Capps v. Dixon

1

AUDRA CAPPS, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH DIXON, et al., Defendants.

TANIKA JOYCE, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH DIXON, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL Nos. 19-12002 (RMB/AMD), 20-01118 (RMB/AMD)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

January 30, 2024

LOUIS CHARLES SHAPIRO LOUIS CHARLES SHAPIRO, P.A. ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS

THOMAS B. REYNOLDS REYNOLDS & HORN, P.C. ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT JOSEPH DIXON

A MICHAEL BARKER GREG PAUL DILORENZO BARKER, GELFAND &amp JAMES, P.C. ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS BRYAN ORNDORF, THE CITY OF MILLVILLE, AND CHIEF JODY FARABELLA

OPINION

RENEE MARIE BUMB, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In these separate, but similar, cases, two women contend that a former officer of the Millville Police Department subjected them to excessive force during two different arrests. Some facts are undisputed. Faced with signs of resistance, the police officer slammed the women onto the ground in unapproved, jiu jitsu “takedown” maneuvers. As a result, both suffered injuries. In fact, the use of force against one of the women was so severe it broke her ribs and caused permanent nerve damage. Thereafter, the police officer was accused of assaulting the women and entered a guilty plea in New Jersey Superior Court as to two counts of third-degree aggravated assault. The women soon filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the police officer's actions violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. They have also claimed that Millville maintained a custom of excessive force and an institutional culture of indifference among supervisors and that the Chief of Police is personally liable for Officer Dixon's use of force.

After the close of discovery, in early July 2023, Defendants Joseph Dixon (“Dixon” or “Officer Dixon”) Officer Bryan Orndorf (“Orndorf” or “Officer Orndorf”), Millville Police Department Chief Jody Farabella (“Farabella” or “Chief Farabella”), and the City of Millville (“Millville”) (Orndorf, Farabella, and Millville together, the “Millville Defendants”) filed Motions for Summary Judgment.^[1] Officer Dixon contends that his use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances of both arrests, notwithstanding his guilty plea to the contrary.^[2] The Millville Defendants submit, among other things, that Chief Farabella cannot be liable under a theory of supervisory liability based on his lack of personal involvement in Officer Dixon's conduct and that the City of Millville had insufficient notice of a pattern of excessive force and appropriately supervised its officers in any case.^[3] They argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs Audra Capps (“Capps”) and Tanika Joyce (“Joyce”) oppose summary judgment.^[4]

On January 16, 2024, the Court held oral argument and conducted a Daubert hearing concerning the proposed testimony of Plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Jon M. Shane. [Capps Docket No. 219.] Following the parties' submissions, for the reasons articulated on the record, the Court indicated that it intended to enter an Opinion and Order denying Dixon's Motion for Summary Judgment, without prejudice, and granting Orndorf's Motion for Summary Judgment.^[5] The Court reserved as to Millville's Motion for Summary Judgment, which the Court will now deny. The Court also indicated its intent to enter an Opinion and Order granting Chief Farabella's Motion for Summary Judgment, but after raising the issue of its jurisdiction sua sponte, in light of Chief Farabella's pending interlocutory appeal before the Third Circuit, this Court now holds that it has been divested of jurisdiction to address his Motion. This Opinion supplements and modifies the Court's reasoning expressed on the record of January 16, 2024.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court only recites those material facts that are relevant to its disposition of the motions pending before it.^[6] Before doing so, however, the Court must make a few observations for the record. This case has been litigated from day one with a counterproductive, “kitchen sink” approach. In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs submitted nearly 400 paragraphs of “factual” allegations in support of their twelve claims for relief. Plaintiffs' submission in opposition to Defendants' motions at the pleading stage was over 800 pages in length. [See Capps Docket No. 67.] This scattershot method required the Court to decipher Plaintiffs' claims and arguments from the muddle. Resolving Defendants' motions at that stage, the Court cautioned Plaintiffs to avoid kitchen-sink pleading. [ See May 21, 2021, Op. at 25-26, Capps Docket No. 80 (“[W]e acknowledge that the practice of ‘throwing in the kitchen sink' at times may be so abusive as to merit Rule 11 condemnation.”) (quoting Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1988)).]

