Canty v. Old Rochester Regional School Dist.

54 F.Supp.2d 66

Kristen CANTY, Jeffrey Canty, and Terri Canty, Plaintiffs, v. OLD ROCHESTER REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, The School Committee of Old Rochester Regional School District, Joan Walsh, Robert Gardner, and John Shockro, Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 98-11531-WGY.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

June 21, 1999.

Craig A. MacDonnell, Keegan, Werlin & Pabian, LLP, Boston, MA, Denis R. Hurley, Thomas A. Conway, Featherstonhaugh, Conway, Wiley & Clyne, Albany, NY, for Kristen Canty, plaintiff.

Richard W. Renehan, Daniel C. Winston, Hill & Barlow, One International Place, Boston, MA, for Old Rochester Regional School District, defendant.

Gregory I. Massing, Attorney General's Office, Boston, MA, for Michael Sullivan, Michael Sullivan, District Attorney for Plymouth County, interested party.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, Chief Judge.

I. Introduction

This action arises out of the sexual abuse of the plaintiff, Kristen Canty ("Canty"), when she was a student at Old Rochester Regional High School, by a coach named John Shockro ("Shockro"). Besides Shockro,¹ the defendants in the action include (i) Old Rochester Regional School District (the "School District"), (ii) the School Committee of Old Rochester Regional School District (the "School Committee"), (iii) the former superintendent of the School District, Joan Walsh ("Walsh"), and (iv) the former principal of the Old Rochester Regional Junior High School, Robert Gardner ("Gardner") (collectively, the "School Defendants"). By her amended complaint, Canty asserts claims for compensatory and punitive damages under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all of the School Defendants. Canty also seeks compensatory and punitive damages against the School District and the School Committee under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (the "Claims Act"). Canty's parents (the "Parents") derivatively seek compensatory and punitive damages under Title IX, section 1983, and the Claims Act.

The School Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), as to portions of the complaint on the ground that they fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In response, Canty and the Parents have withdrawn several claims.² Furthermore, at the conclusion of oral argument, this Court dismissed several challenged claims from the bench.³ As a result, the only claims which presently require consideration are (i) Canty's Title IX claims for punitive damages against the School District, (ii) Canty's Claims Act claims for compensatory damages against the School District, (iii) Canty's section 1983 claims for compensatory and punitive damages against Walsh and Gardner, (iv) Canty's section 1983 claim for compensatory damages against the School District, and (v) Canty's section 1983 claim for compensatory damages against the School Committee.

II. Judgment on the Pleadings Standard

A motion brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) "should be evaluated under the familiar standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Massachusetts Candy & Tobacco Distribs., Inc. v. Golden Distribs., Ltd., 852 F.Supp. 63, 67 (D.Mass.1994) (Karol, M.J.); accord Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F.Supp. 64, 70 (D.N.H.1997). A court's inquiry is a limited one, focusing not on whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but on whether the plaintiff should be entitled to offer evidence to support a claim. See Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F.Supp. at 70. Consequently, taking all facts and inferences in favor of Canty and her Parents, this Court should grant the School Defendants' motion only "if it clearly appears according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff[s] cannot recover on any viable theory." Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 958 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1992).

III. Facts Derived from the Well-Pleaded Complaint

The following alleged facts, all derived from Canty's amended complaint, are material and deemed true for purposes of this motion:

Canty is the daughter of Jeffrey and Terri Canty. See Am.Comp. ¶ 2. In the mid-1990's, Canty was a student at Old Rochester Regional Junior High School and Old Rochester Regional High School, both of which are owned, operated, managed, and controlled by the School District and the School Committee and their agents and employees. See id. at ¶¶ 5, 19. The School District is an educational institution receiving federal funding. See id. at ¶¶ 16-17.

