Canesco v. Ford Motor Co.

570 F.Supp.3d 872

Ricardo CANESCO, an individual, Plaintiff,

v.FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware limited liability company; and Does 1 through 10, Defendant.

Case No.: 3:21-cv-00425-BEN-RBB

United States District Court, S.D. California.

Signed November 4, 2021

Amy L. Hirsh, Mark Anthony Johnson, Jeffrey Orville Moses, Cline, APC, La Jolla, CA, for Plaintiff.

Jason Michael Avelar, Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendant Ford Motor Company.

ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO REMAND and

(2) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

[ECF Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11]

ROGER T. BENITEZ, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ricardo Canesco, an individual ("Plaintiff"), brings this Lemon Law action against Defendant Ford Motor Company, a Delaware limited liability company ("Defendant") pursuant to California's Song-Beverly Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1790 et seq. See Complaint, ECF No. 1-3 ("Compl.") at 3.¹

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (the "Motion"). ECF No. 8. The Motion was submitted on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) and Rule 78(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 10. After considering the papers submitted, supporting documentation, and applicable law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion.

II. BACKGROUND²

A. Statement of Facts

On July 19, 2020, Plaintiff purchased a used 2017 Ford F-150 Raptor from Ken Grody Ford, which was manufactured by Defendant ("the Vehicle"). Compl. at 4, ¶ 4; see also ECF No. 1-5 at 1-4 (the "RISC"). Plaintiff contributed $1,500.00 towards the down payment and agreed to pay $73,521.84 over the course of the loan term for the Vehicle (84 payments of $875.26). Declaration of Jason M. Avelar in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, ECF No. 9-1 ("Avelar Decl.") at 2, ¶ 9. He alleges the Vehicle had several defects that substantially impaired its use, value,³ or safety and violated both an express written warranty as well as the implied warranty of merchantability. Compl. at ¶¶ 6, 19, 20, 21, 22. He further alleges Defendant and its representatives failed to service or repair these defects, causing "damages in a sum to be proven at trial but not less than $25,000.00." Id. at 5, ¶¶ 7, 8, 9. Finally, Plaintiff pleads that Defendant's failure to comply with the Song-Beverly Act and its common-law duties constitutes an unlawful business practice under California's Unfair Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 et seq. (the "UCL"). Id. at ¶ 25.

B. Procedural History

On February 4, 2021, Plaintiff sued in the San Diego Superior Court, alleging state law-based violations by Defendant. See generally Compl.

On March 9, 2021, Defendant timely filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. See ECF No. 1-6 at 18-25; see CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 412.20(a)(3).

On March 10, 2021, Defendant timely removed the case to this Court. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 ("NOR"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), (c)(1). On April 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand. Motion, ECF No. 8-1 ("Mot."). On May 24, 2021, Defendant opposed. See Opposition, ECF No. 9 ("Oppo."). On June 14, 2021, Plaintiff replied. See Reply, ECF No. 11 ("Reply").

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Generally, federal subject matter jurisdiction exists due to the presence of a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or complete diversity between the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In cases arising out of diversity jurisdiction, section 1331 vests district courts with "original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1).

While a plaintiff is the master of his or her complaint and may choose where to file suit, removal qualifies as an important check on the plaintiff's right to choose where to file suit. Polo v. Innoventions Int'l, LLC , 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016). When a plaintiff files a civil action in state court, a defendant in that case may remove it to federal court so long as the case could have originally been filed in federal court, either due to the existence of federal question or diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ; City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons , 522 U.S. 156, 163, 118 S.Ct. 523, 139 L.Ed.2d 525 (1997). However, removing a case does not deprive another party "of his right to move to remand the case." 28 U.S.C. § 1448.

Courts strictly construe the removal statutes, rejecting removal jurisdiction in favor of remand to the state court if any doubts as to the right of removal exist. Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp. , 672 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court must remand the case "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ; see also Smith v. Mylan, Inc. , 761 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2014) ; Bruns v. NCUA , 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "is mandatory, not discretionary"). The defendant removing an action from state court bears the burden of establishing grounds for federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka , 599 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010).

Courts evaluate the existence of diversity jurisdiction—including the amount in controversy—at the time of removal. Kenneth Rothschild Tr. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter , 199 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1000-01 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The frame of reference for ruling on a motion to remand to state court is the four corners of the operative complaint at the time of removal. Gracier v. Edwards Dental Supply Co. , 86 F. Supp. 956, 957-58 (N.D. Cal. 1949) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ; St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co. , 303 U.S. 283, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1939) ).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff filed suit under California's "Song-Beverly Act, also referred to as the Lemon Law, [which] stipulates a vehicle manufacturer's obligations to maintain repair facilities, to repair vehicles to conform to applicable warranties, and to repurchase or replace vehicles that cannot be conformed to applicable warranties." Ortega v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. , 572 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220-21 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (Sabraw, J.). Defendant removed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1446, based on allegations of complete diversity jurisdiction and satisfaction of the amount in controversy. NOR, 3, ¶ 9, 5, ¶ 21. In his Motion to Remand, however, Plaintiff argues Defendant failed to show the diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy requirements have been met. See generally Mot. To support diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy, Defendant provided a copy of the Retail Installment Sales Contract (the "RISC"), which contained an address for the Plaintiff located in Chula Vista, California as well as the Total Sale Price of the Vehicle in the amount of $73,521.84. See RISC at 2. Defendant argues this adequately establishes the Court's diversity jurisdiction over this case. Plaintiff, however, seeks to remand not by arguing that diversity jurisdiction does not, in fact, exist but rather by attacking the sufficiency of Defendant's evidence. First, Plaintiff objects to Defendant's attempt to establish diversity by attaching the RISC to its Notice of Removal, arguing the Court should not consider this document when evaluating the Motion to Remand because it lacks foundation, violates the rule against hearsay, and "proves nothing with respect to Mr. Canesco's citizenship." Mot. at 5:19-6:1, 8:14-17. Next, Plaintiff argues Defendant failed to show the alleged amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 required for removal. Id. at 5:10-16.

In assessing the propriety of removal, the district court considers the allegations in both the complaint and notice of removal as well as any documents attached. See Lowery v. Alabama Power Co. , 483 F.3d 1184, 1213 (11th Cir. 2007) ; see also Hall v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc. , 146 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1198 n.31 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (denying a motion to remand while noting that "in determining whether removal jurisdiction exists, the court is not limited to documents attached to the notice of removal" and may even "consider supplemental evidence later proffered by the removing defendant"). Although evidence in support of removal is not required to be attached to the notice of removal, courts will consider such evidence when a plaintiff contests the Court's jurisdiction. See, e.g. , Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens , 574 U.S. 81, 89, 135 S.Ct. 547, 190 L.Ed.2d 495 (2014) ("Evidence establishing the amount is required by § 1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant's allegation.") (emphasis added). A court may also consider "supplemental documents later proffered by the removing defendant."⁴ See Hall , 146 F. Supp. 3d at 1198 n.31 ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) ("Except as provided in subsection (c), if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant ... of a copy of [some] other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable."); id. at § 1446(c)(3)(A) (noting that "other paper" under subsection (b)(3) includes "information relating to the amount in controversy in the record of the State proceeding, or in responses to discovery").

As outlined below, although the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint make this case a close call, the evidence provided by Defendant proves diversity jurisdiction exists. However, the Court first addresses Plaintiff's evidentiary objections. Then, the Court addresses whether Plaintiff's...