Cannon v. E. Corr. Inst.

LATOSHA N. CANNON v. EASTERN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

Civil Action No. DKC 20-3196

United States District Court, D. Maryland

April 21, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this Title VII and ADA employment discrimination case are the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Eastern Correctional Institution (“ECI”) (ECF No. 25), and the motion for leave to file supplemental complaint filed by Plaintiff Latosha N Cannon (ECF No. 30). The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted and the motion for leave to file will be denied.

I. Background

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set forth in the complaint, the documents and factual narrative attached to the complaint, or evidenced by the Charge of Discrimination Ms. Cannon filed with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights and attached as an exhibit to Ms. Cannon's complaint and ECI's motion to dismiss. The facts are construed in the light most favorable to Ms. Cannon.

Ms. Cannon began working as a correctional officer at ECI on February 1, 2013. (ECF No. 1, at 5). In 2014, she miscarried, which she attributes to job stress. (ECF No. 1, at 5). Three months later, she became pregnant again. She requested an accommodation for light duty, but supervisors told her no. (ECF No. 1, at 5). In fact, supervisors told her that she was a rookie and deserved to walk and work while pregnant. (ECF No. 1-1, at 26). On March 14, 2015, while pregnant and working at ECI, she twisted her left ankle. (ECF No. 1, at 5, 8). This ankle injury became a recurring injury. (ECF No. 1, at 9). She later slipped down several stairs and injured her right knee on September 21, 2016. (ECF No. 1, at 13). She was injured again on January 4, 2018, when, while working at ECI, she slipped on an icy walkway and fell. (ECF Nos. 1, at 6). She complained to supervisors, about the pain she was in, but they did not change her work assignments. (ECF No. 1, at 7). Ms. Cannon had surgery on the ankle in 2019. (ECF No. 1-1, at 5). In June of 2020, Ms. Cannon's doctor concluded that she would “not be able to return to work in Corrections ever.” (ECF No. 1-2, at 12).^[1] Independent of the alleged failure to accommodate Ms. Cannon's ankle and knee injuries, ECI employees harassed Ms. Cannon and treated her with hostility. In November of 2015, Ms. Cannon reported the presence of K-2 smoke in ECI to superiors. (ECF No. 1, at 10-11). The K-2 smoke made her dizzy and disoriented, and contributed to the accidents which caused her left ankle and right knee injuries. (ECF No. 1-1, at 20-21). Despite her complaint, a superior officer continued to require her to work in the area where the K-2 smoke was because the superior did not like her. (ECF No. 1, at 11). Moreover, after her complaint and a meeting with supervisors, the hostility toward her worsened as she was assigned to posts in the cold and rain. (ECF No. 1, at 11). Then, in 2018, another officer sexually harassed Ms. Cannon. The officer repeatedly rubbed her arms and made verbal advances. (ECF No. 1-1, at 23). Lastly, Ms. Cannon states that people at ECI didn't like the color of her skin. (ECF No. 1, at 7).

On January 20, 2018, Ms. Cannon was placed on workers' compensation. (ECF No. 1-1, at 1). She does not appear to have returned to work at ECI after that date.

On July 7, 2020, Ms. Cannon filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights.^[2] The Charge alleged race, sex, and disability discrimination, as well as retaliation, occurring between November 10, 2014, and January 20, 2018. (ECF No. 1-1, at 1). Ms. Cannon states that she received a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on the same day. (ECF Nos. 1, at 14). She did not attach the letter to her complaint. Three months later, Ms. Cannon filed her pro se complaint on October 5, 2020.

Ms. Cannon's complaint alleges claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e). She alleges that she was discriminated against in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. (ECF No. 1, at 4). ECI filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 25). Ms. Cannon subsequently filed correspondence indicating that she wanted to amend her complaint to add a claim. (ECF No. 28). Ms. Cannon was given an opportunity to file a motion for leave to amend her complaint. (ECF No. 29). Instead, she filed what was construed as a motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint. (ECF No. 30). She included as an attachment to her motion for leave to file a second Charge of Discrimination. The second Charge alleges that ECI further violated the ADA when, in March 2021, it informed Ms. Cannon that it was unable to accommodate her disability. (ECF No. 30-4, at 33). The Government opposed the motion.^[3] (ECF No. 31).

II. Standards of Review

ECI's assertion that sovereign immunity bars Ms. Cannon's ADA claim is properly assessed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Hammons v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 551 F.Supp.3d 567, 578-79, 578 n.6 (D.Md. 2021). ECI's assertions that Ms. Cannon's Title VII claim is time barred, or in the alternative does not state a claim, are properly assessed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Sewell v. Strayer Univ., 956 F.Supp.2d. 658, 667 (D.Md. 2013).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) should be granted “only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4^th Cir. 1991). In the context of such a motion, courts should “regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue, ” and “may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4^th Cir. 1999). As a general rule, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Richmond 945 F.2d at 768-69.

The defense of sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar. Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 888 F.3d 640, 649 (4^th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted) (discussing sovereign immunity in the context of government contractors), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 417 (2018); see also Cunningham v. Lester, 990 F.3d 361, 365 (4^thCir. 2021) (recognizing sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional limitation and describing it as “a weighty principle, foundational to our constitutional system”). In this context, however, “the burden of proof falls to an entity seeking immunity as an arm of the state, even though a plaintiff generally bears the burden to prove subject matter jurisdiction.” Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC, 929 F.3d 170, 176 (4^th Cir. 2019) (citing Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 543 (4^th Cir. 2014)).

A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4^th Cir. 2006). “[T]he district court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and draw all reasonable factual inferences in plaintiff's favor.” Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 299 (4^th Cir. 2021). A plaintiff's complaint need only satisfy the standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” A Rule 8(a)(2) “showing” still requires more than “a blanket assertion[] of entitlement to relief, ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007), or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Mays, 992 F.3d at 299-300 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663).

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Liberal construction means that the court will read the pleadings to state a valid claim to the extent that it is possible to do so from the facts available; it does not mean that the court should rewrite the complaint to include claims never presented. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10^th Cir. 1999). That is, even when pro se litigants are involved, the court cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts that support a viable claim. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4^th Cir. 1990); Forquer v. Schlee, No. 12-cv-969-RDB, 2012 WL 6087491, at *3 (D.Md. Dec. 4, 2012) (“[E]ven a pro se complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege a plausible claim for relief.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Analysis

A. ADA Claim

The ADA is divided into several sections called “titles.” Each section forbids a type of discrimination. Title I prohibits employment discrimination; Title II prohibits discrimination in providing public services; and Title III prohibits discrimination in providing public accommodations. Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., 789 F.3d 407, 421-22 (4^th Cir. 2015). Ms. Cannon does not say under what section she is suing. Her ADA claim, however, refers to employment issues. Thus, her ADA claim appears to have been brought under Title I. See Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 421 (“Title II unambiguously does not provide a vehicle for public...