Carawan v. Mitchell

WILLIAM CARAWAN, JR., Plaintiff, v. FNU MITCHELL, et al., Defendants.

3:16-cv-563-FDW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION

June 20, 2018

ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants Takesha Hammond, Jerline Bennett, Darrell Mullis, Patrick Jarman, Randy Mullis, and Ruchia Tillman. (Doc. No. 38).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

Pro se Plaintiff William Carawan, a North Carolina state inmate currently incarcerated at Tabor Correctional Institution, filed this action on July 21, 2016, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. Plaintiff alleges that, between January 6, 2015, and mid-February 2015, while he was housed at Lanesboro Correctional Institution, he was not permitted to freely practice Islam and earn sentence credits for going to school when Defendants threatened him with an infraction if he missed six one-half day periods. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff further alleges that he was not allowed to pray while seated at his desk in class even though it did not cause a distraction during the class, in violation of his federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory damages. (Id.)

Defendants filed the pending summary judgment motion on March 23, 2018. (Doc. No. 38). Defendants have attached the affidavit of Defendant Takesha Hammond, with attached Exhibits A through J; the affidavit of Defendant Ruchia Tillman; and Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, attached as Exhibit 1. (Doc. No. 40).

On March 27, 2018, this Court entered an order in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the requirements for filing a response to the summary judgment motion and of the manner in which evidence could be submitted to the Court. (Doc. No. 41). Plaintiff did not respond to the summary judgment motion, and the time to do so has passed.¹ This matter is therefore ripe for disposition.

B. Factual Background

1. Plaintiff's Allegations

Plaintiff's allegations are summarized as follows:

Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights to both earn gain/earned time for going to school and freely practice Islam were denied because Defendants threatened him with an infraction if he missed six, one-half day periods. Plaintiff further alleges that religious services for Muslims at Lanesboro are one hour, from about 1:15 p.m. to 2:15 p.m., only leaving two hours for school, which Defendant Jarmon would not allow. Plaintiff further alleges that he was not allowed to pray while seated at his desk in class even though it did not cause a distraction, inviolation of his federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that these unconstitutional acts occurred between January 6, 2015, and mid-February 2015. (Doc. No. 1 at pp. 2-5).

2. Defendants' Summary Judgment Materials

Defendants' summary judgment materials include the pleadings and all attachments and the affidavit of Defendant Takesha Hammond, with attached Exhibits A through J; the affidavit of Defendant Ruchia Tillman; and Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, attached as Exhibit 1. These documents show the following events and circumstances:

Lanesboro's Standard Operating Procedures ("SOP") provide written guidance to Lanesboro administrators, chaplains, and correctional staff concerning religious practices and religious paraphernalia. First, Lanesboro's SOP titled "Chaplaincy/Religious Services" provides:

The religious program at Lanesboro Correctional Institution is designed to furnish opportunities for inmates to worship, to receive religious instruction, and to receive spiritual guidance or pastoral care. The program will seek to provide moral, spiritual and social counseling, and ministerial services to the inmates. The program will seek to help men grow into self-respecting and useful citizens. Lanesboro Correctional Institution's Chaplaincy/Religious programs will offer religious services and other opportunities on a regular basis. Religious opportunities include study sessions, regular worship services, books, literature, and a utilization of correspondence courses. As appropriate, the religious program at Lanesboro Correctional Institution will utilize community resources and volunteers to assist with religious activities.

(Doc. No. 40-1 at ¶ 6: Hammond Aff., Ex. B at p. 1). Lanesboro's SOP titled "Chaplaincy/Religious Services" further provides as follows: "Religious programs may include but are not limited to . . . Jumah prayer, Ramadan activities." (Id. at ¶ 7, Ex. B at p. 7).

Further, NCDPS Division of Prisons ("DOP") DOP Policy and Procedures, Chapter H, Section .0101(c), provides that: "[p]risons shall provide access for approved religious services orpractices and pastoral care in all prison facilities. Inmate participation shall be voluntary." (Id. at ¶ 8, Ex. C at p. 1). Section .0103(c) provides as follows:

Specific religious practices policies and procedures are detailed in the Prisons' Religious Practices Reference Manual. This manual includes a list of the current faith practices that are now officially recognized by Prisons. It also includes a brief description of the basic beliefs, authorized practices, worship procedures and authorized religious items associated with each faith.

(Id. at ¶ 9, Ex. C at p. 3). NCDPS recognizes Islam as an approved religion. (Id. at ¶ 10, Ex. D).

On October 29, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred from Warren Correctional Institution to Lanesboro. (Id. at ¶ 5, Ex. A). On August 18, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred from Lanesboro to Tabor Correctional Center. (Id.). Defendants' summary judgment materials show that Plaintiff registered to attend the Custodial Training and Environmental Services class (a full-time educational program that is eligible for an award of earned/gain time sentence credits) on January 6, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 11, Ex. E). School hours were 7:15 a.m. to 10:15 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. to 3:15 p.m. (Id. at ¶ 13). NCDPS pays the registration fee for each assigned inmate, and the classes are voluntary. (Id. at ¶ 12). No one forces an inmate to sign up for classes, but participating inmates are expected to attend the classes every day. (Id.). The School Rules and Safety Regulations provide that three unexcused absences could result in withdrawal from a class. (Id.). Inmates are told about the class schedule and any potential conflicts with the schedule before the class begins. (Doc. No. 40-2 at ¶ 6). A write-up and religious services are unexcused absences. (Id.). Plaintiff provided his signature agreeing to the rules. (Doc. No. 40-1 at ¶ 12, Ex. 7).

According to Defendants, allowing inmates in and out of class is a disruption. The rules related to religious services and unexcused absences are not intended to discriminate against Plaintiff or the Muslim inmate group. (Doc. No. 40-1 at ¶ 17). The summary judgmentmaterials show that Defendants did not threaten to put Plaintiff in segregation for trying to go to religious services from class. (Doc. No. 40-2 at ¶ 10; Ex. 1 at pp. 5, 13, 21, 29). Moreover, Plaintiff's infraction history shows he was not disciplined for any of his absences from class. (Doc. No. 40-1 at ¶ 12, Ex. G). Plaintiff's class attendance that shows Plaintiff missed the Friday afternoon class each week, which was the same time his religious service took place. (Doc. No. 40-2 at ¶ 7; Doc. No. 40-1 at ¶ 13, Ex. H). Plaintiff completed the class and was awarded sentence credits and five Merit days. (Doc. No. 40-1 at ¶¶ 14-15, Exs. I and J).

Finally, Defendants contend on summary judgment that, although Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that he was forced to miss religious services because of his class schedule, Plaintiff was not forced to do anything. (Id. at ¶ 13; Ex. 1 pp. 3, 11, 18-19, 27). Defendants Hammond and Tillman further assert in their affidavits that they did not have anything to do with how the religious services are scheduled. (Doc. No. 40-2 at ¶ 7; Doc. No. 40-1 at ¶ 13).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.

The movant has the "initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal citations omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. The nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. "'Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact...