Caraballo v. Puerto Rico

ARNOLD GIL CARABALLO, et al. Plaintiffs, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 13-1309 (DRD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

August 31, 2015

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Arnold Gil Caraballo ("Gil"), Joel Ramos Beltrán ("Ramos"), and Noel Román Ferrer ("Román") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), along with Nanette Guevara and the conjugal partnership of Gil-Guevara, filed the instant complaint against Defendants Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Commonwealth"), the Secretary of the Department of Correction and Rehabilitation José R. Negrón Fernández ("Negrón"), Captain Ramón López López ("López"), and Lieutenant David Cruz Fernández ("Cruz") (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging political discrimination. Plaintiffs bring this action under Section 1983, alleging violations under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. See Docket No. 11. Plaintiffs also seek relief under the Constitution of theCommonwealth of Puerto Rico and Puerto Rico law. Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. See Docket No. 66.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are three (3) sergeants at the Puerto Rico Department of Corrections who are also affiliated to the New Progressive Party ("NPP"). They had been assigned to the Aguadilla Detention Center for many years before they were transferred to a detention center in the west of Mayaguez. See Docket No. 51 ¶ 1-3, 6, 16, 28, 31, 38, 66, 68; Docket No. 64-1 ¶ 2-14. On February 28, 2013, all three Plaintiffs were presented with transfer letters signed by Defendant Negrón, and personally delivered by Defendant López, ordering their transfers to the Mayaguez facility.¹

On June 21, 2013, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint (Docket No. 11) claiming their transfers had no legal basis and were intentionally granted in violation of their First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs further aver that their relocation to the Mayaguez center was solely politically motivated, as a result of the new government sworn in on January 2013, subsequent to the November 2012 election that resulted in the victory of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"). Furthermore, Plaintiffs avow that, as a consequence of their transfer, they have beenassigned to work rotating shifts (as opposed to the regular schedule exerted at the Aguadilla Department of Correction) and are now incurring in additional transportation expenses. Lastly, Plaintiffs assert that their previous positions at the Aguadilla facility are now occupied by employees affiliated to the PDP.

On January 7, 2014 this Court entered an Opinion and Order (Docket No. 24) dismissing Plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, along with all claims presented by Nanette Guevara and her conjugal partnership with Gil Caraballo, and all Section 1983 claims for monetary damages against the Commonwealth and all official capacity defendants. Plaintiffs' First Amendment and substantive state law claims, both for equitable and prospective injunctive relief against the Commonwealth and the official capacity Defendants, and for compensation for damages against all Defendants in their personal capacities, were not dismissed and therefore remain viable causes of action. See Docket No. 24.

On November 14, 2014 Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 66) on all remaining claims. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination under the First Amendment. Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot prove that Defendants were aware of their political affiliation, or that their transfers from Aguadilla to the Mayaguez facility, aswell as their reassignments to rotating shifts, amount to an adverse employment action under the First Amendment. Moreover, Defendants assert that Defendant Negrón is entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, Defendants seek the dismissal of all pendant state law claims and injunctive relief.

On January 23, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. See Docket No. 64. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant López was aware of Plaintiffs' NPP political affiliations and that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants Cruz and Negrón were aware of Plaintiff's political sympathies. Moreover, they assert that Plaintiffs' transfers and assignments to rotating shifts are adverse employment actions cognizable under the First Amendment. Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that qualified immunity is not warranted in the instant case.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be entered where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-325 (1986). Pursuant to the clear language of the rule, the movingparty bears a two-fold burden: it must show that there is "no genuine issue as to any material facts;" as well as that it is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Veda-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico, 110 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 1997). A fact is "material" where it has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "genuine" where a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence. Id. Thus, it is well settled that "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id.

After the moving party meets this burden, the onus shifts to the non-moving party to show that there still exists "a trial worthy issue as to some material facts." Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular, 11 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1997).

At the summary judgment stage, the trial court examines the record "in the light most flattering to the non-movant and indulges in all reasonable references in that party's favor. Only if the record, viewed in this manner and without regard to credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact may the court enter summary judgment." Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 959-60 (1st Cir. 1997). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, notthose of a judge." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986)). Summary judgment is inappropriate where there are issues of motive and intent as related to material facts. See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 369 U.S. 470, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486 (1962)(summary judgment is to be issued "sparingly" in litigation "where motive and intent play leading roles"); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (1982)("findings as to design, motive and intent with which men act [are] peculiarly factual issues for the trier of fact."); see also Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 (1st Cir. 2000)(finding that "determinations of motive and intent . . . are questions better suited for the jury"). "As we have said many times, summary judgment is not a substitute for the trial of disputed factual issues." Rodríguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 178-179 (1st Cir. 2011)(internal quotations and citations omitted). Conversely, summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party rests solely upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences and unsupported speculation." Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir. 1996). However, while the Court "draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to [the non-moving party] . . . we will not draw unreasonable inferences or credit baldassertions, empty conclusions or rank conjecture." Vera v. McHugh, 622 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2010)(internal quotations and citation omitted). Moreover, "we afford no evidentiary weight to conclusory allegations, empty rhetoric, unsupported speculation, or evidence which, in the aggregate, is less than significantly probative." Tropigas De P.R. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 637 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2011)(internal citations omitted).

Further, the Court will not consider hearsay statements or allegations presented by parties that do not properly provide specific reference to the record. See D.P.R. CIV. R. 56(e)("The [C]ourt may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to the record material properly considered on summary judgment. The [C]ourt shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced."); see also Morales v. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir. 2001)(finding that, where a party fails to buttress factual issues with proper record citations, judgment against that party may be appropriate); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990)("Hearsay evidence, inadmissible at trial, cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.").²

If a defendant fails to file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the district court may consider the motion as unopposed and disregard any subsequently filed opposition. Velez v. Awning Windows, Inc., 375 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 2004). Furthermore, the district court must take as true any uncontested statements of fact. Id. at 41-42; see D.P.R.R. 311.12; see Morales, 246 F.3d at 33 ("This case is a lesson in summary judgment practice .... [P]arties ignore [Rule 311.12] at their own peril, and ... failure to present a statement of disputed facts, embroidered with specific citations to the record, justifies...