Campbell v. Norbertine Community of New Mexico (In re Golden)

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IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GRAHAM R. GOLDEN, Deceased.

ROBERT CAMPBELL, O. PRAEM., Probate Code Personal Representative, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NORBERTINE COMMUNITY OF NEW MEXICO, Interested Party-Appellant, v. DANIEL GOLDEN and DEBORAH GOLDEN, father and mother of the deceased, Respondents-Appellees.

No. A-1-CA-40817

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

March 11, 2024

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

Appeal from the District Court of Bernalillo County Daniel E Ramczyk, District Court Judge

Robert D. Gorman, P.A. Robert D. Gorman Albuquerque, NM for Appellants

Mescall Law Firm, P.C. Thomas J. Mescall, II Phillip Patrick Baca Albuquerque, NM for Appellees

OPINION

KATHERINE A. WRAY, JUDGE

{¶1} Respondents Daniel and Deborah Golden (Parents), parents of Graham R. Golden (Father Golden), deceased, challenged the appointment of petitioner, Very Reverend Robert Campbell, O Praem. (the Reverend), as the personal representative (PR) of the wrongful death estate of Father Golden, pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act (WDA), NMSA 1978, §§ 41-2-1 to -4 (1891, as amended through 2001). The district court eventually determined that Parents are the statutory beneficiaries under the WDA, and Parents could designate the PR. As a result, the district court removed the Reverend as PR and entered three orders (the Orders) that reflected these rulings. We hold that the district court entered the Orders based on a misapprehension of Section 41-2-3 and reverse.

BACKGROUND

{¶2} Father Golden was a thirty-five year old priest who died in an automobile accident. Following Father Golden's death, the Reverend and the Norbertine Community of New Mexico (collectively, the Community), a religious community of which both Father Golden and the Reverend were members, filed an application to appoint the Reverend as PR under both the WDA and the New Mexico Uniform Probate Code (Probate Code), NMSA 1978, §§ 45-1-101 to 45-7-612 (1975, as amended through 2022). The district court granted the application, and the Reverend accepted both appointments. After the appointment, Parents filed a motion to set aside the order appointing the Reverend as the WDA PR^[1] and claimed an interest in any potential wrongful death proceeds. During the hearing on that motion, the district court determined that because the parties could not agree on who had an interest in the wrongful death proceeds, it was appropriate to remove the Reverend as WDA PR and appoint an independent third party. The district court tentatively appointed Parents' selected WDA PR based on the parties' conditional agreement, but ultimately, the Community objected to that individual.

{¶3} The Community filed a motion to reinstate the Reverend as the WDA PR, and Parents filed a motion to designate themselves as the beneficiaries under the WDA. The district court held another hearing and determined that in order to decide who had "standing" to nominate a WDA PR, the statutory beneficiaries must be identified. As a result, the district court (1) found that Parents were the "statutory beneficiaries in this matter for purposes of being [WDA] PR"; (2) denied the Community's motion to reinstate the Reverend as the WDA PR; and (3) granted Parents' motion to designate Parents as the statutory beneficiaries under the WDA and finalized the appointment of Parents' chosen WDA PR. The district court entered the Orders to that effect, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

{¶4} scope of this appeal is fairly narrow-whether Parents are "statutory beneficiaries" under the WDA. Before detailing the parties' arguments further, we pause to define what we mean by "statutory beneficiaries" under the WDA. Section 41-2-3 includes both specifically identified individuals and a priority for their recovery see § 41-2-3(A)-(E), as well as a broad category of potential beneficiaries who could recover "in the manner authorized by law," see § 41-2-3(F). When we refer to "statutory beneficiaries" in this opinion, we mean those individuals who are identified in Section 41-2-3(A) through (E) and further described as "kindred" in Section 41-2-3(F) of the WDA.

