding whether Detective Bowles committed perjury was procedurally barred. See id. at 18-19, 28-30.

On June 30, 2021, the Warden responded to these six claims, all in opposition.^[6] See DE 14. On October 20, 2021, after reviewing all six claims, United States Magistrate Judge Hanly A. Ingram recommended that this Court deny Campbell's petition. See DE 23 at 27 (Report and Recommendations). On November 1, 2021, Campbell objected to Judge Ingram's Report and Recommendations (“R&R”). See DE 25. Then, on August 29, 2022, Campbell filed a motion to withdraw his petition for writ of habeas corpus. See DE 27. The Warden responded on September 1, 2022, opposing Campbell's motion to withdraw. See DE 28. Campbell replied.

II. Campbell's Motion to Withdraw

“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in the habeas context to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Habeas Corpus Rules.” Woodford v. Garceau, 123 S.Ct. 1398, 1399 (2003). Various district courts have applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, which governs voluntary dismissals, in the habeas context. See, e.g., Bernal v. Barr, No. cv-20-00164-PHX-MTL, 2020 WL 8673611, at *2 (D. Az. July 24, 2020); Williams v. Caruso, No. 07-cv-11291, 2008 WL 544954, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 2008); Doster v. Jones, 60 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1269 (M.D. Ala. 1999).

Under Rule 41, once a party files an answer or a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may voluntarily dismiss a suit “only by court order.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2). Whether to grant a voluntary dismissal is within the court's discretion. See Grover ex rel. Grover v. Eli Lily & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994). Unless stated otherwise, a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2). When a case is dismissed without prejudice, it “leaves the situation as if the action has never been filed.” Sherer v. Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A., 987 F.2d 1246, 1247 (6th Cir. 1993). The Sixth Circuit has stated that “the primary purpose of [Rule 41(a)(2)] in interposing the requirement of court approval is to protect the nonmovant from unfair treatment.” Grover, 33 F.3d at 718. To determine whether unfair treatment exists, the Court considers factors including the progression of the case, the movant's explanation for dismissal, and the nonmovant's effort and expense in preparation for trial or in litigating. See id.

In this instance, Campbell seeks to withdraw his petition, post-recommendation from Judge Ingram. See DE 26. As grounds, Campbell states, without explanation, that he has “found relief and such relief in this action is no longer required.” Id. at 1. Campbell further indicates that he plans to take “[n]o further actions on the claims presented[.]” Id. In response, the Warden argues that it is too late for Campbell to withdraw his petition. See DE 28 at 2. In support, the Warden asserts that Judge Ingram issued an R&R as to Campbell's petition and all that remains is for this Court to review those recommendations, against any objections, and enter a judgment. Id. Further, the Warden argues he would be prejudiced by withdrawal because he “has appeared and vigorously defended this action, consuming valuable resources.” Id.

First the Court agrees that at this stage, dismissal of Campbell's petition would result in unfair treatment to the Warden. Campbell filed his petition on December 21, 2020, over two years ago. See DE 1. Since...