Carmichael v. Chappius

BRIAN CARMICHAEL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SUPERINTENDENT PAUL J. CHAPPIUS, JR., ELMIRA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 18-3010-pr

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

April 28, 2020

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 28^th day of April, two thousand twenty.

PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges.

FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT:

JOSEPH M. NURSEY (Christina Swarns, on the brief), Office of the Appellate Defender, New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLEE:

DEBORAH L. MORSE, Assistant District Attorney (Christopher P. Marinelli, Assistant District Attorney, on the brief), for Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney for New York County, New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Katherine Polk Failla, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Petitioner-Appellant Brian Carmichael appeals from a judgment of the district court (Katherine Polk Failla, Judge) denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for relief from his New York state convictions for second-degree sale of a controlled substance. Carmichael claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney inadequately challenged the prosecution's striking of African-American jurors during voir dire. The district court denied the petition, holding that the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), when it determined that counsel's allegedly deficient performance did not result in actual prejudice. The districtcourt further held that "[c]ounsel's alleged failure to craft more comprehensive challenges for his Batson[ v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),] claims [did] not rise to the level of deficient performance under Strickland." Carmichael v. Chappius, 340 F. Supp. 3d 340, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). The district court subsequently granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: whether (1) "there was a reasonable basis for the state court's analysis that Batson errors are not structural," and (2) "trial counsel's failure to present available arguments that the prosecution was striking [b]lack prospective jurors based upon their race did not constitute ineffective assistance under Strickland's performance prong." Joint App'x at 10. Because we determine that counsel's performance in raising his Batson challenges was not deficient under Strickland's first prong, we affirm without addressing Strickland's prejudice prong and whether there was a reasonable basis for the state court's analysis that Batson errors are not structural.

Our previous opinion in this case provides a thorough review of the relevant facts and procedural history. See Carmichael v. Chappius, 848 F.3d 536, 540-43 (2d Cir. 2017). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.

I. Applicable Legal Framework

A. Review of State Court Decisions Under the AEDPA

"We review de novo a district court's denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Dixon v. Miller, 293 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 2002). Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "AEDPA"), a federal court cannot grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on a claim that was "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court decision is "contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," when "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (first alteration in original). An "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent, on the other hand, occurs when a state court "identifies the correctgoverning legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413.

This is a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

To merit federal habeas relief under the "unreasonable application" prong of § 2254(d)(1), a petitioner "must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103. Consequently, a federal court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 411.

B. Strickland Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

In Strickland, the Supreme Court established a two-prong test for evaluating Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See 466 U.S. at 669. First, a defendant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient - "that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. Second, a defendant must establish that counsel's deficient performance resulted in actual prejudice by showing "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance" under the first prong "must be highly deferential" and include "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. A court must make allowances for counsel's strategic choices and apply "a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Id. at 691.

A court has flexibility in how it decides a claim of ineffective assistance. "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Id. at 697.Consequently, if a defendant does not successfully establish either the performance prong or the prejudice prong, the ineffective assistance claim fails, and the remaining prong becomes moot. See id.

C. Review of Strickland Claims Under the AEDPA

Both Strickland and the AEDPA require highly deferential standards of review. Accordingly, "[e]stablishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult." Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. "The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant petitioning for federal habeas relief must show, not that the state court applied Strickland incorrectly, but that the state court applied Strickland "in an objectively unreasonable manner." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002). "The Strickland standard is rigorous, and the great majority of habeas petitions that allege constitutionally ineffective counsel founder on that standard." Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2001).

II. Discussion

Carmichael maintains that his "[t]rial counsel was unknowledgeable on the applicable law on making a prima facie showing of discrimination under Batson's first stage," and therefore that he made deficient Batson challenges when he proffered only statistical data as support. Carmichael's Br. at 34. He asserts that supplemental information should have been readily apparent to counsel - namely, "the fact that four of the six African-American prospective jurors stricken by the prosecution had 'pro-prosecution backgrounds'" - and that had counsel included that additional information, his prima facie showing would have been "virtually unassailable." Id. at 27. Moreover, Carmichael asserts that "[d]espite the trial court telling counsel that he was doing it wrong, counsel persisted in his ineffective representation," providing nothing "more than just statistics . . . to establish the prima facie case." Id. at 23. These purported errors, Carmichael maintains, "cannot be explained convincingly...