Cannon v. S. Univ. Bd. of Supervisors

SHABOYD PIERRE CANNON v. SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION 17-527-SDD-RLB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

June 27, 2019

RULING

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss¹ filed by Defendants, Southern University Board of Supervisors, Freddie Pitcher, Jr., John K. Pierre, and Tony Clayton (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiff, Shaboyd Cannon ("Plaintiff"), has filed an Opposition² to this motion, to which Defendants filed a Reply.³ For the reasons which follow, the Court finds that the summary judgment motion should be granted.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was formerly a student enrolled at the Southern University Law Center ("SULC"), an institution within the Southern University Agricultural and Mechanical College System, which is an agency of the State of Louisiana. The Board of Supervisors("the Board") is the constitutionally established governing body of the Southern System pursuant to Article XII Section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Defendant Freddie Pitcher, Jr. is the former Chancellor of SULC, Defendant John Pierre is the current Chancellor of SULC, and Defendant Tony Clayton was formerly a member of the Board. These Defendants are named solely in their official capacities.

Plaintiff alleges that he was dismissed from SULC on August 22, 2014, while he was in his third year of law school, for failing to report two arrests on his admission application back in 2011.⁴ Following an appeal from this dismissal, Plaintiff alleges he was readmitted to SULC on August 26, 2014.⁵ Plaintiff was dismissed again on January 13, 2015 on the alleged grounds that his 2014 dismissal had been taken "under advisement."⁶ Again, Plaintiff appealed and attended a hearing before the Board, which Plaintiff alleges was "procedurally and substantively flawed," on October 25, 2015.⁷ The Board denied Plaintiff's appeal and upheld his dismissal from SULC.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 8, 2017, asserting a state law breach of contract claim against SULC⁸ and federal claims alleging that Defendants have violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, equal protection, and liberty interest.⁹

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's case under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on prescription and Eleventh Amendment sovereignimmunity. The Court granted Defendants' motion as to Plaintiff's state law breach of contract claim but denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's federal claims because Plaintiff clarified that he sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, rather than money damages.¹⁰ Accordingly, because the Plaintiff alleged that his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were violated and seeks injunctive relief in the form of readmission to SULC, the Court held that his federal claims fall within the Ex parte Young exception and are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.¹¹

Defendants filed the instant motion seeking relief under Rule 12(c) and, alternatively, under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to this motion; however, Plaintiff's Opposition was responsive to a Rule 12(b)(6) standard, not responsive to the issues presented, unsupported by applicable jurisprudence, and rife with inappropriate hyperbole.¹² Nevertheless, the Court provided Plaintiff an opportunity to respond to Defendants' Rule 56 motion,¹³ and Plaintiff submitted a second Opposition within the deadlines provided.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matterof law."¹⁴ "When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we consider all of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence."¹⁵ A party moving for summary judgment "must 'demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case."¹⁶ If the moving party satisfies its burden, "the non-moving party must show that summary judgment is inappropriate by setting 'forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.'"¹⁷ However, the non-moving party's burden "is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence."¹⁸

Notably, "[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'"¹⁹ All reasonable factual inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.²⁰ However, "[t]he Court has no duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate preciselyhow this evidence supports his claim."²¹ "Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts ... will not prevent the award of summary judgment; 'the plaintiff [can]not rest on his allegations ... to get to a jury without any "significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint."'"²²

B. Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence

Plaintiff has failed to submit to the Court admissible summary judgment evidence to support his opposition to Defendants' motion. Plaintiff's Statement of Contested Facts, incorporated into his Opposition, are identified by dates. Only two statements of purported fact contain a citation to record evidence. The statement identified as 2013-8-14 references Exhibit #52.²³ However, this Exhibit is not evidence supporting Plaintiff's statement. The statement identified as 2015-10-14 & 22 references Exhibit #51,²⁴ but this exhibit likewise does not evince support for Plaintiff's proffered statement of fact. No other purported statements of contested facts direct the Court to corresponding record evidence as required by Rule 56(c)(1)(A) which provides that: "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials ... ."

The only other exhibit attached to Plaintiff's Opposition is his Affidavit.²⁵ To the extent the Court considers all other statements as supported by this Affidavit, Plaintiff fares no better. Plaintiff's Affidavit is replete with inadmissible hearsay, speculative and conclusory statements, and is not in proper form. The last page of Plaintiff's Affidavit includes a Notary Acknowledgment that indicates that Plaintiff personally appeared in the State of Louisiana, Parish of East Baton Rouge, before Notary Public Ramana Rao Gudapati of Bibb County, Georgia. La. R.S. 35:5 provides that:

Oaths, acts, and acknowledgments taken, made, or executed by or before any person purporting to be a notary public, duly appointed and duly qualified in any other state, territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia shall have the same force and effect without further proof of the signatures as if taken, made, or executed by or before a notary public in Louisiana.

Thus, an out-of-state notary public is permitted under Louisiana law to notarize a Louisiana document. However, under both Louisiana and Georgia law, a notary public may not notarize a document outside of his jurisdictional limits. La. R.S. 35:10 provides that "[a]ll notarial acts shall be made and executed at any place within the jurisdictional limits of the notary." Under the Georgia Code, OCGA § 45-17-9, "[n]otarial acts may be exercised in any county in the state." As this Affidavit represents that a Georgia Notary Public notarized a document in East Baton Rouge Parish, it is not properly notarized as the notary is not authorized to notarize a document outside of the physical state ofGeorgia. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Affidavit is not admissible summary judgment evidence for the foregoing reasons.

C. Rule 65 Permanent Injunction

"The legal standard for obtaining a permanent injunction mirrors the legal standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction."²⁶ Thus, "[a] plaintiff must demonstrate '(1) actual success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that failure to grant the injunction will result in irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction will not disserve the public interest.'"²⁷ However, the notable difference between the legal standard for a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction is that the Plaintiff must demonstrate actual success on the merits and not just a likelihood of success.²⁸

Plaintiff's arguments suggest confusion regarding the relief he seeks in this matter. First, Plaintiff argues that he "does NOT request injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacity for violating his Federal/Constitutional Rights by way of Summary Judgment."²⁹ However, Defendants have a right to pursue judgment via Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and once Defendants so move, Plaintiff is required to respond under Rule 56. It is of no consequence that it may not be Plaintiff's procedural preference. To proceed to trial on his claims, Plaintiff must defeat Defendants' summaryjudgment motion according to the standard set forth above. Second, Plaintiff states that "there is a substantial likelihood to success on the merits of this case,"³⁰ but, as set forth above, Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction which requires Plaintiff to demonstrate actual success on the merits. Finally, Plaintiff maintains that he "yet prefers Trial...