Cannon v. Commc'n Components, Inc.

BRENDA CANNON, Plaintiff, v. COMMUNICATION COMPONENTS, INC.; DENNIS NATHAN, PAT CERULLI, AND DOES 1-50 Defendants.

Docket No.: 2:20-cv-01626-WJM-MF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

October 22, 2020

OPINION

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:

This matter arises out of an eleven-count complaint (the "First Amended Complaint" or "FAC") filed by Plaintiff Brenda Cannon ("Plaintiff") against Defendants Communication Components, Inc. ("CCI"), Dennis Nathan ("Nathan"), Pat Cerulli ("Cerulli"), and unidentified Does 1-50 ("Doe Defendants", and together with CCI, Nathan, and Cerulli, "Defendants") relating to the termination of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant CCI. The matter comes before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss each of the counts alleged in the First Amended Complaint, with the exception of Count 5 alleging a breach of contract and Count 8 alleging a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ECF No. 53. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹

Plaintiff is a Washington state resident who was employed by Defendant CCI as a sales manager pursuant to the terms of a written employment contract from December 2014 until she was terminated on June 15, 2018. FAC ¶¶ 5, 9. Defendant CCI is a New Jersey corporation that provides a variety of products and services with respect to wireless communication. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 10. Defendant Nathan is the president and CEO of Defendant CCI. Id. Defendant Cerulli is the vice president of sales of Defendant CCI. Id. Both Nathan and Cerulli are residents of New Jersey. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12. Throughout her tenure with CCI, Plaintiff worked with and reported to both Nathan and Cerulli, as well as certain non-party CCI employees, in the performance of her duties, includingpreparation for and participation in sales meetings with existing and potential clients. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.

Plaintiff alleges that over the course of her employment with Defendant CCI she was subjected to ongoing harassment, disparate treatment, and a hostile work environment on account of her sex, and unlawfully terminated in retaliation for objecting to and reporting such treatment to Defendant CCI's human resources department in violation of both federal and state anti-discrimination laws. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that throughout her employment with CCI she was overlooked or otherwise denied various advancement opportunities within the company, was held to higher standards than her male colleagues, denied credit for sales made to new or existing clients in favor of male colleagues, and subject to unwanted sexual advancements and demeaning comments. Plaintiff further alleges that, as a result of such treatment and termination, CCI breached both its employment contract with Plaintiff and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and is liable on a variety of tort theories for fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and emotional distress.

On February 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed a formal Charge of Discrimination against Defendant CCI with the Washington State Human Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC Charge"). Id. at ¶ 19.² In her EEOC Charge, Plaintiff alleged discrimination based on sex and retaliation beginning on August 1, 2017 and ending with Plaintiff's termination on June 15, 2018. Ravin Decl., Exhibit A, ECF No. 52-2.³ In describing the "Particulars" of the alleged discrimination, Plaintiff summarized the personal harm she suffered, stating:

a. During my tenure with [Defendant CCI], I was subjected to continuous faultfinding in the actions that I took by both Bryan Evans, Sales Director, and Pat Ceruli, Vice President, while my male counterparts would not be subjected to such scrutiny.

b. On or around August 2017, Dennis Nathan told me that I outperform all the males in the company, and that they do not like that.

c. Prior to Pat Ceruli's promotion on August 2017, he would constantly tell me that, "If I keep talking to Dennis I'd be fired." I was subsequently terminated on June 2018 by Pat Ceruli.

d. The bonuses promised to me via contract during 2017 and 2018 were not fully paid to me.

Id. In addition, in a section titled "III. Discrimination Statement," Plaintiff stated:

I believe that I was discriminated against because of my sex (Female), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. I also believe that I was retaliated against for following the owner's direct orders.

Id. On February 26, 2019, at Plaintiff's request, the EEOC issued its Notice of Right to Sue, thereby permitting Plaintiff to pursue claims against CCI directly under federal discrimination laws, including Title VII. Ravin Decl., Exhibit B.

On May 28, 2019, Plaintiff commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. On August 23, 2019, in response to Defendants' first motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 24. Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, which was granted in part by the Washington District Court and resulted in the transfer of this action to this Court on February 14, 2020. See ECF No. 38. Now before the Court is the Defendants' second motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(6). ECF Nos. 52, 53.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that CCI is liable for sex based discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 ("Title VII")(Counts 1 and 2, respectively), breach of contract (Count 5), promissory estoppel (Count 7), and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count 8). Plaintiff further alleges that each of the Defendants is liable for discrimination under the Washington State Law Against Discrimination, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 49.60.010 et seq. ("WLAD") (Count 3), discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-1 et seq. ("NJLAD") (Count 4), unjust enrichment (Count 6), fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation (Count 9), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 10), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count 11). Now before the Court is the Defendants motion to dismiss each of the Counts, except for Counts 5 and 8 for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, respectively. The Court addresses each Count sought to be dismissed in turn.

A. Legal Standard

FRCP 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The movant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). "[A]ll allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff must be given the benefit of every favorable inference to be drawn therefrom." Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). The court need not accept as true "legal conclusions," and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.

B. Claims Against Doe Defendants

Defendants seek dismissal of all claims asserted against the Doe Defendants because Plaintiff does not attempt to link the conduct of any Doe Defendant to the specific allegations or claims in the First Amended Complaint. The Court agrees.

Pursuant to FRCP 21, the Court may order that parties to an action be dropped at any stage in a case so long as it is just. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. "District Courts in the Third Circuit have used this Rule to exclude John Doe parties from an action where appropriate." Adams v. City of Camden, 461 F. Supp. 2d 263, 271 (D.N.J. 2006). The Court finds dismissal of the Doe Defendants to be appropriate. Plaintiff makes no substantive allegations with respect to any of the Doe Defendants and does not link any Doe Defendant to any of the claims or allegations set forth in the First Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has failed to state any claims against any of the Doe Defendants, and each count is hereby DISMISSED to the extent it is asserted against any Doe Defendant.

C. Counts 1 and 2 - Sex Discrimination and Retaliation Under Title VII

Defendants argue Plaintiffs' claims for sex discrimination based on a hostile work environment and disparate treatment, and retaliation under Title VII should be dismissed because (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to such claims; (2) the claims are time-barred; (3) Plaintiff's EEOC Charge failed to comply with the notice requirements of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) and (e)(1); and (4) Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts necessary to state a prima facie case for such claims. Mot. at 5-6. Plaintiff responds that her EEOC Charge encompasses the more specific claims and allegations made in the First Amended Complaint because such claims and allegations "can be reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." Pl. Opp. at 4, ECF No. 54. The Court agrees with Defendants and addresses each claim in turn.

1. Count 1: Sex...