Canen v. Chapman

847 F.3d 407

Lana CANEN, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Dennis CHAPMAN, in his individual capacity as Deputy for the Elkhart County Sheriff Department, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 16-1621

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 23, 2016

Decided January 27, 2017

Michael K. Sutherlin, Attorney, Sutherlin & Associates, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Michael F. DeBoni, Nathaniel M. Jordan, Attorneys, Yoder, Ainlay, Ulmer & Buckingham, Goshen, IN, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before Ripple, Rovner, and Sykes, Circuit Judges.

Ripple, Circuit Judge.

Lana Canen was convicted of felony murder on August 10, 2005 in Indiana state court. Over seven years later, the state postconviction court vacated her conviction after Detective Dennis Chapman, the state's fingerprint expert, recanted his trial testimony. He conceded that he mistakenly had identified a latent fingerprint found at the crime scene as belonging to Ms. Canen. The misidentification occurred because Detective Chapman only was trained to compare "known prints" (i.e. , digital, ink, or powder fingerprint exemplars), not "latent prints" (i.e. , invisible, unknown fingerprints found at a crime scene), and thus lacked the necessary qualifications to identify the latent print removed from the crime scene. At no time had he disclosed his lack of training to any party in the underlying state criminal proceeding.

Following her release, Ms. Canen brought this action against Detective Chapman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ She claimed that he had withheld his lack of qualification to perform latent fingerprint analysis and therefore had violated Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The district court dismissed the case at summary judgment. It held that Detective Chapman was entitled to qualified immunity. Ms. Canen then filed an appeal in this court.²

We now hold that the district court's analysis was correct. Detective Chapman's failure to disclose that he was not trained as a latent print examiner cannot be characterized as a violation of any clearly established right, and, accordingly, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects Detective Chapman. Moreover, to the degree that this action is premised on the preparation or presentation of his trial testimony, absolute immunity protects him. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

IBACKGROUND

A.

On November 28, 2002, Helen Sailor was strangled to death in her apartment. At the time, she was a resident of the Waterfall Highrise Apartments in Elkhart, Indiana, which provided housing for low-income elderly people and adults with disabilities. Lana Canen and Andrew Royer, both recipients of Social Security disability benefits, were also residents.

During the murder investigation, the Elkhart City Police Department ("ECPD") found fingerprints on a number of items in Sailor's apartment, including a plastic container used to hold her medication. The ECPD sent these lifts, along with fingerprint samples from various suspects, to Detective Chapman of the Elkhart County Sheriff's Department for analysis because they knew that the Indiana State Police Laboratory would have required substantially more time to do the analysis. Detective Chapman concluded that the latent print on the container matched Ms. Canen's left pinky finger.³

As the investigation progressed, the ECPD interviewed Royer about Sailor's murder. Royer made multiple inconsistent statements during his interviews and ultimately confessed to the murder. He was charged with the crime. Some of Royer's statements also implicated Ms. Canen. During her interview, Ms. Canen denied ever being in Sailor's apartment and, even after being told that her fingerprint was found there, continued to deny ever being in the apartment. Subsequently, the prosecutor also charged Ms. Canen in connection with Sailor's murder.

Prior to her trial, the State allowed Ms. Canen's attorney to review the prosecutor's entire file, including Detective Chapman's report. To aid in her evaluation, Ms. Canen's attorney retained Charles Lambdin, a retired ECPD detective, to analyze the latent print. He examined the print for approximately thirty minutes and found two points of similarity, but no points of difference. As a result of his examination, Mr. Lambdin believed that Ms. Canen was possibly the source of the print. Ms. Canen's attorney did not seek a pretrial deposition of Detective Chapman, nor did he move to exclude his testimony.

B.

At trial, the State's evidence against Ms. Canen focused on testimony regarding her relationship with Royer, her false statement that she was out of town on the day of Sailor's murder, her denial of ever having been inside Sailor's apartment, and Detective Chapman's latent print identification.

