Cantu v. Lumpkin

REYNALDO ALBERTO CANTU, Petitioner, v. BOBBY LUMPKIN, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 6:20-CV-00069

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Victoria Division

March 11, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ACCEPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

DREW B. TIPTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is the March 25, 2021 Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”) signed by Magistrate Judge Jason B. Libby. (Dkt. No. 23). In the M&R Magistrate Judge Libby recommends that the Court grant Respondent Bobby Lumpkin's Motion for Summary Judgment and deny pro se Petitioner Reynaldo Alberto Cantu's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Parties received proper notice and the opportunity to object to the proposed findings and recommendations.^[1] See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Cantu filed timely objections. (Dkt No. 26). As a result, the Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

“Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district court.” Battle v U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quotations omitted). Further, a petitioner does not raise an objection “by merely reurging arguments contained in the original petition.” Edmond v. Collins, 8 F.3d 290, 293 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993). Relevant here, a court must liberally construe a pro se document. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam).

The Court has conducted de novo review of those portions of the M&R to which Cantu specifically objects. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Based on this review and for the reasons that follow, the Court ACCEPTS the M&R.

I. REVIEW OF THE OBJECTIONS

First, Cantu objects to the standard of review Magistrate Judge Libby applied in the M&R. (Dkt. No. 26 at 3-12). In essence, Cantu argues that, in determining whether the state habeas court's decision involved an unreasonable application of federal law, Magistrate Judge Libby improperly applied a subjective standard instead of an objective one. (Id. at 3-6). Second, Cantu objects to Magistrate Judge Libby's conclusion that there is no support in the record for Cantu's claim that a biased jury was unconstitutionally seated. (Id. at 13-17). Specifically, he points to statements in the voir dire transcript as evidence that a biased jury was seated. (Id. at 14-15). The Court addresses each objection in turn.^[2]

A. Unreasonable Application Inquiry

Cantu's first objection is that the M&R applied the incorrect standard of review to the state court's determination of his claims. (Id. at 3-12). Cantu argues that the state court decision involved an unreasonable application of federal law, (id. at 3), and that the M&R incorrectly applied a subjective standard of reasonableness to its review of the state court decision when it should have applied an objective standard, (id. at 3-6).

Cantu's habeas petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The AEDPA standard is highly deferential to the state court's decision. In contrast to “ordinary error correction through appeal, ” AEDPA review exists only to “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376, 191 L.Ed.2d 464 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). While AEDPA “stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal-court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings, ” this standard is difficult to meet “because it was meant to be.” Id. These requirements “reflect a presumption that state courts know and follow the law.” Woods, 575 U.S. at 316, 135 S.Ct. at 1376 (quotations omitted).

Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) dictates that, when custody results from a state court judgment, habeas relief should not be granted unless the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was (1) contrary to, or (2) involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. “Section 2254(d) applies even where there has been a summary denial, ” in which case, the court “must determine what arguments or theories could have supported the state court's decision.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 187-88, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1402, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (cleaned up). The M&R focused on the second clause of Section 2254(d)(1) and found “nothing unreasonable in the state court's application of clearly established federal law[.]” (Dkt. No. 23 at 21). Cantu also focuses on the second clause in his Objections, contending “that although the state court may ha[ve] correctly identified the governing legal rule(s) . . . the state court unreasonably applied them in its analysis of his case.” (Dkt. No. 26 at 7).^[3] In Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court emphasized that the “unreasonable application” inquiry is an objective inquiry, not a subjective one. 529 U.S. 362, 409-10, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1521-22, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Consequently, the Court rejected the lower court's holding that a state court decision involves an unreasonable application when reasonable jurists would all agree its application was unreasonable. Id. This standard, the Court explained, “would tend to mislead federal habeas courts by focusing their attention on a subjective inquiry rather than on an objective one.” Id. at 410, 120 S.Ct. at 1522. In other words, the inquiry is not about whether “at least one of the Nation's jurists has applied the relevant law in the same manner the state court did in the habeas petitioner's case.” Id. Instead, the proper inquiry is about whether the state court's application is objectively unreasonable. Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. at 1521. Though the Supreme Court did not define “unreasonable, ” it stressed that “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Id. at 410, 120 S.Ct. at 1522 (emphases in original); accord Virginia v. LeBlanc, __U.S.__, __, 137 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 198 L.Ed.2d 186 (2017) (per curiam).

Nearly eleven years later, in Harrington v. Richter, the Supreme Court again considered the unreasonable application inquiry from Section 2254(d)(1). 562 U.S. at 100- 104, 131 S.Ct. at 785-87. The Court underscored that an unreasonable application of federal law is not the same as an incorrect application. Id. at 101, 131 S.Ct. at 785 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. at 1522). The Court further elaborated that “[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Id. at 101, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 2149, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004)). Driving the point home, the Court stated, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87 (emphasis added).

Cantu argues that by relying on the Harrington standard of whether fairminded jurists could disagree, the M&R improperly applied the subjective standard rejected by the Williams Court. (Dkt. No. 26 at 3-6). Cantu contends, as have others, ^[4] that Harrington's consideration of whether fairminded jurists could disagree is in tension with Williams's rejection of the standard considering a reasonable jurist when defining an unreasonable application of federal law. (Id. at 5-6). Nevertheless, the Court overrules Cantu's objection.

The M&R properly applied an objective standard to the unreasonableness inquiry under Section 2254(d)(1), not a subjective standard. In determining whether Cantu's state habeas proceeding resulted in an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the M&R relied on the standards from Williams and Harrington, both of which constitute binding precedent.^[5] (Dkt. No. 23 at 5-6). The relevant holding from Williams- that the 2254(d)(1) unreasonable application inquiry is objective-was not disturbed by Harrington. Despite its consideration of “fairminded jurists, ” there is no indication in Harrington that the Supreme Court applied a subjective standard to the unreasonableness inquiry under Section 2254(d)(1).^[6] Not long after Harrington was decided, the Fifth Circuit reiterated Williams's objective standard. Pierre v. Leger, 495 Fed.Appx. 403, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. at 1521).

And even if there is some discord between the two cases with respect to the particular consideration of “reasonable” or “fairminded” jurists the more recent case governs. Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 301 (2016) (“Lower courts almost uniformly adhere to the rule that the most recent opinion of the high court within the jurisdiction is to be followed.”). Harrington is more recent, so its instruction that a “state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision” is properly applied. 562 U.S. at 101, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quotin...