Campbell v. Supreme Court of New Jersey

WILSON J. CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY, et al. Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 11-555 (ES)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Date: March 27, 2012

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

SALAS, District Judge

I. Introduction

Defendants the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Judge Maurice Gallipoli ("Judge Gallipoli"), Candace Moody ("Moody"), and John Tonelli ("Tonelli") seek dismissal of Wilson Campbell's ("Plaintiff" or "Campbell") Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docket Entry No. 8). The Court has considered the parties' submissions in support of and in opposition to the instant motion, and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has subject matter over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a), and exercises supplemental jurisdiction for Plaintiff's related state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

III. Background

Plaintiff, pro se, served as a municipal court judge in Jersey City, New Jersey from October 2007 to October 23, 2009 when he resigned. (Compl. ¶ 25).¹ In April 2008, Campbell became involved in a consensual dating relationship with Anna Kirolos ("Kirolos"), who was also employed by the Jersey City municipal court as Plaintiff's bailiff. (Id. ¶ 30). This relationship ended on June 26, 2008.

On June 30, 2008, Judge Gallipoli—the Assignment Judge of Hudson County—learned of Campbell's relationship with Kirolos and, as a result, "demanded that Campbell [] immediately resign from the bench." (Id. ¶ 31). More specifically, Judge Gallipoli told Campbell that he should "pack his bags and leave," (Id. ¶ 3), and that if Campbell chose not to resign, Judge Gallipoli "would make facts related to the relationship public and seek formal charges through the ACJC² to adversely affect Campbell's career and business opportunities." (Id. ¶ 33). That same day, i.e., June 30, 2008, Campbell informed Judge Gallipoli "that he would not resign from the bench based on his past dating relationship with Kirolos . . . ." (Id. ¶ 34). Consequently, Judge Gallipoli temporarily suspended Campbell from his position as a municipal court judge and "ordered Campbell not to return to work." (Id. ¶ 38).

Subsequently, Judge Gallipoli sent correspondence to Judge Phillip Carchman ("Judge Carchman"), Administrative Director of Courts, stating that "I suggested to Judge Campbell that he . . . seriously consider resignation. [H]e has declined . . . and has informed me that he intends to remain a judge of this court . . . I assume a complaint against Judge Campbell will be filed with the ACJC." (Id. ¶ 40). Following Judge Gallipoli's letter to Judge Carchman, the ACJCconducted an investigation which included the interviews of Kirolos, Rebecca Mason (Assistant Court Director of the Jersey City Municipal Court), and Judge Gallipoli. (See id. ¶¶ 41-46).

According to Plaintiff, Tonelli—the Executive Director of the ACJC—interviewed Judge Gallipoli on January 14, 2009. (Id. ¶ 46). During that interview, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Gallipoli "made it unequivocally clear to Tonelli that [] Gallipoli wanted Campbell off the bench . . . ." (Id. ¶ 47). For example, Judge Gallipoli stated, "I'm not so sure [Campbell] was as contrite as I would have liked him to be and . . . I thought the easy way out of this for everyone . . . was for him to resign and I put it to him that I thought he should seriously consider resigning." (Id. ¶ 48). Judge Gallipoli emphasized that "the easiest way for everyone to just get on with their life, . . . was for him to pack his bags and leave . . . ." (Id. ¶ 49). Although Gallipoli was unaware of a particular policy that prohibited judges from engaging in a consensual dating relationship with other court employees, he stated "quite frankly, you don't really need a policy that's written out . . . [i]t's not unless you are deaf, dumb, and blind that you shouldn't be doing this." (Id. ¶ 50).

Campbell avers that at the time Gallipoli sought his resignation, the policy on consensual dating in the workplace began with the following statement: "[c]onsensual dating relationships between judiciary employees are generally not the Judiciary's business." (Id. ¶ 57). The policy further stated, that while dating relationships are not generally the Judiciary's business, "failure to give proper notice to the supervisor's immediate superior [of the relationship] may result in the denial of legal representation and indemnification by the State in the event that a discrimination or sexual harassment lawsuit is filed in connection with the relationship." (Id. ¶ 58) (alteration in original). To that end, Campbell contends that the policy does notprovide additional consequences for those who choose to keep relationships private, since to do so would be a violation of State privacy rights." (Id. ¶ 59).³

However, on February 2, 2009, the ACJC—following its investigation—filed an ethics complaint against Campbell charging him with violating Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct for "engaging in an intimate relationship with a subordinate municipal court employee over whom he exercised supervisory control." (Id. ¶ 65). Plaintiff alleges that "in the history of the New Jersey Judiciary no judge had ever been charged with an ethics complaint for a consensual dating relationship with a judiciary employee." (Id. ¶ 66). Thus, Campbell contends his disparate treatment is due, in part, to his race, gender, and marital status. (Id. ¶¶ 60, 62).

"In April 2009, Campbell learned of the less favorable treatment he received . . . [and] placed the State of New Jersey on notice of his intent to file suit." (Id. ¶ 68). According to Plaintiff, Judge Gallipoli, Moody, and Tonelli allegedly "delay[ed] the resolution of the ACJC complaint" after receiving notice of Campbell's intent to file suit. (Id. ¶ 69).⁴

Based upon these facts, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on January 31, 2011, raising eleven causes of action. (See Docket Entry No. 1). In Count One, Plaintiff claims thatDefendants violated his right to be free from unlawful race discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In Count Two, Plaintiff avers that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy against Campbell based on his race. In Counts Three and Four, Judge Gallipoli is sued for alleged violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"). Specifically, Plaintiff sues for discrimination in Count Three and retaliation in Count Four. Similarly, in Counts Five and Six, Campbell sues Moody for alleged discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the NJLAD. In Count Seven, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Gallipoli, while aided and abetted by another, unlawfully interfered with Plaintiff's prospective economic advantage. In Count Eight, Campbell asserts a claim for "abuse of process" against Moody for utilizing the ACJC process as a mechanism to punish Campbell. In Count Nine, Plaintiff seeks damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Count Ten, Plaintiff alleges that Moody placed Plaintiff in a false light. Finally, in Count Eleven, Plaintiff seeks damages for Moody and Tonelli's "negligent investigation."⁵

On June 15, 2011, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (See Docket Entry No. 8).

The parties have submitted their respective briefs, and the Defendants' motion is now ripe for this Court's adjudication.

IV. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the existence of a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. "When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion." Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 191 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)). In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, "the district court may not presume the truthfulness of plaintiff's allegations, but rather must 'evaluat[e] for itself the merits of [the] jurisdictional claims.'" Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)).

B. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that a pleader is entitled to relief." The pleading standard announced by Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations; it does, however, demand "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal citation omitted). In addition, the plaintiff's short and plain statement of the claim must "give the defendants fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).

For a complaint to survive dismissal, it "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on its face when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ibid. (internal citation omitted). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a court...