Capodicasa v. Town of Ware

SALVATORE CAPODICASA, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF WARE, DENNIS HEALY, CHRISTOPHER DESANTIS,DIANE GLINIECKI, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 17-30079-MGM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

August 17, 2018

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

(Dkt. No. 6)

MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Salvatore CapoDiCasa, who is deaf, alleges he was arrested and detained on April 6, 2014, following a traffic stop in Ware, Massachusetts. He asserts that despite knowing of his disability, the officers who interacted with him failed to take necessary and required steps to facilitate communications with Plaintiff, causing him acute and ongoing fear, confusion, and anxiety. He brings this action against the Town of Ware (the "Town" or "Ware"); Dennis Healy, who was chief of police at the time of the stop; Christopher DeSantis, the arresting officer; and Diane Gliniecki, another Ware police officer who interacted with Plaintiff following his arrest. In his six count complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim for negligence against the Town (Count I); claims against the Town, DeSantis, Gliniecki, and Healy for discrimination based on disability in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S. § 12131 et seq. and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Count II) and the Massachusetts Public Accommodations Law, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 92A and 98 (Count III) and for violation of the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 103 (Count IV); a claim for intentional and reckless infliction of emotional distress against DeSantis, Gliniecki, and Healy (Count V); and a claim for retaliation against the Town, DeSantis, Gliniecki, and Healy (Count VI).

This matter was initially filed in state court. Defendants removed it to this court. (Dkt. No. 1, Notice of Removal) and then filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim as to Plaintiff's state law claims. (Dkt. No. 6.) Defendants seek dismissal of all claims, except the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims of Count II asserted against the Town. In his opposition, Plaintiff agreed to the dismissal of his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims (Count II) against individual defendants, and that his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V) should be dismissed as to the individual defendants in their official capacity. (Dkt. No. 12.)

II. JURISDICTION

This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over the claims in Count II, which allege violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The other claims arise under state law. Federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims related to and brought together with claims arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The following is a summary of the facts set out in the Complaint. Plaintiff is a resident of Ware. (Dkt. No. 1-1, Compl. ¶ 9.) His primary mode of communication is American Sign Language ("ASL"). (Id. at ¶ 11.) He has a limited English vocabulary; his level of comprehension of writtenEnglish is equivalent to a grammar school student and he is not proficient at reading lips. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff wears a hearing aid that uses vibration to alert him to the presence of sound, but does not enable him to understand speech. (Id. at ¶ 13.)

At approximately 5 pm on April 5, 2014, Plaintiff was driving his truck in Ware when he was stopped by DeSantis. (Id. at ¶ 16-17.) Prior to the stop DeSantis had been informed by police dispatch that Plaintiff is deaf. DeSantis also believed he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff on domestic violence charges. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.) The Ware police department had written policies regarding how officers should interact with hearing impaired individuals. (Id. at ¶ 77-78.) Among other things, these policies required officers to determine the method of communication preferred by a hearing impaired person, avoid assuming deaf individuals can communicate in written English, learn to communicate using basic sign, obtain ASL interpreters for deaf individuals who use ASL, and abstain from using most field sobriety tests with hearing impaired individuals. (Id. at 78.)

After stopping Plaintiff, DeSantis took steps to determine whether Plaintiff had been operating under the influence. (Id. at ¶ 21.) He tried to administer field sobriety tests that were not on the list of permissible tests to use with hearing impaired individuals contained in the written police policies. (Id. at ¶ 21.) DeSantis also administered a portable breath test. (Id. at ¶ 32.) Plaintiff was not able to understand the instructions for the field sobriety tests and was not able to give consent to the breath test. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-39.) Despite efforts by Plaintiff to inform DeSantis that he is Deaf, uses ASL to communicate, and needed help from an interpreter, DeSantis quickly placed handcuffs on Plaintiff, which prevented him from using ASL, and took no steps to learn Plaintiff's preferred method of communication, did not attempt to use ASL to communicate with Plaintiff, and did not take steps to obtain the services of an ASL interpreter. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-28.) Due to his inability to communicate effectively with police officers, Plaintiff was unable to make arrangements to havehis truck retrieved by friends or family and he is not aware of police officers seeking alternatives to having the truck towed. (Id. at ¶¶ 41-42.) As a result, his truck was towed. (Id.)

