Capalbo v. Kris-Way Truck Leasing, Inc.

821 F.Supp.2d 397

Kevin CAPALBO, Plaintiff

v.KRIS–WAY TRUCK LEASING, INC., Defendant.

No. 2:10–cv–348–JHR.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

Oct. 28, 2011.

Guy D. Loranger, Nichols, Webb & Loranger, P.A., Saco, ME, for Plaintiff.

Richard G. Moon, Verrill Dana LLP, Portland, ME, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ¹

JOHN H. RICH III, United States Magistrate Judge.

Defendant Kris–Way Truck Leasing, Inc. (“Kris–Way”) moves for summary judgment as to all of plaintiff Kevin Capalbo's claims of whistleblower retaliation in violation of the Maine Whistleblowers' Protection Act (“MWPA”), 26 M.R.S.A. §§ 831–40, and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (“STAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 31105. See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) (Docket No. 21) at 1–2; Complaint (Docket No. 1). For the reasons that follow, I grant the Motion in part and deny it in part.

I. Applicable Legal Standards

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Santoni v. Potter, 369 F.3d 594, 598 (1st Cir.2004). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the nonmoving party.” Rodríguez–Rivera v. Federico Trilla Reg'l Hosp. of Carolina, 532 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Thompson v. Coca–Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir.2008)). “A fact is material if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation.” Id. (quoting Maymi v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.2008)).

The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether this burden is met, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor. Santoni, 369 F.3d at 598. Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmovant must “produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.” Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1999) (citation and internal punctuation omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment to the moving party.” In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

B. Local Rule 56

The evidence that the court may consider in deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist for purposes of summary judgment is circumscribed by the local rules of this district. See Loc. R. 56. The moving party must first file a statement of material facts that it claims are not in dispute. See Loc. R. 56(b). Each fact must be set forth in a numbered paragraph and supported by a specific record citation. See id. The nonmoving party must then submit a responsive “separate, short, and concise” statement of material facts in which it must “admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts[.]” Loc. R. 56(c). The nonmovant likewise must support each denial or qualification with an appropriate record citation. See id. The nonmoving party may also submit its own additional statement of material facts that it contends are not in dispute, each supported by a specific record citation. See id. The movant then must respond to the nonmoving party's statement of additional facts, if any, by way of a reply statement of material facts in which it must “admit, deny or qualify such additional facts by reference to the numbered paragraphs” of the nonmovant's statement. See Loc. R. 56(d). Again, each denial or qualification must be supported by an appropriate record citation. See id.

Failure to comply with Local Rule 56 can result in serious consequences. “Facts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted.” Loc. R. 56(f). In addition, “[t]he court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment” and has “no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statement of fact.” Id.; see also, e.g., Sánchez–Figueroa v. Banco Popular de P.R., 527 F.3d 209, 213–14 (1st Cir.2008); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion[.]”).

II. Factual Background

As a threshold matter, I note that, in their statements of material facts, the parties dispute certain points of law, including whether, pursuant to applicable United States Department of Transportation (“DOT”) regulations, Capalbo was required to maintain daily driver logbooks while employed as a so-called “yard jockey” by Kris–Way. Compare, e.g., Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (“Defendant's SMF”) (Docket No. 22) ¶¶ 3, 26 with Plaintiff's Responses to [ ] Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (“Plaintiff's Opposing SMF”) ¶¶ 3, 26; compare also, e.g., Plaintiff's Statement of Facts (“Plaintiff's Additional SMF”) (Docket No. 35) ¶¶ 36, 81–82 with Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts (“Defendant's Reply SMF”) (Docket No. 39) ¶¶ 36, 81–82. The parties' conflicting interpretations of DOT regulations or other legal requirements are not “facts.” Hence, I omit them from my factual recitation. By contrast, the following are “facts”: (i) statements concerning what certain individuals understood or believed the DOT to require, and (ii) statements describing the content of Kris–Way's policies, even if those policies are predicated in whole or in part on DOT regulations. I have included those statements to the extent that they are admitted or supported by the citations given.

With that clarification, the parties' statements of material facts, credited to the extent that they are admissible over any objection and are either admitted or supported by record citations in accordance with Local Rule 56, with disputes resolved in favor of Capalbo as nonmovant, reveal the following relevant facts.²

A. Kris–Way's Business

Kris–Way is a Maine-based company providing truck rentals and leasing, dedicated contract carriage, and contract maintenance services. Defendant's SMF ¶ 1; Affidavit of James Ryan (“Ryan Aff.”) (Docket No. 24) ¶ 1. It has its own trucks and drivers, leases trucks to other companies and individuals, and repairs trucks and trailers. Id. Its largest facility is in South Portland, where it employs approximately 136 drivers, mechanics, and administrative personnel. Id. It has a total of 214 employees and has been in business since 1978. Id.³

B. Nature of Capalbo's Job

Capalbo was employed by Kris–Way as a commercial truck driver from July 2006 through August 20, 2008. Defendant's SMF ¶ 4; Plaintiff's Opposing SMF ¶ 4. He was hired to do two jobs: yard work and over-the-road work. Plaintiff's Additional SMF ¶ 3; Defendant's Reply SMF ¶ 3.

During his employment with Kris–Way, Capalbo worked primarily as a “yard jockey” at the Country Kitchen warehouse terminals in Lewiston, Maine. Defendant's SMF ¶ 24; Plaintiff's Opposing SMF ¶ 24. Yard work involved moving trailers between and around the bakery yards. Plaintiff's Additional SMF ¶ 4; Defendant's Reply SMF ¶ 4. The two yards are about a half mile apart. Id.⁴ A yard jockey spends a portion of his or her work time waiting for instructions from Country Kitchen's shippers, another portion hitching and unhitching trailers and the related lines, and the rest moving and positioning trailers and doing pre- and post-work truck inspections. Defendant's SMF ¶ 25; Affidavit of Clayton Farrin (“First Farrin Aff.”) (Docket No. 23) ¶ 3.⁵

Country Kitchen determines the yard jockey's starting and ending times on any given day. Defendant's SMF ¶ 27; Plaintiff's Opposing SMF ¶ 27. When working as a yard jockey, Capalbo was Kris–Way's only employee assigned full time to Country Kitchen's terminals. Defendant's SMF ¶ 28; First Farrin Aff. ¶ 3. ⁶ Capalbo, when working as a yard jockey, was on the honor system for recording his hours of work on his weekly timesheet, as there was no one present for Kris–Way to observe when he commenced work, what work he did, and when he finished work. Defendant's SMF ¶ 29; Plaintiff's Opposing SMF ¶ 29.⁷ Kris–Way provided Capalbo with a weekly timesheet form on which Capalbo entered the number of hours he worked during each day of that week and described the work he had done that day. Id. ¶ 14. Kris–Way used the timesheets, which Capalbo turned in weekly, to calculate his pay for that week. Id.

C. Kris–Way's Policies and Forms

The DOT regulates truck drivers involved in interstate commerce, including regulating how many hours a truck driver may work and how hours are logged. Plaintiff's Additional SMF ¶ 74; Defendant's Reply SMF ¶ 74. Kris–Way has written policies that require all of its drivers to maintain driver's logs mandated by the DOT. Defendant's SMF ¶ 2; First Farrin Aff. ¶ 6.⁸

Kris–Way provides all of its drivers with logbooks in which to record one month of work. Defendant's SMF ¶ 3; First Farrin Aff. ¶ 9.⁹ The logbooks provided to Capalbo contained descriptions of federal DOT regulations on hours of work and driving and described...