Campbell v. United States

JAMES CAMPBELL, APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

No. 18-CO-894

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

Submitted October 10, 2019

January 30, 2020

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.

Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia

(CF2-10147-14)

(Hon. Milton Lee, Motion Judge)

Vincent A. Jankoski was on the brief for appellant.

Jessie K. Liu, United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Elizabeth H. Danello, Bernard Delia, and Kristina Ament, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, THOMPSON, Associate Judge, and NEBEKER, Senior Judge.

THOMPSON, Associate Judge:

Appellant James Campbell argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his D.C. Code § 23-110 (2012 Repl.) motion. We affirm the ruling of the motion judge.

I.

The factual background of this case is set out more fully in this court's opinion in Campbell v. United States, 163 A.3d 790 (D.C. 2017) ("Campbell I"). The following is a brief summary of the facts pertinent to the instant appeal. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on June 9, 2014, Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") Officer George Poor was on routine patrol in the area of Third and I Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C., when he observed an Infiniti sedan parked on a grassy median between two parking lots in the vicinity of Mount Carmel Baptist Church. Because the area was known for prostitution, the car was parked in an unusual manner, and the rear passenger window of the car was missing and had been replaced with a towel, Officer Poor decided to drive into the parking lot, turn on his emergency lights, and approach the Infiniti on foot with a flashlight. The car was not running and no lights were on in the vehicle. As Officer Poor shined his flashlight into the car, he observed an individual, later identified as Mr. Campbell, slumped in the driver's seat of the car. The officer testified that the individual's lack of reaction to the emergency lights and to the officer's approach made him "somewhat concerned for the well-being of the person inside the car[.]" At this point, Officer Poor knocked on the driver's window to get Mr. Campbell's attention. As Officer Poor was looking into the vehicle, he observed a bottle of Absolut vodka "a third to maybe halfway empty" in the front center console, in the proximity of Mr. Campbell's right arm. When asked by Officer Poor whether he had been drinking, Mr. Campbell admitted to taking "a couple of sips" of the vodka. Officer Poor arrested Mr. Campbell for possession of an open container of alcohol ("POCA"). In the search incident to that arrest, he recovered the key to the car in appellant's pocket, two stolen watches, and a screwdriver, as well as paperwork indicating that Mr. Campbell was not the owner of the Infiniti. A further search at the police station revealed four shards of glass in Mr. Campbell's pocket, which appeared to be consistent with the shards found on and near the shattered window of the Infiniti.

On October 3, 2014, Mr. Campbell, through his counsel, filed a motion to "suppress any tangible evidence obtained as a result of [his] illegal stop" and subsequent arrest, arguing that Officer Poor had no reason to stop Mr. Campbell because his vehicle was parked in a private parking lot, the officer had no basis to believe the vehicle was parked illegally, there was no basis for an investigative detention, the officer did not believe that the car was stolen or that the driver was in distress, there had been no calls raising concern regarding the vehicle or its occupant, and none of appellant's actions warranted the belief that criminal activity was afoot. At an October 30, 2014, pre-trial status hearing, trial counsel characterized the motion to suppress as "a very basic motion. It's just based soley [sic] on the stop." Counsel also agreed with the trial court that the basis of the motion was "the legitimacy of the stop." Because of the unexceptional nature of the arguments raised in the motion to suppress, trial counsel estimated that a motions hearing would be brief, and consented to have the motion resolved on the basis of the testimony at trial instead.

On November 4, 2014, the trial court denied Mr. Campbell's suppression motion, addressing it after resolving appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal. As to the latter motion, the trial court reasoned, without objection from appellant's trial counsel, that the evidence sufficed for conviction on the POCA count because the bottle of liquor was unsealed and was in physical proximity to appellant. In addressing the motion to suppress, the trial court reasoned that the officer's observation that the vehicle had a broken window and was parked on grass instead of in one of the many available parking spaces, his further observation that there was "somebody possibly asleep [or unconscious] in the driver's seat," and his knowledge that the area was known for prostitution gave the officer "at least reasonable articulable suspicion" to investigate further. Appellant's trial counsel responded that the vehicle's location on private property meant that anything strange about where the vehicle was parked did not give the officer "a right to approach." When the court then remarked that the officer's (flashlight-assisted) observation of a half-empty bottle of vodka in the vehicle provided probable cause, appellant did not object that an open container on private property did not provide probable cause to believe that appellant had committed a POCA violation, but said only that he would "submit on the evidence at this point[.]"

On November 5, 2014, the jury found appellant guilty of first-degree theft (vehicle), receiving stolen property ("RSP") (vehicle), unauthorized use of a vehicle ("UUV"), and POCA. In his direct appeal, appellant argued that his arrest for POCA, i.e., for possession of an open container in a vehicle "in or upon any street, alley, park, or parking area," D.C. Code § 25-1001(a)(2) (2012 Repl.), was unlawful because the statute did not reach his conduct: possessing an open container of alcohol on a grassy strip in a parking lot on private property. Appellant also argued that because his arrest for POCA was unlawful, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the various fruits of the search incident to arrest. On July 20, 2017, this court reversed appellant's POCA conviction, reasoning that the grassy median on private property on which he was parked did not constitute a "parking area" within the meaning of § 25-1001(a)(2), and that appellant's conduct was outside the ambit of the POCA statute. Campbell I, 163 A.3d at 795-98. However, we affirmed appellant's convictions for first- degree theft and UUV, rejecting appellant's argument that the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence of those crimes as the fruits of appellant's unlawful arrest for POCA. See id. at 798, 798 n.13.¹ We did so on the ground that appellant had waived that basis for suppression because his suppression motion and related oral argument before the trial court "did not put the trial court on notice, even in vague terms, of the question of statutory construction now before this court." Id. at 798 n.13.

On August 1, 2017, Mr. Campbell filed a § 23-110 motion under the theory that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in that he failed to argue that the POCA statute did not reach possession of an open container in the area where he was parked. The trial court denied appellant's motion without a hearing, finding that trial counsel "did raise the contention that the car was parked on private property" and "did raise the claim alleged to have been omitted." The court therefore ruled that appellant failed to make the required showing that his trial counsel's performance was deficient.

This appeal followed. Appellant argues that the trial court's rationale for denying his § 23-110 motion — i.e., that trial counsel did argue that appellant's possession of an open container of alcohol while parked on private property did not constitute a POCA violation — was erroneous and in conflict with this court's decision and mandate in Campbell I.

II.

The following principles guide our analysis. In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that his counsel's performance was deficient, and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To establish deficiency, a defendant must show that trial counsel "made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Dickerson v. District of Columbia, 182 A.3d 721, 730 (D.C. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). To show prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. We need not address both prongs of the test if appellant does not meet the burden of one or the other showing. Id. at 697.

"Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice." Porter v. United States, 37 A.3d 251, 256 (D.C. 2012). More specifically, and as is pertinent here, a contention of prejudice arising from a failure to effectively litigate a motion requires a multi-step analysis. Turner v. United States, 116 A.3d 894, 934-35 (D.C. 2015). The defendant must first demonstrate a ...