Caraballo v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., Inc.

178 F.Supp.2d 60

Carmen CARABALLO, Plaintiff, v. PUERTO RICO TELEPHONE, INC., Defendant.

No. 01-1003 (HL).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

December 12, 2001.

Federico Lora-Lopez, San Juan, PR, for Carmen I. Caraballo.

Gregory T. Usera-Macfarlane, Lourdes C. Hernandez-Venegas, Sara E. Colon-Acevedo, Schuster, Usera, Aguilo & Santiago, San Juan, PR, for Puerto Rico Telephone Company, Inc.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAFFITTE, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant Puerto Rico Telephone, Inc.'s, ("PRT") motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, Carmen Caraballo ("Caraballo"), was a supervisor at PRT until she was dismissed in January, 2000. Caraballo alleges that she was fired in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., for taking time off to attend to her daughter's medical needs. Caraballo also invokes the Court's supplemental jurisdiction for her Puerto Rico law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

The Court draws inferences and evaluates facts in the light most favorable to Caraballo. Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 751 (1st Cir.1995). At the time of her dismissal, Caraballo worked as a supervisor in PRT's Information Systems Department. As part of her duties, Caraballo supervised an average of eight employees. In 1997, Caraballo became pregnant with her second child. Due to some complications related to her pregnancy, Caraballo was ordered to bed rest on September 22, 1997.¹ She remained on prolonged sick leave until October 14, 1997, when she gave birth to her second daughter, Eileen.² At that point, she began her maternity leave, which lasted until December 12, 1997.³

Shortly after her birth, Eileen was diagnosed with a condition known as microcephalia and with cerebral palsy.⁴ These conditions require constant medical attention, and Eileen had to attend up to five different therapies a week.⁵ In addition, Eileen also had to attend visits with several different medical specialists.⁶ Realizing she would need to miss time from work, Caraballo, on or about January 14, 1998, contacted her immediate supervisor, Pablo Alemañy, and informed him that as appointments became necessary, she would need time to take her daughter to these appointments.⁷ On that date, Caraballo missed work to take her daughter to a doctor's appointment in preparation for an operation Eileen was to undergo the following week. In connection to that operation and subsequent complications, Caraballo was absent for the next two weeks until February 2, 1998.⁸

In the next year and a half, Caraballo took several leaves relating to her daughter's condition. When Eileen underwent a second operation, Caraballo was absent from work from March 24, 1998 until April 13, 1998.⁹ Then on September 24, 1998, Eileen was again hospitalized, and Caraballo was out until October 13, 1998.¹⁰ On January 15, 1999, Caraballo took part of the day to pre-admit Eileen to the hospital for her third operation.¹¹ She was scheduled to be out until January 25, 1999.¹² However, due to some post-operation complications, she did not return to work until February 8, 1999, and even then, only on an intermittent basis.¹³

Caraballo also missed several days due to her own medical needs. She was out a week from April 13, 1998 until April 20, 1998 due to illness.¹⁴ Then on April 5, 1999, Caraballo missed five (5) days due to a stomach flu.¹⁵ Later that month, on April 27, she was out again for several days with asthma.¹⁶ Again, on June 30, 1999, Caraballo was absent until August 3, 1999, citing back pains. Finally, Caraballo was out yet again after being ordered to rest at home, from October 27, 1999 until November 8, 1999.¹⁷

In the period between 1996 and 1999, Caraballo missed a significant number of days aside from those itemized above.¹⁸ Due to her absenteeism, Caraballo was cited with several disciplinary actions. The first of several written reprimands came as early as January 17, 1996.¹⁹ By that date, Caraballo had missed over a week of work for injuries she sustained after a fall. It is noteworthy that in this particular instance, Caraballo was out until April 10, 1996, at which time her attendance was intermittent at best until her maternity leave began on May 20, 1996.²⁰ She was out on maternity until July 5, 1996.²¹

On February 20, 1997, Caraballo received a second written warning due to excessive absences.²² She appealed to both her immediate supervisor, Alemañy, and to Jorge Marrero, the department director, who upheld the reprimand.²³ This citation, however, was later eliminated from Caraballo's record in exchange for her signature on a stipulation with PRT on March 12, 1998, in which she expressed that she would commit herself to improving her attendance record.²⁴

A few months later, on May 12, 1998, Alemañy again reprimanded Caraballo for failing to come in at the start of her shift, and for informing a subordinate rather than him, her immediate supervisor, of her absence.²⁵ Next, on August 5, 1998, Caraballo was summoned to an informal hearing to discuss a possible sanction for her excessive absenteeism.²⁶ In the summons, Alemañy outlined Caraballo's dismal attendance record for the previous few months.²⁷ As a result of the hearing, she was suspended for ten days.²⁸

On January 27, 1999, Caraballo received a third reprimand when she failed to return to work on the designated day after she took vacation time for her daughter's operation.²⁹ Caraballo again failed to contact her supervisor to explain her absence. She appealed, and Marrero again sustained the measure.³⁰ Later in the year, Caraballo received a second suspension of thirty (30) days on August 3, 1999 due to excessive absenteeism.³¹

At the conclusion of her suspension, Caraballo was to return to work on September 15, 1999.³² She did not return as scheduled, and only started back on September 27, 1998.³³ This prompted a second consecutive suspension of fifteen (15) days until October 20, 1999.³⁴ Caraballo was warned that if the absenteeism persisted, she would be terminated.³⁵ Despite this warning, once the suspension ended, Caraballo was absent one (1) day for personal reasons and eight (8) days on sick leave.³⁶ Thus, on November 8, 1999³⁷, Caraballo was suspended indefinitely from PRT, and ultimately terminated on January 13, 2000.

On January 2, 2001, Caraballo filed this suit against PRT. In her complaint, Caraballo alleges that PRT violated FMLA. However, she fails to specify exactly how PRT did so. In her complaint, Caraballo states that in taking disciplinary action against her, PRT failed to consider her accrual of sick leave and vacation time as well as the remedies provided by FMLA. From this as well as from the facts presented, it appears that Caraballo's claim is that she was terminated in violation of the FMLA because she took leave to which she was entitled under the statute in order to attend to her daughter's medical needs.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

The standard for summary judgment is straightforward and well-established. The Court shall grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining if a material fact is "genuine," the Court does not weigh the facts but, instead, ascertains whether "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; Leary, 58 F.3d at 751 (1st Cir.1995).

Once a party moves for summary judgment, it bears the initial burden. Specifically, "a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [evidence] ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 n. 22, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

Once this threshold is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmovant may not rest on mere conclusory allegations or wholesale denials. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e); Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 435 (1st Cir.1995). Instead, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Further, the nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

II. FMLA:

The Family and Medical Leave Act was enacted in an effort to help working men and women balance the often conflicting demands of work and life by recognizing that there are times in a person's life when work must yield to medical needs. Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir.1998). The act's purposes purport to "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families" and "to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons." 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) & (2). However, FMLA strives to accomplish these purposes "in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers" as well. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3).

Under its statutory scheme, FMLA creates certain substantive rights. Eligible employees are entitled to a total of twelve workweeks of unpaid leave during any twelve month period for any of the following purposes: because of the birth, adoption, or placement in foster care of a child, 29 U.S.C. § 2912(a)(1)(A) & (B); to care for a close family member with a serious health condition, 29 U.S.C. § 2912(a)...