Campbell v. Woodcliff Health & Rehab. Ctr.

318 A.3d 708

479 N.J.Super. 64

ESTATE OF Donville CAMPBELL, THROUGH Executor of the Estate, Dwayne CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.WOODCLIFF HEALTH & REHABILITATION CENTER, Defendant-Respondent,andBirinder Kaur, M.D., Defendant-Appellant.

Estate of Donville Campbell, through Executor of the Estate, Dwayne Campbell, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Woodcliff Health & Rehabilitation Center, Defendant-Appellant,andBirinder Kaur, M.D., Defendant-Respondent.

DOCKET NO. A-3177-22

A-3178-22

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued January 18, 2024

Decided June 26, 2024

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-7744-21.

Ryan Alan Notarangelo argued the cause for appellant Birinder Kaur, M.D. in A-3177-22 and respondent in A-3178-22 (Dughi, Hewit & Domalewski, attorneys; Rachel Melissa Schwartz, of counsel; Ryan Alan Notarangelo, of counsel and on the briefs).

Salvatore Christopher Martino argued the cause for appellant Woodcliff Health & Rehabilitation Center in A-3178-22 and respondent in A-3177-22 (Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, attorneys; Malinda Ann Miller, Alex W. Raybould, Salvatore Christopher Martino and Salvatore D’Elia HI, Newark, of counsel and on the briefs).

Alexandra Loprete, Springfield, argued the cause for respondent Estate of Donville Campbell, through Executor of the Estate, Dwayne Campbell (Fredson Statmore Bitterman, LLC, attorneys; Alexandra Loprete, of counsel and on the briefs).

Anthony Cocca, Morristown, argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Defense Association (Cocca & Cutinello, LLP, attorneys; Anthony Cocca and Katelyn E. Cutinello, of counsel and on the briefs).

Daniel B. Devinney argued the cause far amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Snyder Sarno D’Aniello Maceri & da Costa LLC, attorneys; Paul Manuel da Costa, of counsel and on the brief; Daniel B. Devinney and Mitchell A. Dornfeld, on the brief).

Before Judges Accurso, Gummer and Walcott-Henderson.

₆₈The opinion of the court was delivered by

ACCURSO, P.J.A.D.

Selva Campbell, a stroke patient, was admitted to defendant Woodcliff Health & Rehabilitation Center in Bergen County on March 23, 2020, coming under the care of defendant Birinder Kaur, M.D. less than two weeks after the World Health Organization declared the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) a global pandemic and two days after Governor Murphy issued his first stay-at-home order.

Three weeks later, on April 14, Woodcliff discharged Mrs. Campbell from the facility to her home and the care of her husband Donville Campbell. The day before Mrs. Campbell’s discharge, Dr. Kaur administered a COVID PCR (polymerase ₆₉chain reaction) test to Mrs. Campbell. The off-site lab returned a positive test result to Woodcliff on April 16, two days after Mrs. Campbell’s discharge. The facility notified Mrs. Campbell of her positive test as soon as staff received it. According to plaintiff, Woodcliff advised "Mrs. Campbell should quarantine, and Mr. Campbell should be tested immediately."

Mrs. Campbell recovered from COVID, although she has since succumbed to other causes. Tragically, however, Mrs. Campbell’s husband contracted COVID shortly after his wife, allegedly from her, and he died from complications of the virus on May 28, 2020.

Plaintiff, the Estate of Donville Campbell, filed a three-count complaint against Woodcliff and Dr. Kaur alleging medical negligence, wrongful death and a survival claim, all premised on Dr. Kaur’s alleged "negligent, grossly negligent, careless and reckless actions and omissions" in failing to ensure Mrs. Campbell was not COVID positive before discharging her from Woodcliff. Plaintiff alleged Dr. Kaur owed a duty not only to her patient Mrs. Campbell, "but also to those third parties who foreseeably and reasonably relied on competent skill and care to be exercised" by Dr. Kaur in testing Mrs. Campbell for COVID and discharging her home, "and who would be foreseeably affected by any deviation in the standard of care," such as her husband Mr. Campbell.

