Campos v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n, Case No. 1:18-CV-1660 AWI EPG

441 F.Supp.3d 945

Ceasar CAMPOS, Latana M. Chandavong, Neng Her, and Hugh Yang, Plaintiffs

v.FRESNO DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION, County of Fresno, and Xavier Becerra in his official capacity as Attorney General of California, Defendants

Case No. 1:18-CV-1660 AWI EPG

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed February 27, 2020

Jonathan F. Mitchell, Pro Hac Vice, Mitchell Law, PLLC, Austin, TX, Talcott J. Franklin, Pro Hac Vice, Talcott Franklin P.C., Dallas, TX, Bradley A. Benbrook, Benbrook Law Group, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Monique Alonso, Messing Adam & Jasmine LLP, Natasha Saggar Sheth, California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, Gary Marc Messing, Jason H. Jasmine, Messing Adam & Jasmine LLP, Sacramento, CA, Catherine E. Basham, Daniel Carl Cederborg, Fresno County Counsel, Fresno, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Anthony W. Ishii, SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a dispute between current and former members of the Fresno County Sheriff's Department regarding the collection of union dues by Fresno County. The operative complaint is the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). In essence, Plaintiffs' contend that after Janus v. AFSCME , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018), their union, Defendant Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Association ("FDSA"), and Defendant Fresno County ("the County") have unconstitutionally collected dues or service fees from their paychecks and unconstitutionally refused to accept the Plaintiffs' resignation from the FDSA. Currently before the Court is a Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss by the FDSA, and a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss by California Attorney General Becerra ("the AG"). For the reasons that follow, the motions will be granted.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows for a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1). It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978) ; K2 Am. Corp. v. Roland Oil & Gas, 653 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2011). Limits upon federal jurisdiction must not be disregarded or evaded. Owen Equip., 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978) ; Jones v. Giles, 741 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1984). "It is presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) ; K2 Am., 653 F.3d at 1027. Rule 12(b)(1) motions may be either facial, where the inquiry is confined to the allegations in the complaint, or factual, where the court is permitted to look beyond the complaint to extrinsic evidence. See Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) ; Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When a defendant challenges jurisdiction "facially," all material allegations in the complaint are assumed true, and the court determines whether the factual allegations are sufficient to invoke the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Leite, 392 F.3d at 362; Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1039. When a defendant makes a factual challenge "by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction." Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1039 ; see Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121. The court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations under a factual attack. Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1083 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011).

Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. See Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kwan v. SanMedica, Int'l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2017). However, complaints that offer no more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Johnson v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 793 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court is "not required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Seven Arts Filmed Entm't, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Mollett, 795 F.3d at 1065. In assessing a motion to dismiss, courts may consider documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters subject to judicial notice. In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2014). If a motion to dismiss is granted, "[the] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made...." Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2016). However, leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile or the plaintiff has failed to cure deficiencies despite repeated opportunities. Garmon v. County of L.A., 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ceasar Campos ("Campos") is a Deputy Sheriff in the Fresno County Sheriff's Department, Plaintiff Latana Chandavong ("Chandavong") is a Deputy Sheriff in the Fresno County Sheriff's Department, Plaintiff Neng Her ("Her") is a Community Service Officer in the Fresno County Sheriff's Department, and Plaintiff Hugh Yang ("Yang") is a retired Bailiff Deputy Sheriff from the Fresno County Sheriff's Department. Plaintiffs Campos, Chandavong, and Yang allege that, as a condition of employment, they were forced to either join the FDSA and pay full membership dues or not join the FDSA and pay "fair-share service fees." Plaintiffs also allege that, pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code § 1157.12(b), county employees are required to direct cancellations or changes in payroll deductions regarding employee organizations to the employee organization. Section 1157.12(b) requires the County to rely on information provided to them by an employee organization and provides that payroll deductions may be revoked only pursuant to the terms of the employee's written authorization.

Campos alleges that he joined the FDSA when he began his employment with the County in 2013. Campos completed a "County of Fresno Employee Representative Authorization Card" ("ERA Card"). See Doc. No. 40-3.¹ The ERA Card reads: "Most Fresno County Employees are represented by a union/association, which is certified under the ordinance Code as exclusive representative. The County and these groups have agreed that each employee has the option to become or not become a member or pay a service fee. Therefore, check your choice under No. 10 and 11 below." Id. Item 10 is entitled "Status" and has three boxes to check, "New," "Cancel," and "Change"; Campos checked "New." Id. Item 11 is entitled "Deduction Options," and required an employee to check one of three boxes. Id. The three "deduction options" are: "I choose to become a member," "I choose NOT to become a member or pay a service fee," and "I elect to pay a service fee." Id. Campos selected "I chose to become a member." Id. On the back of the card is a paragraph that is entitled in bold type and all caps: "Important – Please Read The Following Paragraph Before Signing Below." Id. That paragraph reads: "I understand that, if I have opted to become a member, my signature below authorizes the deduction of any amounts voted for pursuant to the provisions of my organization's constitution or bylaws at a general membership meeting and certified by the President of the organization and this authorization shall remain in force and effect until the withdrawal period specified in the Memorandum of Understanding for my job class and after being rescinded by me on the proper card." Id. (underline in original). Campos attempted to resign his membership on August 20, 2018, shortly after the Janus decision. On August 29, 2018, the FDSA responded that Janus does not apply to union members and that the FDSA will only consider requests to withdraw membership that conform to the requirements set forth in Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") Article 17.² Article 17 provides for a one-month window for resignation of membership that opens two months before the MOU expires. See Doc. No. 24-4. The then existing MOU expired on December 15, 2019, which meant that FDSA did not allow Campos to resign his membership until November 2019. After Campos received FDSA's letter denying his attempted withdrawal, he e-mailed the County Payroll and Human Resources Department and cc'd the FDSA. Campos's email stated that he resigned his membership in the FDSA, he has informed FDSA of his withdrawal and instructed them to stop taking dues from his paycheck, and he revoked any authorizations for payroll deductions or wage diversions to the FDSA. The FDSA immediately responded to all recipients with a copy of MOU Article 17, and thus, effectively instructed the County to continue making deductions from Campos's check.

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