Carlson v. Wiggins

675 F.3d 1134

Steven CARLSON; Mary Granzow; Richard Kettells; William Ramsey, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.Justice David WIGGINS, in his official capacity as Chairman of the State Judicial Nominating Commission; Jean Dickson; Steven J. Pace; Beth Walker; Amy J. Skogerson; Joseph L. Fitzgibbons; Guy R. Cook; H. Daniel Holm, Jr., in their official capacities as Elective Members of the State Judicial Nominating Commission; Margaret G. Redenbaugh; Coleen A. Denefe; Mary Beth Lawler; Madalin A. Williams; David C. Cochran; Steve Brody; Timothy L. Mikkelsen, in their official capacities as Appointive members of the State Judicial Nominating Commission; David K. Boyd, in his official capacity as State Court Administrator, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 11–1374.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 20, 2011.Filed: April 9, 2012.

James Bopp Jr., argued, Josiah Neeley, Joseph Adrian Vanderhulst, on the brief, Terre Haute, IN, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Mark E. Schantz, Solicitor General, argued, Meghan Gavin, AAG, on the brief, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Steven Carlson, Mary Granzow, Richard Kettells, and William Ramsey (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint and moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, alleging section 16, article V, of the Iowa Constitution, as implemented by Iowa Code sections 46.2, 46.4–46.10, and 46.14, violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the laws. The district court ¹ denied Plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order and scheduled the matter for a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion. The State moved to dismiss, arguing Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. After a hearing, the district court granted the State's motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1962, the people of Iowa voted to amend the Iowa Constitution and replace Iowa's elective judicial system with a merit selection system. Under this selection system, whenever a vacancy arises on the Iowa Supreme Court or the Iowa Court of Appeals, the State Judicial Nominating Commission (“Commission”) must accept applications to fill the vacancy. See Iowa Const., art. V, §§ 15, 16. After reviewing all applications, the Commission creates a list of three nominees to submit to the Governor. See id.; see also Iowa Code §§ 46.14 and 46.14A. The Governor is to appoint one of the three nominees to fill the vacancy. See Iowa Const., art. V, § 15. If the Governor fails to make an appointment within thirty days of receiving the nominations, the judicial appointment is to be made by the Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court. See id.; see also Iowa Code § 46.15.

After serving for one year, the newly appointed judge must stand for retention in the next judicial election. See Iowa Const., art. V, § 17 (explaining “[j]udges shall serve for one year after appointment and until the first day of January following the next judicial elections after the expiration of such year”); see also Iowa Code § 46.16(1)(a). In a retention election, the people of Iowa vote “yes” or “no” on whether to retain the judge in office. See Iowa Const., art. V, § 17. If a majority of Iowa voters elect to retain the judge, the judge may then serve the remainder of his or her full term, as proscribed by the Iowa Constitution. See id.; see also Iowa Code § 46.16(1)(b) (providing “[t]he regular term of office of judges of the supreme court retained at a judicial election shall be eight years, and of judges of the court of appeals ... shall be six years”). At the end of this term, the judge must again stand for retention.

The Commission currently consists of fifteen members. In accordance with the Iowa Constitution, seven of the fifteen members are “electors of the state” appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the state senate (“appointive members”); seven are attorneys elected by the resident members of the Iowa State Bar (“attorney members”); and the final member, who also serves as the chair of the Commission, is “[t]he judge of the [Iowa] [S]upreme [C]ourt who is senior in length of service on said court, other than the chief justice.” Iowa Const., art. V, § 16. Members of the Commission serve for six years and are ineligible for a second term. Id. During their six-year term, the members may not hold any office of profit of the United States or the State of Iowa. Id.

On November 2, 2010, three Iowa Supreme Court justices stood for retention. A majority of Iowa voters elected not to retain them, leaving three vacancies on the Iowa Supreme Court as of January 1, 2011. On December 8, 2010, Plaintiffs, all registered voters in the State of Iowa, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against all fifteen members of the Commission and David K. Boyd, in his official capacity as the State Court Administrator. Specifically, Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the ongoing process to fill the three judicial vacancies on the Iowa Supreme Court. In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged Iowa's method of electing the attorney members of the Commission denies Plaintiffs the right to equal participation in the selection of judges to the Iowa Supreme Court and the Iowa Court of Appeals, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Complaint, at ¶ 3. On December 13, 2010, the district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for temporary retraining order and scheduled a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion. Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss, asserting Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

On January 6, 2011, the district court held a consolidated hearing on Plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction and Defendants' motion to dismiss. In a written memorandum opinion and order, the district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and denied Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion as moot. The district court explained the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee Plaintiffs a fundamental right to vote for the attorney members of the Commission. Therefore, the court concluded, the challenged provisions do not require strict scrutiny, but are only subject to rational basis review.

In the alternative, the district court stated rational basis review was nonetheless warranted due to the nature of the election at issue. The court rejected Plaintiffs' argument the election for the Commission's attorney members is an election of general interest, subject to strict scrutiny, noting an election of general interest involves entities with traditional government powers over an entire geographic area. The Commission is not such an entity, the court determined. First, the Commission's functions are rather limited in that the Commission “simply ‘selects and forwards to the Governor the names of three applicants it deems best qualified’ for each vacant position” on the Iowa Supreme Court and the Iowa Court of Appeals. Carlson v. Wiggins, 760 F.Supp.2d 811, 828 (S.D.Iowa 2011) (quoting Dool v. Burke, 2010 WL 4568993, at *3 (D.Kan. Nov. 3, 2010) (slip copy)). Second, the Commission's activities do not “have sufficient impact” on the daily lives of all Iowans. Instead, they impact a definable group of constituents—the members of the Iowa Bar—more than others. Based on the Commission's narrow functions and its disproportionate effect on a definable group of constituents, the court determined the election of the attorney members of the Commission is a special interest election to which rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, applies. Applying rational basis review, the district court concluded the election of the attorney members of the Commission by and from members of the Iowa Bar is rationally related to Iowa's legitimate interests, including the interest of selecting well-qualified judges and having the views of the attorneys of Iowa represented on the Commission.

On appeal, Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim on the ground Iowa's method of electing the Commission's attorney members does not violate Plaintiffs' rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs further argue the district court erred in concluding the election for the attorney members of the Commission is an election of special interest, subject to rational basis review. Contending the election is one of general interest, Plaintiffs claim the district court was required to apply strict scrutiny to Iowa's system of allowing only members of the Iowa Bar to participate in the election of the attorney members of the Commission. Because this “occupation-based” voter qualification cannot withstand strict scrutiny, Plaintiffs urge us to declare Iowa's method for electing the attorney members of the Commission unconstitutional.

II. DISCUSSION

“We review de novo the district court's dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198, 1203 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting O'Neil v. Simplicity, Inc., 574 F.3d 501, 503 (8th Cir.2009)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (providing dismissal is proper when the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)...