When Canty was in the seventh grade and thereafter for two years until approximately the end of 1997, Shockro had improper sexual contact with Canty both in and out of school. See id. at ¶ 19. In 1995, Shockro raped Canty. See id. at ¶ 20. Although Shockro's contact with Canty in 1995 was reported to several employees and officials of the School District, he remained in his employment with the school and continued to sexually harass, abuse, and assault Canty, both on and off school property, until late 1997. See id. at ¶ 21. In 1997, Shockro pled guilty to charges of rape and sexual assault of Canty. See id. at ¶ 22.

The School District and School Committee, through its agents, representatives, and employees, had knowledge of Shockro's sexual harassment and abuse of Canty as well as other female students, some incidents dating back to the 1970s. See id. at ¶¶ 24-26. Two agents of the School District, Gardner and Walsh, had knowledge of Shockro's history of sexual improprieties, both before and during his improper sexual contact with Canty. See id. at ¶ 49. Walsh and Gardner had specific knowledge in 1995 that Canty had been sexually harassed, sexually abused, and raped by Shockro. See id. at ¶ 55. Walsh and Gardner also knew that the harassment and abuse of Canty continued after 1995. See id. at ¶ 56.

IV. Canty's Title IX Claims for Punitive Damages Against the School District

The School District maintains that, as a municipal entity,⁴ it is not subject to claims for punitive damages under Title IX. Neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit Court of Appeals has decided whether punitive damages are available against a municipality under Title IX.

In 1979, the Supreme Court held that Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of action. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688-89, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Relying on the presumption that once a right of action has been recognized a federal court has the power to award "all appropriate remedies" absent "clear direction to the contrary by Congress," and determining that Congress had not indicated an intent to limit the private remedies under Title IX, the Supreme Court later held that the implied right of action under Title IX includes a remedy for monetary damages. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66-73, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992). The Franklin Court did not, however, specify whether such remedy includes punitive damages, much less whether it includes punitive damages against a municipal entity. Since municipal entities typically enjoy immunity from punitive damages under federal law, see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), it is unclear whether the Franklin Court meant to include punitive damages against municipal entities as part of "all available remedies." Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72, 112 S.Ct. 1028 (emphasis added).

Only a limited number of courts have addressed the availability of punitive damages against municipal entities in Title IX suits. In the First Circuit, the issue has been most extensively addressed in the District of New Hampshire. One district judge expressly has held that punitive damages are not recoverable against a school district under Title IX. See Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F.Supp. at 76 (DiClerico, C.J.); see also Edwards v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., No. 96-7162, 1998 WL 464904, at *2 n. 1 (E.D.Pa. July 30, 1998); Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F.Supp. 1209, 1217 (E.D.Pa.1997). The Londonderry court reasoned that Fact Concerts permits municipal liability for punitive damages only when there is express statutory authority, and Title IX contains no such authority. See Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F.Supp. at 76. Only two months later, however, another district judge in New Hampshire treated the issue of municipal liability for Title IX punitive damages as unresolved and noted:

[I]n the rare case in which a local public school district has demonstrated complete indifference to the requirements of Title IX and has committed ongoing egregious violations with no sign of relenting, a federal court might determine, in its discretion, that a punitive damages remedy for a private party is the best, or only, means of forcing the school district into compliance.

See Doe v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F.Supp. 467, 483 n. 17 (D.N.H.1997) (Devine, J.) (emphasis added).⁵ The Oyster River court's less receptive approach to municipal immunity for punitive damages is bolstered by an earlier District of New Hampshire decision in which the court relied upon Franklin in its refusal to dismiss punitive damages claims against a school district under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which it deemed "closely analogous" to Title IX. See Penney v. Town of Middleton, 888 F.Supp. 332, 342 (D.N.H. 1994) (Barbadoro, J.); see also DeLeo v. City of Stamford, 919 F.Supp. 70, 72-73 (D.Conn.1995) (holding punitive damages available under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187, 1194 (1st Cir.1994) (interpreting the Franklin presumption of a full remedy to allow for exemplary damages for violations of the implied right of action under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970).

On balance, the sweeping language of Franklin to allow "all available remedies" and the demonstrated reluctance of courts in this...