Detective Chapman's testimony included a discussion of his prior experience with fingerprint examinations. He described his past experience with the FBI and his participation in a twelve-week FBI training program in which he had learned how to classify and examine fingerprints. He also stated that he was assigned to the Elkhart County Sheriff's Department Crime Laboratory after attending the Integrated Indiana Law Enforcement Crime Scene Training School in the fall of 2000. Additionally, he testified:

Q: ... And in the lab as a full time detective technician, is it one of your responsibilities to examine as well [as] compare fingerprints?

A: Yes, it is.

Q: Based upon your experience, have you been able to make fingerprint comparisons in the past several years?

A: Yes, I have.

Q: Any idea how many comparisons you've made?

A: Not right off the top of my head. Several—maybe 100 or so .

Q: ... Do you also have training and experience in attempting to recover latent prints from a crime scene?

A: Yes.

Q: Is that part of your responsibilities at the sheriff's department?

A: Yes, it is.^[4]

Detective Chapman then explained how he compared Ms. Canen's known print card to the latent print taken from Sailor's apartment and stated that the latent print matched Ms. Canen's known print. On cross-examination, Ms. Canen's attorney did not question Detective Chapman about his qualifications, nor did he offer a witness to refute his conclusion.

The jury convicted both Ms. Canen and Royer. The court imposed a fifty-five year sentence on Ms. Canen. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction on direct appeal,⁵ and the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer.⁶

C.

In August 2009, after exhausting her direct appeals, Ms. Canen filed a petition for state postconviction relief ("PCR").⁷ As part of her PCR, Ms. Canen's attorney retained an expert, Kathleen Bright–Birnbaum, to analyze the fingerprint evidence. Ms. Bright–Birnbaum is certified in latent fingerprint examination, and her review excluded Ms. Canen as the source of the fingerprint.

Detective Chapman re-examined the evidence and also concluded that he had erred in his previous finding. He testified as to this conclusion during the PCR hearing. When asked why his opinion had changed, he stated that "part of it" was additional training on latent fingerprint identification received in 2006 (after Ms. Canen's trial).⁸ He also stated that he had more experience "[l]ooking at a lot of prints" since he conducted the initial analysis.⁹ Detective Chapman explained that when he had testified at trial about his experience, he was referring to his experience with "known" or "inked" prints.¹⁰ He simply had not reviewed as many latent prints as suggested by his initial testimony.¹¹ When asked if he ever considered saying "maybe [he] shouldn't" do the comparison, Detective Chapman testified, "Yes."¹² Nonetheless, he explained that he did not bring this to someone's attention because he "was trying to help out Elkhart City."¹³

The State then requested a continuance in the PCR proceeding to allow the Indiana State Police Laboratory ("State Police") to examine the fingerprint evidence. The State Police excluded Ms. Canen as the source of the latent print. The court then granted Ms. Canen's PCR petition; it concluded that Ms. Canen's exclusion as the source of the latent print constituted newly discovered evidence. Her conviction was vacated.¹⁴ She was released after over seven years of confinement.¹⁵

D.

In this subsequent civil action in the federal district court, Ms. Canen sought money damages. Her complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleged that Detective Chapman had violated her right to due process under Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), when he held himself out as an expert in fingerprint identification but failed to inform anyone that he lacked the qualifications necessary to examine latent fingerprints.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment in favor of Detective Chapman. The court expressed "doubts" as to whether Detective Chapman's inexperience was "suppressed for purposes of Brady " because the evidence was potentially "available to [Ms.] Canen through the exercise of reasonable diligence."¹⁶ The district court did not resolve that issue, however, because it believed that, in any event, Detective Chapman was immune from suit.

The district court based its determination of immunity on two grounds. First, the district court noted that Detective Chapman enjoyed absolute immunity for his allegedly misleading testimony that he had made "maybe 100 or so" fingerprint comparisons.¹⁷ The court also held that Detective Chapman was entitled to qualified immunity. In this respect, the court focused its analysis on the second prong of the qualified immunity test: whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Specifically, the court held that Ms. Canen had failed to establish "whether the violative nature of [Chapman's] particular conduct is clearly established."¹⁸

IIDISCUSSION

We review a district court's decision granting summary judgment de novo. McDonald v. Hardy , 821 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2016)....