Cantrell v. McClure

TERRY CANTRELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TREVOR MCCLURE, individually, TREVOR MCCLURE, in his official capacity as an Officerwith the Ellijay Police Department, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-12516

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

March 5, 2020

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cv-00141-RWS

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

Before ANDERSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN,^* District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff-Appellant Terry Cantrell appeals an order of the district court, granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing all federal and state-law claims against defendants, Officer Trevor McClure in his individual and official capacities, Chief of Police Edward D. Lacey in his official capacity, and the City of Ellijay, Georgia.¹ For the following reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts, as alleged by Cantrell, as clearly presented in police dashboard camera footage, or as otherwise undisputed, are taken as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss.² On June 16, 2015, Cantrell was driving a vehicle while intoxicated. Officer Brady Dover initiated a traffic stop. Cantrell didnot stop; instead, he accelerated and a chase ensued. After narrowly avoiding a collision with an oncoming vehicle, Cantrell crashed into a park, abandoned his vehicle, and tried to elude arrest on foot.

A second police car in pursuit of Cantrell approached the park, and Officer McClure, who was riding in the passenger seat, undertook a chase of Cantrell on foot. A video on the dashboard of the second police vehicle recorded the following scene, second-by-second: at 16:00:46 the second police car arrived at the park; at 16:00:48 Cantrell, spotting the officers, turned and began walking away. At 16:00:51, McClure exited the police vehicle and began running towards Cantrell; and at 16:00:53, Cantrell stopped, turned around towards the approaching officers, and began to raise his hands over his head. Less than a second later, McClure, already sprinting towards Cantrell, tackled him to the ground. Fewer than four seconds passed between the moment that McClure exited the police car, and when he tackled Cantrell; only at the last second did Cantrell gesture an apparent surrender.

Upon being tackled, Cantrell hit the ground and his head struck the pavement. Cantrell was subsequently air-lifted to Atlanta Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with intracranial bleeding and a closed head injury, and remained in a coma for 12 days.

Defendants moved for dismissal on the pleadings of all of Cantrell's claims. The district court granted the motion, dismissing Cantrell's claims (1) against McClure, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, concluding McClure was entitled to qualified immunity; (2) for municipal liability against the City of Ellijay, finding no constitutional violation had occurred; and (3) under Georgia state law, based on, among other things, an official immunity defense. Appellant filed this timely appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We review de novo a district court's entry of judgment on the pleadings, accepting the facts in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1524-25 (11th Cir. 1996)). "Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001)). "If a comparison of the averments in the competing pleadings reveals a material dispute of fact,judgment on the pleadings must be denied." Perez, 774 F.3d at 1335 (citing Stanton v. Larsh, 239 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1956)).³

III. DISCUSSION

A. McClure Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity

As we have often observed, "qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009) (alteration adopted) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 2002)). "The purpose of qualified immunity is to allow officials to carry out discretionary duties without the chilling fear of personal liability or harrassive litigation, 'protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.'" Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff "must satisfy the two-pronged qualified-immunity standard: (1) the facts alleged in his complaint constitute a violation of his constitutional rights, and (2) the constitutional rights were 'clearly established' when the defendant committed the act complained of." Morris v. Town of Lexington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2014) (citingPearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Based upon the uncontroverted video evidence, and taking Cantrell's allegations as true, we conclude that McClure is entitled to qualified immunity, as Cantrell has failed to meet his burden on either count.

As to the first prong of the test, Cantrell has failed to establish that a constitutional violation took place. The force McClure used in the course of Cantrell's arrest was objectively reasonable. "In determining the reasonableness of the force applied, we look at the fact pattern from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene with knowledge of the attendant circumstances and facts, and balance the risk of bodily harm to the suspect against the gravity of the threat the officer sought to eliminate." McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1206. "In deciding whether a police officer used excessive force, we pay 'careful attention to the facts and circumstances' of the case, 'including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.'" Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). Courts should also be "mindful that officers make split-second decisions in tough and tense situations." Id.

Here, McClure was aware that Cantrell was both non-compliant, and a serious risk to public safety. In the moments leading up to the instant before thetackle, Cantrell had evaded a traffic stop; had forced Officer Dover into a dangerous car chase; had narrowly missed colliding with an oncoming vehicle; had crashed his vehicle into a park; had evaded arrest by the first officer he encountered; and had indicated an intent to evade the second set of officers attempting to detain him. Furthermore, McClure had literally a split second to change both his mind, and the momentum of his body in midair, to avoid tackling Cantrell after Cantrell's apparent last-second surrender. Given the circumstances, the force McClure used to arrest Cantrell was not excessive.

This conclusion is not, as Appellant contends, premature or better left to a jury. Courts are to "ascertain the validity of a qualified immunity defense as early in the lawsuit as possible," because qualified immunity "is a defense not only from liability, but also from suit." Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 272 (11th Cir. 2013). An evaluation of the reasonableness of the force used is appropriate at this stage because "the question of whether the force used by the officer in the course of an arrest is excessive is a pure question of law, decided by the court." Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1321 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). The district court had before it all the information necessary for a judgment on the pleadings.

Equally unavailing is Appellant's argument that McClure may have been subjectively unaware of the events preceding his encounter with Appellant. It iswell established that we impute "the collective knowledge of the investigating officers . . . to each participating officer." Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2012)(citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985)). Furthermore, we must "judge use of force solely on an objective basis, and we do not consider an officer's subjective belief." Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). Objectively and indisputably, Cantrell—who posed a danger to others and was demonstrably non-compliant—was walking away from McClure at the moment McClure began to chase him. Using the proper standard applied to these facts, the district court correctly concluded that McClure did not use excessive force.

Turning to the second independently adequate grounds for granting qualified immunity, a right may be clearly established "either by similar prior precedent, or in rare cases of 'obvious clarity.'" Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2015)(quoting Gilmore, 738 F.3d at 277). "Exact factual identity with a previously decided case is not required, but the unlawfulness of the conduct must be apparent from pre-existing law." Id. (quoting Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).

We conclude that even if it could be argued that McClure violated a constitutional right (which, as noted above, he did not), qualified immunity is appropriate because under the circumstances of this case, the right invoked was not"clearly established" at the time of the events in question. The two cases Appellant cites as "clearly establishing" the claimed right do not support him. The first, Mercado v. City of Orlando, was decided on a materially distinguishable set of facts that, if anything, highlights our...