Carey v. AB Car Rental Servs., Inc.

DAWN CAREY, Plaintiff, v. AB CAR RENTAL SERVICES, INC; AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL, LLC;and AVIS BUDGET GROUP, INC., Defendants.

Docket no. 1:20-cv-00117-GZS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

February 8, 2021

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

Before the Court are two motions: (1) the Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Disability Discrimination Claims by Defendants AB Car Rental Services, Inc., Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC, and Avis Budget Group, Inc. (hereinafter, "Avis") (ECF No. 12); and (2) the Motion to Amend First Amended Complaint by Plaintiff Dawn Carey (ECF No. 26). Having reviewed the Motions, the related memoranda filed by both parties (ECF Nos. 15, 18, 28), and supplemental briefing previously ordered (ECF Nos. 24 & 25), the Court first GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (ECF No. 26) and then GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June 2020, Defendants filed the pending Partial Motion to Dismiss, which sought dismissal of Plaintiff's associational disability discrimination claims under both the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Maine Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), 5 M.R.S.A. § 4571 et seq. Defendants asserted that Plaintiff had failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies as to these claims. In October 2020, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on the following two questions related to this Motion:

1. On the record presented, where it appears that the Maine Human Rights Commission denied Plaintiff's request to amend her administrative complaint to add the associational disability claim as untimely, should Plaintiff's associational disability claim be deemed dismissed under 5 M.R.S.A. § 4612(2-A)?

2. In light of the 2019 Amendments [to the MHRA], does failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies bar a plaintiff from recovering attorney's fees, civil penal damages, or compensatory and punitive damages under 5 M.R.S.A. § 4622?

(10/27/20 Order (ECF No. 19).) In connection with the supplemental briefing, Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint "to ensure all possible conditions precedent are alleged to have been met in light of the briefing following th[e] Court's Order Directing Supplemental Briefing." (Pl. Mot. to Amend (ECF No. 26), PageID #s 243-44.)

II. MOTION TO AMEND

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 specifies that, with exceptions not relevant here, a party may amend her complaint only by leave of court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Such leave will be freely given "when justice so requires," id., but the Court also has "discretion to deny such a request for reasons including undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, undue prejudice, or futility of amendment," Keach v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. (In re Montreal, Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd.), 888 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26-1) seeks to add the following language: "All preconditions precedent required to obtain the relief listed in 5 M.R.S.A. § 4622(1) and for EEOC administrative exhaustion have been performed or have occurred." (Pl. Mot. to Amend, PageID # 243; 2d Am. Compl., PageID # 248.)¹ Defendants argue that theamendment would be futile since it primarily relates to Plaintiff's associational disability claims, referencing their pending arguments that those claims should be dismissed.

While the Court appreciates Defendants' futility argument, the Court discerns no reason to deny Plaintiff's current request to amend her complaint. See United States ex. rel. Kelly v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 827 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 2016). Rather, in its discretion, the Court determines that it is appropriate and in the best interest of judicial economy to accept the Second Amended Complaint as the operative pleading and to determine whether Plaintiff has failed to state an associational disability discrimination claim accordingly, especially considering that the analysis for futility of a proposed amendment is the same as the general analysis on a motion to dismiss. See Adorno v. Crowley Towing and Transp. Co., 443 F.3d 122, 126 (1st Cir. 2006) ("In assessing futility, the district court must apply the standard which applies to motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).") The Court notes that Defendants will not be unduly prejudiced by this approach as the amendments do not substantively change the nature of the claims. The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and proceeds to consider the pending Partial Motion to Dismiss with the Second Amended Complaint as the operative pleading.

III. PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter "to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "In evaluating whether a complaint states a plausible claim, [the court] 'perform[s] [a] two-step analysis.'" Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Cardigan Mountain Sch. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015)). First, "the court must separate the complaint's factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusorylegal allegations (which need not be credited)." Morales-Cruz v. University of Puerto Rico, 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Second, the court "must determine whether the 'factual content . . . allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). "This standard is 'not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.'" Saldivar, 818 F.3d at 18 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

"Although evaluating the plausibility of a legal claim requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense, the court may not disregard properly pled factual allegations, even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable." Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Rather, "[t]he relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of liability" from the facts. Id. at 13.

While a "motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) generally provides no occasion upon which to consider documents other than the complaint," Doe v. Pawtucket Sch. Dep't, 969 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2020), the Court "may make narrow exceptions for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs' claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint," Flores v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., 886 F.3d 160, 167 (1st Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, each party has tacitly consented to the review of the other's exhibits without converting the motion to one for summary judgment, provided that its own exhibits are considered. Additionally, neither party disputes the authenticity of the other's exhibits. Thus, the Court reviews all of the exhibits (ECF Nos. 12-1-12-7, 15-1-15-17 & 25-1), together with Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, without converting the motion.

B. Factual Background

In February 2018, Carey, who was then 61 years old, applied for a full-time Rental Sales Associate position with Avis at their Bangor airport facility. (2d Am. Compl. (ECF No. 26-1), PageID #s 248-50.) During her interview with the location's manager, Carey revealed that her spouse had Lyme Disease; that he would be leaving his job because of it; and that she was seeking a job that offered full benefits to replace his health insurance.

In March 2018, Avis offered Carey a position that did not include benefits, but it indicated that benefits could potentially become available at a later date. At roughly the same time, Avis offered a full-benefit position to a 20-year-old candidate. Carey resigned on April 11, 2018, when Avis still had neither provided full benefits nor indicated a date upon which benefits would begin.

In August 2018, Carey filed a pro se administrative complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission ("MHRC"), opting to also dual-file with the EEOC. (Def. Ex. A (ECF No. 12-2), PageID # 96.) In this complaint, Carey checked boxes to indicate that she had been discriminated against on the bases of age and religion.² As relevant here, she wrote that she believed she "was discriminated against based on [her] age because [she] had years of customer service experience and was totally honest about [her] intentions and need of full-time employment." (Id.) She further asserted that she was compelled to resign because she was not given a date by which benefits would be offered. Carey's complaint referenced neither her spouse nor his condition. Upon receipt of the complaint, the EEOC provided Carey notice that it would be investigating discrimination under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). (Id., PageID # 100.)

Between August and December 2018, Avis submitted to the MHRC a response to the complaint. In December 2018, Carey submitted a rebuttal to that response in which, as relevant here, she made the following statements:

In February, I interviewed with Brett and his supervisor, Ashley. He asked if I were interested in part-time or full-time employment. I specifically told him full-time as I was in need of full-time benefits. My husband would soon be leaving his job due to his d[e]bilitating battle with Lyme disease. Brett said that was great because that's what he was looking for. He asked Ashley to explain the wonderful health benefits that she and her wife received from ABG. I was excited about the benefits but a bit disappointed with the pay

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