At summary judgment, Plaintiffs' submissions are just as chaotic as before. For instance, the Court observes that Plaintiffs' Statements of Material Facts fail to comply with the requirements of Local Civil Rule 56.1. Under that rule, each party must address the “material” facts that are (or are not) in dispute, and the statements are not to contain “legal argument or conclusions of law.” L. Civ. R. 56.1. Plaintiffs' Responsive Statements of Material Facts-each inexplicably subdivided into separate docket entries-plainly contain legal argument, case citations, and other impertinent information. [See Capps Docket Nos. 199, 199-1, 199-2, 200, 200-1, & 200-2 and Joyce Docket Nos. 181, 181-1, 181-2, 182, 182-1, & 182-2.] Moreover, Plaintiffs' “Counterstatement” of Material Facts masquerades as a factual submission of material facts while comprising, in actuality, the entire discovery record. [See Capps Docket Nos. 199-2, 199-3, 199-4, 199-5, 199-6, 199-7, 199-8, 199-9, 199-10, 200-2, 200-3, 2004, 200-5, 200-6, 200-7, 200-8, 200-9, & 200-10 and Joyce Docket Nos. 181-2, 181-3, 181-4, 181-5, 181-6, 181-7, 181-8, 181-9, 181-10, 182-2, 182-3, 182-4, 182-5, 182-6, 1827, 182-8, 182-9, & 182-10.] It is 780 paragraphs long, and it references over 2,000 pages of documents that are all titled “exhibit” on the docket. [See generally Capps Docket No. 205 and Joyce Docket No. 186.]

Worse, Plaintiffs' Opposition Briefs fail to meaningfully engage with the discovery record or provide clarity on the material facts Plaintiffs believe to be in dispute. Instead, as discussed further below, Plaintiffs merely gesture at factual issues, leaving it to the Court to fill in the blanks. [See, e.g., Pls.' Opp'n to Millville Defs. at 13 (“There was the avoidance of examining use of force incidents as part of the MVR [mobile video recording] policy used to train and supervise its officers. There was the policy language itself.”).] Which MVR policy? What language? This familiar approach has required the Court (much like it did at the motion-to-dismiss stage) to devote substantial time to piece the factual record together from Plaintiffs' disparate and voluminous filings. (Following the Court's January 8, 2024, Text Order, the Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs' counsel submitted a table of contents, [Capps Docket No. 197], which was of some help.) In the end, rather than striking Plaintiffs' submissions, the Court undertook the laborious task of independently identifying the undisputed material facts to resolve Defendants' pending Motions. The Court recites those facts as follows:

A. Arrest of Audra Capps

On February 25, 2018, at approximately 8:22 p.m., Millville Police Department (“MPD”) Officers Orndorf and Dixon conducted a motor vehicle stop on State Highway 49 in Millville. [Dixon's SOMF in Capps ¶ 1; Millville's SOMF ¶ 1; Pls.' RSOMF ¶ 1, Capps Docket Nos. 199, 200.] Officer Dixon ordered Capps out of her vehicle on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. [Pls.' CSOMF ¶ 464.] After administering field sobriety tests, which Capps failed, Officer Dixon began placing handcuffs on Capps. [Millville's SOMF ¶¶ 2-4.] As demonstrated by the mobile video recording, Capps took a step away “so as to not be handcuffed,” and Officer Dixon immediately responded with a “takedown maneuver.” [Mobile Video Recording of Capps Arrest, Pls.' Ex. 1, Capps Docket No. 205 (Flash Drive File “VideoTS”); see also Dixon's SOMF in Capps ¶ 2; Millville's SOMF ¶¶ 5-6.] He placed his left arm around Capps' neck in a headlock position, lifted her up by the neck and head, swung her over his hip, threw her to the ground, and fell on her with all his weight. [Millville's SOMF ¶ 6; Pls.' CSOMF ¶¶ 473-74.] Officer Dixon weighed approximately 230 lbs. and stood several inches taller, at 6 feet, 1 inch. [Pls.' CSOMF ¶ 467.] At the time, Capps was 50 years old, of “slim build,” and weighed around 90 lbs. [Id.] After Officer Dixon landed on top of Capps, she stated, “I'm done” and “I think you broke my ribs.” [Id. ¶ 482.] She asked to call her husband, and she said that she could not breathe. Officer Dixon said, “if you can speak, you can breathe.” [See id. ¶ 483.] Officer Dixon's takedown maneuver and arrest took less than 30 seconds to complete. [See Pls.' Ex. 1.]

Capps also claims that Officer Orndorf placed his knee on her back while she lay face-down on the concrete as Dixon completed the arrest. [Millville's SOMF ¶ 9; Pls.' RSOMF ¶ 9.] Officer Orndorf denies that he ever knelt on Capps' back. [Millville's SOMF ¶ 12; see also Orndorf Dep. at 98:8, Millville Defs.' Ex. 44 Capps Docket No. 193-48 (“I wasn't on top of her.”).] The mobile video recording clearly shows Officer Orndorf squatting near Capps' body, but not placing his knee on her back. [Pls.' Ex. 1.] Moreover, the uncontested forensic report of Highlands Investigations & Consulting, LLC concluded that the “video evidence is inconsistent with Officer...