{¶5} Turning to the issues on appeal, we observe that though the Orders are not explicit, at the hearings the district court based its rulings on the finding that Parents are statutory beneficiaries under Section 41-2-3. See San Pedro Neighborhood Ass 'n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2009-NMCA-045, ¶ 8, 146 N.M. 106, 206 P.3d 1011 ("We do not consider the oral ruling as a final order, but simply as instructive in determining the court's intent where an ambiguity exists in the court's decision." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Specifically, after concluding that Parents are statutory beneficiaries "for the purposes of determining standing to request appointment of a personal representative under the [WDA]," the district court on that basis appointed Parents' selected WDA PR and denied the Community's motion to reinstate the Reverend as WDA PR. The parties argued and the district court accepted that only the statutory beneficiaries have standing to nominate a WDA PR, but we need not consider this premise because we conclude that Parents are not statutory beneficiaries under the WDA.^[2]

{¶6} "To the extent we must construe the applicable statutes, our review is de novo." Jones v. City of Albuquerque Police Dep't, 2020-NMSC-013, ¶ 17, 470 P.3d 252 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our goal is to "give effect to the intent of the Legislature" by examining the language used and by applying its "ordinary and plain meaning." Grisham v. Romero, 2021-NMSC-009, ¶ 23, 483 P.3d 545 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "We are to read the statute in its entirety and construe each part in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole." Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 1996-NMSC-038, ¶ 14, 121 N.M. 764, 918 P.2d 350. We therefore begin with the language of the statute.

{¶7} Section 41-2-1 generally establishes a cause of action "[w]henever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another." Section 41-2-3 explains that

[e]very action mentioned in Section 41-2-1 . . . shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person, and the jury in every such action may give such damages, compensatory and exemplary, as they deem fair and just, taking into consideration the pecuniary injury resulting from the death to the surviving party entitled to the judgment, or any interest in the judgment, recovered in such action and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act, neglect or default. The proceeds of any judgment obtained in any such action shall not be liable for any debt of the deceased; provided the decedent has left a spouse, child, father, mother, brother, sister or child or children of the deceased child, as defined in the New Mexico Probate Code . . ., but shall be distributed as follows:

A. if there is a surviving spouse and no child, then to the spouse;

B. if there is a surviving spouse and a child or grandchild, then one-half to the surviving spouse and the remaining one-half to the children and grandchildren, the grandchildren taking by right of representation;

C. if there is no husband or wife, but a child or grandchild, then to such child and grandchild by right of representation;

D. if the deceased is a minor, childless and unmarried, then to the father and mother who shall have an equal interest in the judgment, or if either of them is dead, then to the survivor;

E. if there is no father, mother, husband, wife, child or grandchild, then to a surviving brother or sister if there are any; and

F. if there is no kindred as named in Subsections A through E of this section, then the proceeds of the judgment shall be disposed of in the manner authorized by law for the disposition of the personal property of deceased persons.

(Emphasis added.) Despite the language in Section 41-2-3(D) limiting WDA distribution to the parents of unmarried and childless minors, Parents contend that Section 41-2-3 permits the parents of adult children to receive distribution based on the language we have italicized in Section 41-2-3(E) and (F); the language that we have italicized in the introduction to the statute (the prefatory language); Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 1992-NMSC-023, 113 N.M. 566, 829 P.2d 645; and Varney v. Taylor, 1968-NMSC-189, 79 N.M. 652, 448 P.2d 164. We begin with Parents' construction of Section 41-2-3.

{¶8} Parents acknowledge that Section 41-2-3(D) limits recovery of wrongful death proceeds to only the parents of unmarried and childless minors, but Parents argue that Section 41-2-3(E) authorizes parents of all children to receive wrongful death proceeds because Section 41-2-3(E) mentions "father mother" but does not reference minors. Parents also point to Section 41-2-3(F), which only permits recovery as "authorized by law" if "there is no kindred as named" in Section 41-2-3(A) through (E). Parents reason that the reference in Section 41-2-3(E) to "father, mother" is enough to establish that the parents of adult children are "kindred as named in Subsections A through E." According to Parents, those "kindred" must be permitted to receive disbursement under the WPA as statutory beneficiaries, otherwise the existence of parents of adult children would block recovery by anyone because Section 41-2-3(F) only permits distribution "in the manner authorized by law"...