Canty-Massey v. Vantage Mgmt.

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ROMANE CANTY-MASSEY, Plaintiff, v. VANTAGE MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. GLR-23-2227

United States District Court, D. Maryland

June 11, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

George L. Russell, III United States District Judge

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Vantage Management Inc.'s (“Vantage”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No 18). The Motion is ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2023). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part.^[1]

I. BACKGROUND^[2]

A. Factual Background

Self-represented Plaintiff Romane Canty-Massey is an African American woman and is disabled. (Compl. at 6, ECF No. 1).^[3] From May 1, 2021 to around May 1, 2022 she resided at a property managed by Vantage in Bethesda, Maryland with her adult son. (Id. at 1, 9). Canty-Massey alleges that from October 2021 to April 2022, the tenants directly above and below her apartment harassed and stalked her. (Id. at 6-8). Canty-Massey reported her neighbor's actions to the Montgomery County Police Department and obtained a peace order against the tenant directly below her apartment. (Id. at 7, 8). Canty-Massey alleges that she also reported the incidents to Vantage repeatedly from October 2021 to April 2022, but no action was taken against her neighbors in response to her complaints. (Id. at 6-8). Canty-Massey alleges that Vantage declined to address her complaints because of her race and sex. (Id. at 8-9).

Canty-Massey specifically states that Vantage declined her request to move her to a different apartment, declined her request to mediate a dispute with the neighbors, and retaliated against her by citing her with a noise violation. (Id. at 7-9). Canty-Massey alleges that Vantage allowed white tenants access to the rental office but denied such access to black tenants. (Id. at 6; Supp. Compl. at 8, ECF No. 5-1). Liberally interpreting the Complaint, Canty-Massey also alleges that Vantage resolved the complaints of “nonBlack” male tenants but ignored her complaints. (Compl. at 6, 8-9; Supp. Compl. at 6). Canty-Massey alleges that as a result of this purported discrimination she suffered post-traumatic stress disorder and various cardiovascular conditions, and her son suffered from a seizure. (Compl. at 10).

B. Procedural History

Canty-Massey filed a Complaint in this Court on August 15, 2023 (ECF No. 1), and filed a Supplement to the Complaint on September 8, 2023 (ECF No. 5). The Court granted in part Canty-Massey's motion to seal the medical records in her Supplemental Complaint. (ECF Nos. 4, 8). Canty-Massey's Complaint can be construed as asserting five claims against Vantage: (1) violation of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA); (2) Fair Housing Act (FHA) Race/Sex Discrimination; (3) FHA Disability Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate; (4) FHA Retaliation; and (5) FHA Harassment.^[4] (Compl. at 69). Canty-Massey seeks pain and suffering damages. (Compl. at 10).

Canty-Massey filed a Motion for Default Judgment as to Vantage on December 15, 2023, which was denied without prejudice that same day. (ECF Nos. 15, 16). Canty-Massey filed a Motion for Clerk's Enter of Default for want of an Answer on February 8, 2024. (ECF No. 17). Vantage filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 9, 2024. (ECF No. 18). Canty-Massey filed an Opposition on February 26, 2024, (ECF No. 22), and Vantage filed a Reply on March 4, 2024, (ECF No. 24). Canty-Massey filed a Motion to Unseal the Supplement to the Complaint on February 27, 2024. (ECF No. 23).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to “test[] the sufficiency of a complaint,” not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), or does not “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Though the plaintiff is not required to forecast evidence to prove the elements of the claim, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish each element. Goss v. Bank of Am., N.A., 917 F.Supp.2d 445, 449 (D.Md. 2013) (quoting Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012)), aff'd, 546 Fed.Appx. 165 (4th Cir. 2013).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must examine the complaint as a whole, accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). But the court need not accept unsupported or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979), or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see Spencer v. Earley, 278 Fed.Appx. 254, 259-60 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Dismissal of a pro se complaint . . . for failure to state a valid claim is therefore only appropriate when, after applying this liberal construction, it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'” (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972))). Nonetheless, “liberal construction does not absolve Plaintiff from pleading a plausible claim.” Desgraviers v. PF Frederick, LLC, 501 F.Supp.3d 348, 351 (D.Md. 2020) (quoting Bey v. Shapiro Brown & Alt, LLP, 997 F.Supp.2d 310, 314 (D.Md. 2014)).

B. Analysis

1. Violence Against Women Act Claim

Canty-Massey asserts federal question jurisdiction over claims arising under VAWA, 34 U.S.C. § 12471 et seq. (Compl. at 4).^[5] The Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison held unlawful the federal civil remedy provision of VAWA. 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). Circuit courts have clearly stated that it follows that “there is no civil private remedy under VAWA.” Esposito v. New York, 453 F.App'x. 37, 39 (2d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Morales-De Jesus, 372 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2004). Because no private cause of action exists under VAWA, any claims Canty-Massey asserts under VAWA must be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Fair Housing Act Claims

Canty-Massey raises a variety of FHA claims arising from Vantage's failure to resolve her complaints or otherwise take action regarding her neighbors' harassment including sex discrimination, race discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, and harassment. The Court will evaluate each claim in turn.

i. Sex and Race Discrimination

The FHA prohibits discrimination in rental housing or “in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith” on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, familial status, or disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), (b). “[A]n FHA claim can proceed under either a disparate-treatment or a disparate-impact theory of liability. . . .” Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Ltd. P'ship, 903 F.3d 415, 421 (4th Cir. 2018). “Under a disparatetreatment theory of liability, a ‘plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive,' whereas ‘a plaintiff bringing a disparate-impact claim challenges practices that have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale.'” Id. (quoting Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. 519, 524 (2015)).

To establish an FHA disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must show that “he is a member of a protected class and that he was treated differently than other tenants because of his membership in that class.” Roberson v Graziano, No. WDQ-09-3038, 2010 WL 2106466, at *2 (D.Md. May 21, 2010), aff'd, 411 F.App'x. 583 (4th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff may proffer either direct or indirect evidence of discriminatory intent, or make a showing of discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), burden-shifting framework. See Martin v. Brondum, 535 Fed.Appx. 242, 244 (4th Cir. 2013). Direct or indirect evidence of discriminatory intent includes “conduct or statements that both (1) reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude, and (2) bear directly on the contested . . . decision.” Laing v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a plaintiff does not present direct evidence of discrimination, she must proffer sufficient circumstantial evidence to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework. See Martin, 535 Fed.Appx. at 244 (applying McDonnell Douglas to FHA claim). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 2000). Subsequently, the defendant may respond by producing evidence that it acted with a legitimate,...