Carbonell v. Cnty. of San Diego

SONIA INES CARBONELL, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO et al., Defendant.

Case No.: 3:17-CV-64-CAB-BLM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

November 7, 2017

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

[Doc. Nos. 16-19]

This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants TERM a/k/a Treatment and Evaluation Resource Management, Optum Health Holdings, LLC ("Optum"), Radmila West, and LeAnn Skimming (collectively, the "TERM Defendants"), and a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants the County of San Diego (the "County"), and Sara Maltzman (together, the "County Defendants").¹ The motions have been fully briefed and the Court deems them suitable for submission without oral argument. For the following reasons, the motions are granted as to Plaintiff's federal claims, and in the absence of those claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

I. Allegations in the First Amended Complaint ("FAC")

Plaintiff Sonia Ines Carbonell is a clinical and cultural psychologist who assisted "indigent, not original Spanish-speaking parents and family in dealing with the juvenile court and other legal systems in San Diego County." [Doc. No. 10 at ¶ 6.] In 2008, Carbonell contracted with Defendant Optum (formerly known as United Behavioral Health) to provide these services. [Doc. No. 10-1.] The contract stated Carbonell was an independent contractor [Doc. No. 18-2 at 8], and that Optum was acting as the administrative services organization for the County of San Diego Behavioral Health Services. [Doc. No. 10-1 at 3.] Pursuant to this contract with Optum, Carbonell would provide services to children and adults in the Child Welfare Services ("CWS") system or the Juvenile Probation Services system referred to her through TERM [Id. at 18-20; Doc. No. 10 at ¶ 7], which is a "mental health program developed under the direction of the Board of Supervisors and operated by the Health and Human Services Agency (HHSA), County of San Diego." [Doc. No. 10 at ¶ 1; Doc. No. 18-2 at 7.]

The FAC alleges that:

TERM, Optum (named Defendant doctors) and various County of San Diego agencies, including the [HHSA], [CWS], were engaged in a conspiracy to subvert psychologists retained and paid by state and federal funding to change their honest, legitimate opinions based on their training, experience, and credentials in order to a) punish families that would not believe false accusations of sexual abuse by a family member; b) provide a false cover for criminal acts also amounting to civil wrongs by County of San Diego employees, primarily social workers, but including criminally and civilly culpable foster family parents (not County of San Diego employees), every and all to the detriment of the families unfortunate to be devoured and damaged when in their clutches.

[Doc. No. 10 at ¶ 9.]

The thirty-seven page FAC frequently repeats these conclusions and asserts several others, but it alleges few facts. In general, Carbonell appears to allege that Optum terminated her contract and prohibited her from providing additional services to TERM clients because of testimony that she provided in juvenile dependency hearings thatDefendants did not like. The FAC, which Carbonell filed after her original complaint was removed from state court based on federal question jurisdiction, asserts five state law claims and three claims under federal law: (1) "Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983"; (2) "Violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"; and (3) "Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq."

The TERM Defendants now move to dismiss all claims against each TERM defendant for failure to state a claim. The County Defendants move to dismiss only the three federal claims, while separately moving to strike the state law claims.

II. Legal Standards

The familiar standards apply here. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, the Court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, the Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is the Court "required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or . . . allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

The FAC is confusing and conclusory, and because it focuses on alleged wrongdoing within the San Diego County child welfare system to the detriment of the families involved in that system, it is difficult to discern how Plaintiff was deprived of any rights providedby the Constitution or federal law or otherwise suffered an injury sufficient to give her standing to assert a federal claim. Plaintiff's opposition briefs, which consist almost entirely of block quotes pasted from cases and from the FAC with no analysis or argument specific to Plaintiff's claims, shed little light on Plaintiff's federal claims and why they should survive dismissal. As best as the Court can discern, Plaintiff claims that she was not retained as an independent contractor by Optum and has had been unable to perform work for TERM clients based on her testimony at dependency hearings. That Plaintiff's contract was terminated and/or breached is insufficient without more to establish the deprivation of a Constitutional or federal right as required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to assert a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, or to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Court declines to guess at possible factual allegations that would support these claims. The lack of clarity and absence of fact allegations in the FAC alone requires dismissal of these federal claims. Additional deficiencies specific to each claim are discussed below.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The FAC repeatedly refers to violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, "Section 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). "The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and laws.'" Baker, 443 U.S. at 140. Both motions to dismiss argue that the FAC does not allege a deprivation of any such right.²

The FAC alleges that this action is "brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover damages against defendants for violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights to engage in a state regulated profession, right to be free of retaliation for refusal to break the law, violation of her license, violation of the constitutional rights of those entrusted to her, guaranteed by the 1^st 4^th 5^th 9^th and 14^th Amendments to the United States Constitution." [Doc. No. 10 at ¶ 70.] In her opposition to the County Defendants' motion, meanwhile, Plaintiff argues that she is suing for civil rights violations committed against her. [Doc. No. 23 at 5.] In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites to allegations in the FAC that Defendants fired her in retaliation for testifying "under oath that Defendants in a civil matter were in the wrong and had pressured her to lie." [Doc. No. 10 at ¶ 14.; see also ¶¶ 28, 29.]

The FAC, however, does not allege facts that would support her conclusion that she has been deprived of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or federal law.³ Moreover, she must make allegations specific to each Defendant that would make that Defendant liable under section 1983. Further, the FAC must allege which rights were allegedly violated. Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a § 1983 claim based on violations of the rights of others. See San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 479 (9th Cir. 1998) ("With no alleged violation of their own rights and no standing to assert the rights of others, the [plaintiffs] have no claim under § 1983."); see also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) ("We have adhered to the rule that a party 'generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'") (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). Merely listing amendments to the Constitution like Plaintiff does in the FAC is not sufficient to state a section 1983 claim, even if a state actor is involved.

To the extent Plaintiff intends to allege that Defendants alleged retaliatory termination of her independent contractor agreement deprived her of a right guaranteed to her by the First Amendment, she must at least satisfy the requirements the Ninth Circuit has articulated for First Amendment retaliation cases involving public employees:

(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff's protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from other members of the general public; and (5) whether

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