Defendants Woodcliff and Dr. Kaur moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), alleging they owed no duty of care to Mr. Campbell, and that defendants were immune under the New Jersey COVID-19 Immunity Statute, L. 2020, c. 18, and the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act), 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d.¹ The trial ₇₀court denied defendants’ motions and their motions for reconsideration, finding plaintiff should be permitted the opportunity to take discovery on whether defendants’ conduct constituted gross negligence, thereby depriving them of the immunity provided by the New Jersey COVID-19 Immunity Statute.

We denied defendants’ motions for leave to appeal the denial of their dismissal motions. The Supreme Court granted defendants’ motions for leave to appeal and remanded the matter to us for consideration on the merits. See Malik v. Ruttenberg, 398 N.J. Super. 489, 494, 942 A.2d 136 (App. Div. 2008) (noting "[a] motion to dismiss filed early in a proceeding is a particularly effective device to resolve any claim of immunity"). Having reviewed the record and heard argument, we consolidate defendants’ appeals for purposes of this opinion and reverse the denial of their motions to dismiss, finding defendants immune from any liability under the New Jersey COVID-19 Immunity Statute.

[1–4] We review a trial court’s decision granting or denying a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), applying the same standard governing the trial court. ACLU of N.J. v. Cnty. Prosecutors Ass’n of N.J., 257 N.J. 87, 100–01, 312 A.3d 276 (2024). Although "our inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint," we give plaintiff ₇₁"every reasonable inference" to be drawn from those facts, with- out any concern about its ability to prove the allegations at this early stage of the litigation. Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746, 563 A.2d 31 (1989). If, however, "the complaint states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide one, dismissal is the appropriate remedy." Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 166, 876 A.2d 253 (2005). As our review is de novo, we owe no deference to any of the trial court’s legal conclusions we deem mistaken. Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108, 203 A.3d 133 (2019).

Defendants contend they owed no duty to Mr. Campbell as a matter of law because he was not their patient and they rendered him no medical care. See Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 465, 457 A.2d 431 (1983) (explaining "[w]here damages are the proximate result of a deviation from standard medical care, a patient has a cause of action for malpractice"). They further contend that even assuming for purposes of argument they owed some duty to Mr. Campbell, they are immune from, liability for damages from injury or death resulting from any of their acts or omissions in providing medical services in response to the COVID outbreak during the public health emergency under the COVID Immunity Statute² and are immune from suit and liability under the PREP Act.

Plaintiff counters that New Jersey has long "recognized that medical care providers owe a duty to take reasonable steps to protect readily identifiable third-party victims that may be put at ₇₂risk by the providers’ lack of adherence to the standard of care," see McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 485, 403 A.2d 500 (Law Div. 1979) (imposing duty on a psychiatrist to warn identifiable victim of a dangerous patient),³ including the duty to warn poten- tial victims of contagious diseases, id. at 484, 403 A.2d 500.

Although the Estate acknowledges the COVID Immunity Statute extends to defendants, it contends it pleaded facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude defendants were grossly negligent or reckless, thus depriving them of the statute’s protections. Plaintiff further contends its common law malpractice claims are not preempted by the PREP Act, as the injuries it suffered from defendants’ discharge of Mrs. Campbell before learning the results of her COVID PCR test were not "caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure" under that statute, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a).

₇₃We reject defendants’ argument that settled New Jersey law establishes they owed no duty to Mr. Campbell because he was not their patient and they provided him no medical care. Although it may well be that defendants owed no duty to Mr. Campbell, it is not possible to definitively say so on this complaint. See Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746, 563 A.2d 31 (requiring courts to search for a "fundament of a cause of action … even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary") (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem’l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252, 128 A.2d 281 (App, Div. 1957)).

We are, however, confident that even if plaintiff could amend its complaint to articulate a recognizable duty in defendants, plaintiff could not plead facts sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find defendants were grossly negligent or reckless in not waiting to discharge Mrs. Campbell from Woodcliff while the result of her PCR test was pending. See Scheidt v. DRS Techs., Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 188, 193, 36 A.3d 1082 (App.’Div. 2012) (noting "the essential facts supporting plaintiff's cause of action must be presented in order for the claim to survive; conclusory allegations are insufficient in that regard"). Simply stated, the Legislature’s decision in the COVID Immunity Statute to temporarily limit the scope of whatever duty we might recognize defendants owed the Campbells to one of simply avoiding gross negligence during the height of the COVID pandemic leaves the Estate unable to state a claim on the facts alleged. It...