Carder v. Lamb

HOLMES, MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

MEMORANDUM

WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff James Stephen Carder, #553468, an inmate of the Hardeman County Correctional Facility in Whiteville, Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Billy Lamb, Sabrina Patterson, Richard Phillips, Devon l/n/u, Manco l/n/u, Ramirez l/n/u, and Colten l/n/u, alleging violations of Plaintiff's civil and constitutional rights that occurred while Plaintiff was in the custody of the Marshall County Jail in Lewisburg, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 1).

The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

I. PLRA SCREENING STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, ” id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).

The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838 F.3d 736, 739 (6^th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6^th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)). Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts' “duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).

II. SECTION 1983 STANDARD

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6^th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6^th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

III. ALLEGED FACTS

The complaint alleges that, from September 2019 until Plaintiff's transfer to another facility, staff at the Marshall County Jail used an unspecified chemical spray “on inmates, ” on their mats and linens, and on inmate masks as a state-mandated COVID-19 precaution.^[1] (Doc. No. 1 at 11, 12).

Plaintiff was in the custody of the Marshall County Jail during this time. On June 15, 2020, Plaintiff first had the ability to read the label on the spray. (Id. at 6). The label indicated the spray's toxicity to humans and, in Plaintiff's opinion, “explained [Plaintiff's] breathing problems as well as [his] eyesight being affected.” (Id.) Plaintiff also had developed a painful rash on his neck and back since the spraying began.

Plaintiff told Officers Ramirez, Colton, and Marco about his concerns regarding the spray. Ramirez and Marco “expressed reluctance in continued sprayed and agreed it should not be continued with this particular chemical but was told to proceed and make inmates have matts [sic] sprayed.” (Id. at 32). The officers relayed Plaintiff's concerns about the spray to Defendant Patterson. Plaintiff also wrote numerous grievances about this issue.

Plaintiff asked on six occasions to see an eye doctor “and was told that the jail did not pay for [an] eye doctor and family would have to pay for it.” (Id. at 6).

Each named Defendant continued to spray the offending product even after Plaintiff expressed his concerns and explained his health conditions. Plaintiff's eyesight has deteriorated since Defendants' use of the spray. Plaintiff must use glasses to see anything within four feet of him. Plaintiff since has been transferred to the Hardeman County Correctional Complex.

IV. ANALYSIS

The complaint names as Defendants the following: Billy Lamb, Marshall County Sheriff; Sabrina Patterson, Marshall County Jail Administrator; Richard Phillips, Assistant Administrator; Devon l/n/u, Corrections Officer; Marco l/n/u, Corrections Officer; Ramirez l/n/u, Corrections Officer; and Colten l/n/u, Corrections Officer. Each Defendant is sued in his or her individual and

official capacities. The complaint alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 3).^[2]

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

To satisfy an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that he is incarcerated under conditions that exposed him to a substantial risk of serious harm. Miller v. Calhoun Cnty, 408 F.3d 803, 821 (6th Cir. 2005). A constitutional violation only arises when the deprivation is objectively sufficiently serious. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (2013). Only deprivations denying “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” are sufficiently grave enough to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. Subjectively, deliberate indifference entails conduct that “amounted to more than ordinary negligence or medical malpractice.” Atkins v. Parker, No. 19-6243, 972 F.3d 734, 739 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)). It has been described as “something approaching a total unconcern for [the inmate's] welfare in the face of serious risks, or a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent harm.” Slone v. Lincoln Cnty., Ky., 242 F.Supp.3d 579, 591 (E.D. Ky. 2017) (quoting Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992)).

A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with “deliberate indifference” to an inmate's health or safety only if that official knows that the inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent it. Wilson, 501 U.S. 294, 298

1. Chemical Spraying

The complaint alleges that each Defendant sprayed Plaintiff or Plaintiff's personal belongings with a toxic chemical that caused Plaintiff to develop a rash and experience a significant decline in his eyesight. This allegation satisfies the objective component of an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.^[3]

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff personally notified Sheriff Lamb and Officers Ramirez, Colton, and Marco about the dangers of the chemical spray and asked the officers to notify Defendant Patterson of the same. According to the complaint, Officers Ramirez and Marco subsequently expressed their desire to discontinue the spraying, unspecified superiors told the Officers to continue, and the Officers continued using the spray even after being made aware of the risk of harm to Plaintiff. The complaint also alleges that Defendants Patterson and Lamb continued to spray Plaintiff and his belongings after having been notified of Plaintiff's health and safety concerns. The complaint does not include any allegations as to the states of mind of the other named Defendants. The Court finds that the complaint sufficiently alleges that, although

Defendants Ramirez, Colton, Marco, Lamb, and Patterson knew that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm if they continued to use the chemical spray, these Defendants disregarded that risk, causing additional harm to Plaintiff.

Thus, for purposes of the required PLRA screening, the Court finds that the complaint states colorable Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims under Section 1983 against Defendants Ramirez, Colton, Marco, Lamb, and Patterson in their individual capacities based on their continued spraying of the chemical on Plaintiff and his belongings even after being made aware of the dangers of the chemical and the negative health effects Plaintiff was experiencing. As to the other named Defendants, the complaint does not allege that those Defendants acted with deliberate indifference regarding the chemical spray. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against these Defendants, therefore, will be dismissed without prejudice.

As noted above, the complaint also names all Defendants in their official capacities. When a defendant is sued in his or her official capacity as an employee of the government, the lawsuit is directed against “the entity for which the officer is an agent.” Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 657 (6th Cir. 1993). Here, Defendants are employees of Marshall County, Tennessee. A claim of governmental liability requires a showing that the alleged misconduct is the result of a policy, statement, regulation, decision or custom promulgated by Marshall County or its agent. Monell Dep't of Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978). In short, for Marshall County to be liable to Plaintiff under Section 1983, there must be a direct causal link between an official policy or custom and the alleged violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Burgess v. Fisher, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693 (1978)); Regets v. City of Plymouth, 568 Fed.Appx. 380, 2014 WL 2596562, at *12...