Cardenas v. Rochester Reg'l Health

192 A.D.3d 1543

144 N.Y.S.3d 774

John CARDENAS, as Administrator of the Estate of Abraham E. Cardenas, Deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.ROCHESTER REGIONAL HEALTH, Unity Mental Health, Rochester General Hospital, Marc Johnson, MHC, Defendants-Appellants, et al., Defendant.

914

CA 20-00131

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Entered: March 19, 2021

HARRIS BEACH PLLC, PITTSFORD (SVETLANA K. IVY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

FITZSIMMONS, NUNN & PLUKAS, LLP, ROCHESTER (JOSEPH R. PLUKAS OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: CARNI, J.P., LINDLEY, WINSLOW, BANNISTER, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint against defendants Rochester Regional Health, Unity Mental Health, Rochester General Hospital, and Marc Johnson, MHC, is dismissed.

Memorandum: Plaintiff, as administrator of decedent's estate, commenced this medical malpractice and wrongful death action against Rochester Regional Health, Unity Mental Health (UMH), Rochester General Hospital (RGH), and Marc Johnson, MHC (collectively, defendants), among others, seeking damages for, inter alia, the negligent treatment of plaintiff's wife and failure to provide proper instruction to her family members regarding her mental health care. The complaint alleges that plaintiff's wife was hospitalized for several weeks at RGH due to her mental health status. In the days immediately following her discharge, plaintiff's wife twice treated with Johnson at UMH. Shortly after his wife's second session with Johnson, plaintiff, prompted by his wife's worsening condition, began calling UMH at various times over the course of two days seeking additional care. He was advised that his wife should keep her upcoming psychiatric appointment, which was scheduled for approximately two weeks in the future. On the evening of the second day, plaintiff's wife killed their son (decedent) with a knife.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint against them pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), contending that they bore no duty to decedent because he was not their patient. Supreme Court denied defendants’ motion. We reverse.

Whether defendants owed a duty of care to the child of their patient is an issue of law for a court to determine (see Davis v. South Nassau Communities Hosp. , 26 N.Y.3d 563, 572, 26 N.Y.S.3d 231, 46 N.E.3d 614 [2015] ; Pingtella v. Jones , 305 A.D.2d 38, 40, 758 N.Y.S.2d 717 [4th Dept. 2003], lv dismissed 100 N.Y.2d 640, 769 N.Y.S.2d 204, 801 N.E.2d 425 [2003], rearg denied 1 N.Y.3d 594, 776 N.Y.S.2d 224, 808 N.E.2d 360 [2004] ). "Foreseeability of injury does not determine the existence of duty" ( Eiseman v. State of New York , 70 N.Y.2d 175, 187, 518 N.Y.S.2d 608, 511 N.E.2d 1128 [1987] ; see Pingtella , 305 A.D.2d at 40, 758 N.Y.S.2d 717 ). Instead, "[c]ourts resolve legal duty questions by resort to common concepts of morality, logic and consideration of the social consequences of imposing the duty" ( Tenuto v. Lederle Labs., Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co. , 90 N.Y.2d 606, 612, 665 N.Y.S.2d 17, 687 N.E.2d 1300 [1997] ).

Generally, medical providers owe a duty of care only to their patients, and courts have been reluctant to expand that duty to encompass nonpatients because doing so would render such providers liable "to a prohibitive number of possible plaintiffs" ( McNulty v. City of New York , 100 N.Y.2d 227, 232, 762 N.Y.S.2d 12, 792 N.E.2d 162 [2003] ; see Pingtella , 305 A.D.2d at 41, 758 N.Y.S.2d 717 ). The scope of that duty of care has, on occasion, been expanded to include nonpatients where the defendants’ relationship to the tortfeasor " ‘place[d] [them] in the best position to protect against the risk of harm,’ " and "the balancing of factors such as the expectations of the parties and society in general, the proliferation of claims, and public policies affecting the duty proposed herein ... tilt[ed] in favor...