Campos v. Shinn

1

Daniel Campos, Petitioner, v. David Shinn, et al., Respondents.

No. CV-22-00892-PHX-ROS (ESW)

United States District Court, D. Arizona

March 17, 2023

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Honorable Eileen S. Willett, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the Court is Daniel Campos' (“Petitioner”) “Petition under 28 U.S.C § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer (Doc. 11), to which Petitioner has replied (Doc. 15). For the reasons explained herein, it is recommended that the Court deny habeas relief.

I. BACKGROUND

The Petition challenges criminal judgments entered against Petitioner in the Superior Court of Arizona in two separate cases: Case No. CR2017-151875-001 (the “2017 Case”) and CR2019-124969-001 (the “2019 Case”).

In April 2018, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement in the 2017 Case in which Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, a class 4 felony. (Doc. 11-1 at 7). The trial court accepted Petitioner's guilty plea. (Id. at 12).

On July 17, 2018, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a ten-year term of supervised probation. (Id. at 22-25). On January 31, 2019, Petitioner's probation officer filed a petition to revoke probation for Petitioner's failure to comply with numerous terms of his probation. (Id. at 27-30). At the violation hearing on February 11, 2019, Petitioner admitted to violating the probation term imposing a curfew. (Id. at 32). The Court reinstated supervised probation for a ten-year term to begin on February 11, 2019 with a revised expiration date of July 25, 2028. (Id. at 34-37).

On March 26, 2019, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) and PCR Petition. (Id. at 39-41, 43-46). The trial court appointed Petitioner counsel. (Id. at 49). On June 18, 2019, Petitioner's counsel filed a notice stating that counsel could not find any colorable claims to raise in post-conviction proceedings. (Id. at 52-54). The trial court ordered that counsel must remain in an advisory capacity for Petitioner until resolution of the PCR proceeding. (Id. at 56-57). In a minute entry filed on September 20, 2019, the trial court dismissed the PCR proceeding because Petitioner had not filed a PCR Petition and the deadline to do so had passed. (Id. at 59).

On May 24, 2019, Petitioner's probation officer filed another petition to revoke probation in the 2017 Case. (Id. at 61-64). On July 16, 2019, the State of Arizona filed an information in the 2019 Case charging Petitioner with (i) one count of interference with monitoring devices, a class 4 felony and (ii) escape in the second degree, a class 5 felony. (Id. at 66-67). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to interference with monitoring devices. (Id. at 76-77). The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Petitioner to a three-year prison term in the 2019 Case. (Id. at 77, 88). The trial court also revoked Petitioner's probation in the 2017 Case and sentenced Petitioner to a prison term of 3.75 years. (Id. at 90).

On October 18, 2019, Petitioner filed a PCR Notice in both the 2017 and 2019 Cases. (Id. at 92-94). The trial court appointed PCR counsel. (Id. at 96-98). On February 10, 2020, counsel filed a notice stating that no colorable claims could be found. (Id. at 100-02). Petitioner thereafter filed a pro se PCR Petition. (Doc. 11-2 at 8-40). Following briefing, on May 18, 2021, the trial court denied relief. (Id. at 69-77). Petitioner sought further review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at 79-119).

In a decision filed on March 29, 2022, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's request for review and granted partial relief by vacating Petitioner's sentence in the 2017 Case and remanding the matter to the trial court for resentencing. (Id. at 141).

On May 24, 2022, Petitioner filed the Petition seeking federal habeas relief (Doc. 1). The Court screened the Petition and required Respondents to file an Answer. (Doc. 5). Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 11) on July 20, 2022 and notified the Court of supplemental authority on August 5, 2022 (Doc. 12). Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 15) on October 24, 2022. As explained below, the undersigned concurs with Respondents that Petitioner has not presented a meritorious habeas claim.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Respondents Raise an Affirmative Defense as to Petitioner's 2017 Case Only

The Petition contains one claim for relief that is directed to both Petitioner's 2017 and 2019 Cases. Respondents do not assert that the claim is unexhausted or procedurally defaulted as to either case. Respondents concede that Petitioner's habeas claim should be reviewed on the merits as to Petitioner's 2019 case, but Respondents assert that the claim is time-barred as to Petitioner's 2017 case.^[1] (Doc. 11 at 9-13). Although a procedural issue should ordinarily be resolved first, “judicial economy sometimes dictates reaching the merits [of a claim] if the merits are easily resolvable against a petitioner while the procedural bar issues are complicated.” Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1162 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”); Barrett, 169 F.3d at 1162 (seeing no need to “belabor” the “difficult question” of a procedural bar when the claim was easily resolvable against the petitioner on the merits); Miller v. Mullin, 354 F.3d 1288, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004) (in the interest of judicial economy, choosing not to address issues of whether habeas claims were procedurally barred “because the case may be more easily and succinctly affirmed on the merits”).

Here, the undersigned finds that it is more efficient to resolve Petitioner's habeas claim on the merits as to both the 2017 and 2019 Cases. See Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 564 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The simplest way to decide a case is often the best.”).

B. Legal Standards Applying to Merits Review of Habeas Claims

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner's claims, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) requires federal courts to defer to the last reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court's adjudication of his or her claims either:

1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

2. resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011).

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” refers to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions applicable at the time of the relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)).

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011). A state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004) (as amended) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

C. Petitioner's Habeas Claim is without Merit

Petitioner's habeas claim alleges that Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights “were violated in his of-right state post-conviction proceeding where no Anders or comparable safeguard was followed denying him the right to counsel.” (Doc. 1 at 16) (italics added).

In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the United States Supreme Court invalidated the State of California's policy of allowing court-appointed appellate attorneys to withdraw without explaining that there were no meritorious claims and without requiring an independent review by the appellate court. The Supreme Court reasoned that, when an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that the defendant does not receive less thorough appellate review than nonindigent defendants who can afford private counsel. Id. at 741. Therefore, when a court-appointed appellate attorney finds a direct appeal frivolous, counsel should

so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel's brief should be furnished [to] the

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