Cano v. Williams

RAYMOND CANO, Applicant, v. DEAN WILLIAMS, Executive Director, C.D.O.C.,and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 20-cv-00257-DDD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

May 6, 2021

Judge Daniel D. Domenico

ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

This matter is before the Court on the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) filed pro se by Applicant Raymond Cano. Mr. Cano challenges the validity of his conviction in Adams County District Court case number 96CR12. After reviewing the record, the Court finds and concludes that the Application should be denied and the case dismissed with prejudice.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Cano was convicted by a jury on one count of first-degree murder for stabbing a fellow gang member, Miguel Larios, at a New Year's Eve party attended by several gang members. According to the Colorado Court of Appeals, "[b]efore his attendance at the party and eventual murder, Larios received multiple threats on his life and had entirely withdrawn from communication with fellow gang members." (Doc. 12-9 at p.3.) Mr. Cano was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On April 20, 2000, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. (See Doc. 12-4.) In January 2001 the Colorado Supreme Court denied Mr. Cano's petition for writ of certiorari on direct appeal. (See Doc. 12-1 at p.20.)

Mr. Cano subsequently filed a postconviction motion pursuant to Rule 35(c) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure raising several claims that counsel was ineffective, including a claim that trial counsel had a conflict of interest due to simultaneous representation of Mr. Cano and a potential witness at Mr. Cano's trial named Sergio Aguilar. The trial court denied the motion following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings pertinent to the conflict of interest claim. (See Doc. 12-7.) On consolidated review with a case raising a similar issue, the Colorado Supreme Court clarified the appropriate standard that would apply to such a claim predicated on the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. West v. People, 341 P.3d 520 (2015). The trial court again denied postconviction relief and that order was affirmed on December 6, 2018. (See Doc. 12-9.) On October 15, 2019, the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review in the postconviction proceedings. (See Doc. 12-10.)

Mr. Cano asserts four claims for relief. He contends in Claim 1 that his right to a fair trial was violated when the trial court denied a defense request for a continuance to prepare for trial. Mr. Cano contends in Claim 2 that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him and his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fairtrial were violated by admission of multiple instances of hearsay testimony. In Claim 3, Mr. Cano contends the prosecution committed misconduct during closing arguments in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. Mr. Cano finally contends in Claim 4 that his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated because counsel: (a) failed to conduct sufficient investigations that would have allowed discovery of alibi witnesses; (b) was operating under conflicting interests; (c) failed to obtain gang and toxicology experts and failed to communicate effectively with Mr. Cano; (d) failed to call witnesses who would have testified that the testimony of prosecution witnesses was fabricated; and (e) coerced Mr. Cano into waiving a preliminary hearing.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must construe the Application and other papers filed by Mr. Cano liberally because he is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Still, the Court cannot act as an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that a writ of habeas corpus may not be issued with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on anunreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Mr. Cano bears the burden of proof under § 2254(d). See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).

The Court's inquiry is straightforward "when the last state court to decide a prisoner's federal claim explains its decision on the merits in a reasoned opinion." Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). "In that case, a federal habeas court simply reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable." Id. When the last state court decision on the merits "does not come accompanied with those reasons . . . the federal court should 'look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning." Id. The presumption may be rebutted "by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed." Id.

The threshold question the Court must answer under § 2254(d)(1) is whether Mr. Cano seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time the state court adjudicated the claim on its merits. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011). Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

Clearly established law consists of Supreme Court holdings in cases where the facts are at least closely-related or similar to the case sub judice. Although the legal rule at issue need not have had its genesis in the closely-related or similar factual context, the Supreme Court must have expressly extended the legal rule to that context.

House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 2008). If there is no clearly established federal law, that is the end of the Court's inquiry pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). See id. at 1018.

If a clearly established rule of federal law is implicated, the Court must determine whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that clearly established rule of federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05.

A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if: (a) "the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases"; or (b) "the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent." Maynard [v. Boone], 468 F.3d [665,] 669 [(10th Cir. 2006)] (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S. Ct. 1495). "The word 'contrary' is commonly understood to mean 'diametrically different,' 'opposite in character or nature,' or 'mutually opposed.'" Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (citation omitted).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when it identifies the correct governing legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. 1495.

House, 527 F.3d at 1018.

The Court's inquiry pursuant to the "unreasonable application" clause is anobjective inquiry. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. A decision is objectively unreasonable "only if all fairminded jurists would agree that the state court got it wrong." Stouffer v. Trammel, 738 F.3d 1205, 1221 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore,

[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations. [I]t is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme] Court.

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, brackets in original). In conducting this analysis, the Court "must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported[] the state court's decision" and then "ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court." Id. at 102. In addition, "review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181.

Under this standard, "only the most serious misapplications of Supreme Court precedent will be a basis for relief under § 2254." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671; see alsoRichter, 562 U.S. at 102 (stating "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable").

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a

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