Following Plaintiff's arrest, he was transported to the Ware police station. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Without obtaining an interpreter or even asking Plaintiff if he required an interpreter, DeSantis and Glinieki questioned Plaintiff after he arrived at the Ware police station. (Id. at ¶¶ 45, 47.) Plaintiff was not able to understand what was being said to him during the interview. (Id. at ¶ 46.) While Plaintiff's arrest was being processed, Plaintiff perceived anger and hostility from Gliniecki and DeSantis, both of whom appeared to him to become frustrated and angry in response to the communication difficulties he experienced. (Id. at ¶¶ 60-62.) Approximately half way through the booking and interview process, officers asked, for the first time, whether Plaintiff could read English. (Id. at ¶ 53.) He answered no, that he communicates using ASL and asked for an interpreter. (Id. at ¶ 54.) A professional interpreter was not provided and no family members or friends were permitted to serve as amateur interpreters, even though his sister contacted the Ware police department in order to find out what was happening with Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 55-57.) Plaintiff was not informed of any steps being taken to provide him with an interpreter and, he believes, the Ware Police Department did not have any agreements in place to obtain ASL interpreter services when needed. (Id. at ¶¶ 58-59.)

Despite his lack of proficiency with written English, Plaintiff was presented with written forms. (Id. at ¶ 48.) These forms included substantive information about Plaintiff's rights, including his right to an independent medical examination. (Id. at ¶ 52.) Plaintiff signed forms he did not comprehend because he found the behavior of Gliniecki and DeSantis frightening and did not understand his rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 63-65.) Additionally, as a result of communication difficulties, Plaintiff spoke about matters related to the alleged domestic violence incident that he otherwise would not have discussed. (Id. ¶¶ 75-76.)

While at the Ware police station, Plaintiff requested an attorney and tried to use an ASL video translation application on his mobile phone to contact an attorney. (Id. at ¶¶ 67-72.) No attorney was provided to him and his attempt to use his mobile phone was unsuccessful because the battery on his phone was low and he was not permitted to charge his phone. (Id.) Because Plaintiff was not able to contact an attorney he was unable to arrange his release. (Id. at ¶ 76.) As a result he was held in custody until his arraignment the next day. (Id.)

On April 7, 2014, Plaintiff was arraigned and charged under Massachusetts law with operating under the influence. (Id. ¶ 81.) While preparing a defense in that case, Plaintiff sought discovery from the Ware police department related to the policies and procedures for conducting field sobriety tests on deaf individuals. (Id. at ¶ 82.) In the months following Plaintiff's request for discovery, Ware police stopped Plaintiff's truck on several occasions when he was not driving it. (Id. at ¶ 84.) In each case the operator of the truck was operating the truck lawfully. (Id.)

II. DISCUSSION

"To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Flock v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 840 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2016). "Setting aside any statements that are merely conclusory, [this court] construe[s] all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine if there exists a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted." Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 733 F.3d 349, 353 (1st Cir. 2013).

A. Discrimination Claims Under Massachusetts State Law

Before addressing the specific claims made by Plaintiff and for which dismissal is sought by Defendants, the court briefly outlines the scope of Massachusetts law regarding discrimination claims. In the Massachusetts Public Accommodation Law, Massachusetts defines places of publicaccommodation and bars discrimination based on a number of criteria, including disability, in such places. MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 272, §§ 92A, 98. A separate statute, Chapter 151B ("151B") bars discrimination in other situations and establishes the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") to investigate and adjudicate discrimination claims. MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 151B, §§ 4, 6. The practices made unlawful under 151B are discrimination by private and public employers against employees or prospective...